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INTRODUCTION
The theoretical perspective one adopts helps
is

even more true when, as typically

case, the perspective one adopts

is

shared by those others with

one habitually interacts.

To some degree,

perspective can sustain patterns of

life that

provide or inhibit, and the lives we
condition of

women

in

is

And

are incomplete.

we

live, applies

general

this

hold, the possibilities they

with particular force to the

contemporary society.

The vocabulary one adopts,
which one

whom

then, an inadequate theoretical

point about the connection between the theories

to

and/or limit

— and this

possibilities about one's life
is the

to construct

committed.

This

in part, reflects the theoretical perspective

is true of the

and the vocabularies of the social sciences.

vocabulary typically applied

to

In

women assumes

security, order, passive contentment.

Woman

vocabularies in ordinary

life

contemporary society the
that she has a special need for

is

described as

".

.

.

gentle,

naive, simplistic,
loving, unaggressive, tender, modest, giving, patient,
ir rational, instinctual, intuitive,

home -cente red.

When drawn

together in a

(Boston: New England
^)ana Densmore, "Sex Roles and Female Oppression,"
Elizabeth Douvan, in
Vroe Press n. d. p. 5. Also Judith Bardwick and
Gornick and Barbara
"Ambivalence: The Socialization of Women, " in Vivian
Basic Books, 1971), list
Moran eds. Women in Sexi^
dependence, passivity,
women: ".
the often quoted adjectives used to describe
,

,

^

.

.

non-competitiveness, inner
low pain tolerance, non-aggression,
empathy, sensitivity, nurturance,
orientation, interpersonal orientation,
fragility,

receptivity, inability to risk, emotional
subjectivity, intuitiveness, yieldingness,
liability, supportiveness. " (p. 147.)

vii

these terms

list,

many

seem

superficial ^nd trivial;

actually hold the views about

indeed,

I

women which

this vocabulary implies.

it

was enunciated by Emile Durkheim.

that while this perspective does express widely held views about the needs

and limits of

human

women

in

potentialities in

contemporary society,

precludes the consideration of

it

women.

Other vocabularies are today sometimes applied

more

often to

men; and these other vocabularies too

to

persons

— perhaps

reflect different theoretical

orientations.

Bypassing here those which reflect Hobbesian and Freudian

perspectives,

I

My

But

will argue, this vocabulary reflects a well articulated theoretical

perspective —the theory of anomie as

And

hardly seems possible that

it

will juxtapose the theory of

overriding purpose will be to ask how

anomie

woman

is

to the

theory of alienation.

viewed from within the confines

of each, and the consequence these conceptions have for conceiving of

persons

.

I

will then present a set of considerations designed to

show

alienation perspective is, on the whole, and on balance, the richer
for understanding

women and

Women

condition.

women

as

that the

framework

for forging a response to their circumscribed

need an ideology and the alienation perspective provides the

appropriate and correct starting point for that ideology.

My

task is

made somewhat more

difficult

social scientists have tacitly converted what

by the fact that

many contemporary

was classically a dispute

of

consequence between well articulated theoretical perspectives dealing with
differential

assessments about human capacities

into a

muddle

of

common

called the "alienation-anomie" syndrome. Typically, the theories of

views

Marx and

viii

Durkheim are stripped

of the concerns

which sharpened their theoretical debate

and the social scientists in question then adopt without argument, the more
conservative side of Durkheim's theory.
using the language of alienation.

My

Sometimes, indeed, they do

decision to examine the theories of

Durkheim and Marx directly and comparatively flows from my view
the best

in

way

to

come

this while

to grips with the underlying issues of

human

that this is

potentiality

complex, modern societies.
I

will begin, then, with an examination of

Durkheim's theory of the moral

order, drawing attention where pertinent, to the differences he sees between
the actual and possible life styles of

snme issues

in the

men

and women.

I

will then consider these

writings of Marx, exploring especially his theory of the

"species life."
Since the differences between

Marx and Durkheim

differences in the model of "person" development assumed,

chapter to an examination of this difficult issue.

seek to vindicate their models of development?
scientists face these questions?

theory of

human "needs"

How

should

we

How

some

turn to

did

I

extent on

devote the third

Marx and Durkheim

How

do contemporary social

face

them?

in this context, asking to

I

what extent

will discuss the

it

provides an

adequate basis for judgments of this sort.
I

women

will then apply the results of this exploration to the understanding of

in

contemporary society, arguing

more generally

that though the

anomie paradigm

applied to the condition of women, the alienation model is

appropriate and fruitful.

It

is

more

reveals hidden sources of discontentment and anger;

ix

it

exposes new prospects for growth and development;

more conscious

of the extent to

circumscribe the

life of

the

it

renders

its

proponents

which established vocabulary and theories

contemporary woman.

CHAPTER

I

EMILE DURKHEIM: PRIORITIES OF THE MORAL ORDER

Everything which is a source of solidarity
is moral, everything which forces man to take
account of other men is moral.
.

.

Emile Durkheim
Being a more instinctive creature than man,
has only to follow her instincts to
find calmness and peace.
Emile Durkheim

woman

Durkheim' s conception of the individual and the relationship existing

between the individual and society
societal organization.

is at the root of his

The condition

varied relationships which

man can

of the

theory of morality and

moral order, and of anomie, express

experience in society.

The pivotal position

and significance of the moral order, anomie and conceptions of the individual,
in

Durkheim' s theory may be clarified by a thorough explication of his views

"man's

'needs'. "

It

is

hoped, that through these discussions, one can begin to

construct a viable idea of a "preferred person" within Durkheim' s thought.
ideal of a

person expresses a sense

Marx's view

of the

of

person

of priority for the

in "species life" will

"moral"

be examined in

life.

The

Later,

light of

Durkheim's

treatment of the moral order.

Such an analysis of the individual

in society, the

moral order, Durkheim's

his treatment
statements on needs, his conception of the moral person as well as

2
of

women, are

all

necessary

if

one is going to try to assess the theory of anomie

as a valid statement of societal problems and examine

it

as a theoretical

vehicle for understanding the person in contemporary society.

The "Individual and
With conceptions

'Society' "

of the individual (most often referred to as views of

nature) at the root of political theory,

it

seems most appropriate

an examination of Durkheim's picture of the individual.
about his conceptual treatment of

"man

Not

human

to begin with

until one is clear

in 'society' " can one understand his

Students of Durkheim have written that he maintains that the

broader theory.

individual is a "social being for

whom

the society of other persons is a necessary

and natural environment.""'' In support of this view, although somewhat refined,

Durkheim

states in his Rules of Sociological

Method

:

has not been proved at all that the tendency to gregariousness
has been an inherited instinct of the human species from its
beginnings. It is much more natural to consider it a product of
social life, which was slowly developed within us; for it is a fact
of observation that animals are or are not gregarious according
It

to

whether their habits oblige them

avoid

However, even

common

this

example may express a tension

some

in

,

or to

Durkheim's thought

level as instinctual behavior

(New York: Russell &

Harry Alpert. Emile Durkheim and His Sociology .

Russell Inc.

life

it.

[since] gregariousness is often treated on

^

to live a

2

1961), p. 137.

^Emile Durkheim, The Rules of Sociological Method
(New York: Free Press, 1938), p. 107.

,

ed.

,

George

Catlin,

"

.

3

necessary

to survival rather than as a socially

between the "natural" as opposed

Durkheim's discussions

at the

to the "sociological"

is social

This

is not to

This tension

reappears throughout

of egoistic tendencies and the theory of

as his treatment of women.

perspective which

learned phenomena.

anomie, as well

deny the major thrust of Durkheim's

as well as historical,"^ but to note a serious problem

base of his thought.

According

to

Durkheim, often times psychological states which are the

consequence of social phenomena are designated mistakenly as determining
social

phenomena.

Thus a certain religious sentiment has been considered innate
in man, a certain minimum of sexual jealousy, filial piety,
paternal love, etc. And it is by these that religion, marriage,
and the family have been explained. ^
History has shown Durkheim believes, that these are not inherent in the essence

The tendencies noted above may even be lacking altogether.

of tnan.

sentiments then, result from the collective organization and are not

And

to the extent particular

tendencies derive from the society

does not remain constant throughout history;
'

it

is

".

.

"These
its

.

basis. "^

his nature

modified with societies.

For instance, Durkheim's treatment of suicide

is social

6

and historical.

He

notes the causes of suicide as particular to specific societal arrangements as well
as studies them historically in terms of the different stages of development in
society. See, Emile Durkheim, Suicide, (New York: Free Press, 1951).
^
Ibid

.

,

p. 107.

'^Ibid

^Emile Durkheim, The Division
1933), p. 403.

of Laboj^in^Societ;^,

(New York:

Free Press,

4

Durkheim's societal and historical view

of

man's essence encompasses

the idea of potentiality.

To say

that innate characteristics are for the

most part very
general, is to say that they are very malleable, very flexible,
since they can assume very different forms .
potentialities
constitute man.
.

However, the potential which Durkheim appears
is that of

man's potential

to

become

to

be the most preoccupied with

self-seeking, or egoistic.

discuss this dimension of Durkheim's thought because he

here from the innate drive theory of Hobbes or Freud.
be as clear as one might like
societally initiated (e.g.

,

it

.

to be.

is to

It is

important to

be distinguished

But the distinction cannot

Sometimes he discusses

egoistic drives as

as a result of an unregulated economy) but other times

he treats them as though they are imiversal qualities regardless of time or place.

The discussion
it

of egoistic inclinations in

reflects upon the larger

The

is

is of

of the relationship

key importance because

between man and society.

individual is seen in this sphere as a bundle of passions in need of

constraining forces.

man

problem

Durkheim

"In neither the organic nor the psychological constitution of

anything to be found which sets a boundary to such propensities."

specific egoistic tendency dealt with by
in relation to the industrialized

set up because

"human nature

Durkheim

economic society.

is substantially the

"^Emile Durkheim, Education and Sociology

,

is

greed, and this is discussed

Curbs and controls are

same among

all

(Glencoe Illinois:

men

^Emile Durkheim, "OnAnomie," in C. W. Mills, ed.
(New York: George Braziller Inc. 1960), p. 450.

,

Images

to

be

in its

Free Press,

1965), p. 84.

,

The

of

M^,

essential qualities.

It is

not

human nature which can assign

the variable limits

necessary to our needs.
So far

it

has been stated that Durkheim conceives of

man

as primarily

social and historical and therefore flexible and changing; although

egoistic tendencies.

man

of

man

is

essentially in society and not what he is in

some inherent make-up.

is social

But

I

see a serious tension in the view that

and historical which underlines Durkheim's theory, and his view

of the underlying constancy of

man

as egoistic and self-interested.

Durkheim

constructs the view that order and constraint are necessary to social
this

view of

does have

Basically when Durkheim speaks of "man's nature," he

says he means by this what

terms

man

man

as plagued by self-seeking tendencies.

I

from

life

feel uneasy, therefore,

with the privileged status extended the necessity of social constraint.

The

necessity for constraint becomes a "constant" in Durkheim, as will be seen wherf
the ideal of the
flexible need,

There

is

modified

moral order

is

analyzed.

One rather expects him

to treat

a serious tension between saying that the individual unfolds and
in society

which implies a

almost devoid of social impact.

flexibility to

man

is

and on the other hand
of the individual,

The tension derives from whether man as

egoistic, viewed as a bundle of passions, is a social

phenomena or whether

inherent in man's nature.

John Horton explains the relationship
cit.

,

as a

which would be consistent with a social and historical framework.

assuming egoistic tendencies as a dominant characteristic

^Op.

it

Durkheim, The Division

of

of the individual

Labor

and society

in Society , p. 247.

in

it is

6

Durkheim's thought as homo duplex; "£art egoistic, anarchistic and
£art moral in so far as he
neat distinction aids us

regulated and constrained by society.

is

finding out

little in

where the

self seeking,

"''"^

But this

lines are to be drawn.

Durkheim's division, though murky, between the socially developed, and innate
characteristics, appears somewhat mechanical in relation to his statement of

man.

social

For example, Durkheim does discuss

in his

and Civic Morals innate characteristics of the individual.

Professional Ethics
"It is

unreasonable

and contrary to the character of manldnd that things should not be taken possession
of.

"^^

Marshall Clinard writing on Durkheim states

man

one of the innate desires of

On
like

the other hand, often

or egoistic behavior,

words,

it

is the society

it

"Durkheim considered

be ambition to achieve unattainable objectives."

when Durkheim speaks

is related to the

of the

problem

economic sphere

of passion-

of society.

In other

which stimulates and further develops the tendencies

individuals for self-seeking.

problem

to

that

The problem

of

anomie which

is

in

directly tied to the

of endless desires and expandable tendencies is rooted in the economic

system for Durkheim.

"The

fact is that there (in the

world of commerce and

industry) a state of disturbance and of anomie is constant, and so to speak normal."

^^John Horton, "The Dehumanization of Anomie and Alienation: A Problem
in the Ideology of Sociology," British Journal of Sociology , 15 (1964), p. 290.

^-'-Emile

Durkheim, Professional Ethics and Civic Morals, (London: Routledge

& Kegan Paul,

1957), p. 131.

-^^Marshall Clinard, "The Theoretical Implications of Anomie and Deviant
Behavior, " in Marshall Clinard, ed. Anomie and Deviant Behavior (New York:
,

Free Press, 1964),
^^Op.

jcit.,

p. 11.

Durkheim

in C.

W.

Mills, p. 458.

,

7
In other

terms self-seeking flourishes within certain economic systems.

Anthony Giddens

emphasis

in

Capitalism and Modern Social Theory notes the blending of

Durkheim while emphasizing

in

his social and

economic perspective.

Durkheim anchors egoistic needs in the biological
pre-social)
structure of the individual organism; but he
,
nevertheless makes it clear that egoism is also in large part a
product of society —the impulse to self-advancement, for instance,
is as much a creation of modern society for Durkheim as it is
It is

true that

(i.e.

for

One
of

egoism

(1)

therefore, left with three possible alternatives to the explanation

is,

in

Marx.

Durkheim.

At different points he seems to adopt each of the three.

That the economic sector

is a

major element

in the

that the endless passions and desires originate in the

the individual is "egoistic" through

some inherent

the

(2)

and

I

quality

I

thinly,

which
(3)

think that Durkheim' s position is a

A

is

Or,

allowed

to

(2)

run

third alternative

somewhat uneasy

(3).

In conclusion, the discussion about

reflects,

egoism;

has egoistic tendencies which are developed and prodded by

economic system.

mixture of

of

economic sector.

loose because of the structure of industrialized society.
is that the individual

development

Durkheim's treatment of egoistic man

the unresolved inconsistencies in his discussion.

On

the one

hand egoistic tendencies are an outgrowth of a social order without clearly defined
rules, as is stated in the theory of anomie.

As a result individuals aim

objectives for themselves which are unattainable and even
unsatisfying.

On

the other hand

it

would be

when

at

attained are

still

totally consistent with his stated views

Anthony Giddens, Capitalism and Modern Social Theory An Analysis of Marx,
Durkheim and Max Weber, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1971), p. 225.
;

8

(reflecting a social and historical perspective)

if

Durkheim saw anomie

not as

a result of insufficient rules or the lack of their
internalization (which posits
the individual needing constraint and order) but
instead as an outcome of a

society which practiced and supported the wrong rules.

sees the crux of the problem of egoism as inherent
individual.

me

Let

explain what

I

mean by

the

Unless, that

is,

he

to the internal structure of the

wrong

rules.

Capitalism operates, Durkheim agrees, upon a set of rules; the rules
of
laissez-faire individualism and competition.

be stable; yet

its

Presumably a

guiding ethic leads to anomie

.

capitalist society can

The problem

is not the

absence

of rules to structure behavior, but rather that the organizing rules of
behavior
(i.e., competition)

may be

a

major cause, once internalized and accepted,

of the

condition of anomie; of individual self-seeking.
If

Durkheim focused

his interpretation in this direction he

would be led

to

a

theory which emphasized the necessity of changing the societal rules of operation
as opposed to trying to institute rules to limit the individual.

The point

Durkheim

I

slides

(sometimes only

wish

to

make

is

somewhat elusive but nevertheless important.

away from a social and historical perspective
to

at

be noted in terms of the priorities he sets).

key points

In his treatment

of needs and the related theory of anomie, as will be shown, he does not carry

through with his own analysis.
of

This

is especially true in the

case of his analysis

women.
He has rooted

extent

it

is

his treatment of

egoism partially

a "particular" phenomena, and partially

innate need theory which lends

it

"universal" status.

in society,

(this

and

to this

varies in degree) in an

But as the three possible

,

9

explanations

I

construct show, the relation between the particular
and universal

status is confused.

The language

of

egoism has been used as such not because

clarity to the issues at hand but because

The problem with the egoism-altruism

it

I

thinl<

it

lends

appears in the literature of Durkheim.

distinction is that in a non-anomic social

order people cannot be captured either by the category of egoism or
altruism.

The distinction

is not helpful if

between people

in given social situations or as social beings

others.

For".

.

.

one

is

in the pursuit of

trying to grasp the difficult relationships

who prize

ties to

most characteristically human goals

impossible to separate out a part that

is the

part that is devoted to the needs of others.

consulting of
15

"

my own

it

is

interest and a

Social living will involve the broader

interdependency of reciprocating relationships.
In

my

in

which

cannot but be involved in reciprocal relationships,
I have to pay for selfseeking behavior is a loss of certain kinds of relationships. But if
I want to live a certain kind of life, with relationships of trust, friendsocial life
it

may

I

certainly be conceded that the price

my wanting their good and
wanting my good are not two independent discriminable desires
I have one desire to live in a certain way, which cannot be characterized
as a desire for my good rather than that of others.
ship, and cooperation with others, then

my

.

For Durkheim, the "individual"
the social ties

which help

is not

He

is

is

A

In a

non-anomic social order, he

is

he adequately understood as a mix of both.

a socialized being, motivated to follow the

^•"^Alasdair Maclntyre,

.

an isolate, comprehensible outside of

to constitute his life.

neither fully egoistic nor altruistic; nor

.

norms

of his society because those

Short History of Ethics , (New York:

MacMillan, 1966),

p. 186.

^^Alasdair Maclntyre, "Egoism and Altruism,

Paul Edwards, (1967), p. 466.

"

Encyclopedia of Philosophy

,

ed.

8

10

norms have become part
ments,

is

of him.

capable of a narrow

But the individual, under certain social arrange-

egoism—an egoism which makes him

the very time he ignores the needs of others.
in a

suffer at

These themes emerge more clearly

consideration of anomie.

Problem

Durkheim's theory

of

anomie

of

Anomie

is

rooted in the view of the "passionate"

individual prodded by the economic system.

Anomie

reflects both the

between the individual and the society as well as incorporates

assessments which derive from his
It

is interesting to note that

initial

most

(2)

relations

(1)

the "need"

conceptions of man.

of the discussion of

anomie

in

Durkheim

is

either directly tied to a discussion of the anomie division of labor or anomie
suicide.

Anomie

is then

these social phenomena.

almost always defined as integral

Anomie

to

one or the other of

division of labor is a result of rapid economic

growth without the development of the necessary regulatory apparatus.

When

the relations of the organs are not regulated they are in a state of anomy.

Production

is

unbridled and unregulated.

neither with too

integration, nor too

Anomie

societies."-'-^

^'^Qp. cit.

much

,

18

Anomie

little,

but

suicide

it

is

".

.

.

has to do

a result of the crises of

suicide differs from egoistic and altruistic suicide in

Durkheim, The Division of Labor

in Society , p. 368.

1

Ibid., p. 370.

19

E mile Durkheim,

Suicide,

(New York:

Free Press, 1951),

p.

153.

its

11

"dependence, not on the way in which individuals are attached

how

Anomie, often termed as lawlessness or rulelessness, derives
from the society.

concept, with
(be other.

man and

It

often is the result of the individual failing to internalize

to structure his life.

man and

This

not only

21

which are

the rules

Anomie operates as

a two-pronged

his needs on the one side, and the organized society on

is not to

deny, but rather to emphasize the interrelationship between

his society; although this relationship is not always clear, nor constant.

Anomie

is

created in the economic sector where the customary limits and

boundaries are lacking because of the capitalist ethic of greed and gain."

"The state

22

of rulelessness (dereglement) is further heightened by the fact that

human desires are

constraint as

much

moment when

less disciplined at the very

stronger discipline.

20

on

20

regulates them."

it

to society, but

23
"

as

it

Anomie

is then tied to the

is to the

they would need a

conception of

man

needing

expansion and loosening of "customary" limits.

Robert Bierstedt, Emile Durkheim,

(London:

Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1966),

p. 154.

21

Anomie as defined by

the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, as quoted in

the Division of Labor , originally applied to the disregard for divine law.

came
The

to

mean lawlessness, or

rulelessness.

Division of Labor in Society

,

(p.

ix).

As

See o£.

cit.

a positivist

Later

it

Emile Durkheim,
Durkheim seems to ignore
,

the distinction between a law and a rule as indicative of quite different processes;
hence, anomie applies to both lawlessness and rulelessness.

^^Herbert McClosky and John Schaar, "Psychological Dimensions of Anomy,"
American Sociological Review, 30 (February 1965), p. 15.
23

Op.

cit.,

Durkheim

in C.

W.

Mills, ed.

,

p. 456.
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So, Durkheim,

who saw economic expansion and development as furthering

the

individual's bottomless abyss, concluded that "the
entire morality of progress

and perfection

is

thus inseparable from a certain amount of anomy."^^

Durkheim discusses varied

social relationships as resulting in anomie.

The following construct allows one

to organize

most

of

Durkheim' s study

of

anomie.

Anomie

exists

and

b

when
,

creating

the relation between

results in condition

d

with effect
society and the individual.

In the

above

(a)

a

.

c

e

on the

could be: rapid economic growth, industrial revolution, unregulated

division of labor;

(b) is

a constant,

it is

the individual in need of constraint, an

individual with indefinitely expandable desires and the impossibility of satisfaction

without limits;

(c) is:

unclear boundaries, lack of order, lack of solidarity,

rulelessness, lack of social integration;

(d) is:

competitiveness, status seeking,

concentration on consumption, economic ethic of greed and gain;
disintegration of society,

reading of the construct

Anomie

weak conscience

(e) is:

collective, lawlessness.

the

Hence, one

is:

exists

when

the relation between rapid economic growth ,

and man results in condition of rulelessness creating economic
greed and gain with the effect of a weak conscience collective
on the society and the individual.
,

,

,

The entire
of anomie;

,

set of relationships involves a causal flow and

encompasses the theory

"a" and "b" cause conditions "c," "d, " and "e."

Besides the objective social conditions and relationships above, anomie
involves whole sets of assumptions about the individual's needs.
24

Op.

cit.

,

Durkheim, Suicide,

p. 247.

This conception

13
of the nature of the individual which is built upon his statement of
needs and desires

necessitates a concern with constraining the individual.

assumptions

built into the theory of

The three most basic

anomie therefore are:

1)

man

has endless

desires and will always be striving for what he does not already have,
individual cannot limit his desires himself, and

necessary and therefore valued for the "happy"

Durkheim's assessment

of

3)

the

constraint and order are

life.

needs and desires has serious implications for

what he sees as the necessary arrangements between

was not viewed as having

2)

man

and society.

If

maa

indefinitely expandable desires the social condition of

anomie would not be posed as a problem.

The description

of the objective

social conditions of a capitalist society are not sufficient for a theory of anomie.

Without Durkheim's view of the individual and his needs one might find some of
his descriptions of capitalist

It is

economy conducive

to a partial discussion of alienation.

the opposing conceptual views of the individual which is one of the

significant differences between

and alienation.

Durkheim and Marx and

Durkheim as well as a description

Durkheim's ideas about needs are crucial

terms

first

to the theory of

anomie as well

of our later discussions.

Needs and

It is

of the society.

Hence, his statement on needs calls for

as to his view of the moral order.
in

their theories of anomie

In other words, integral to the theory of anomie is the picture of

the individual developed by

examination

most

the

Theory

of

Anomie

important to examine the language Durkheim uses

human needs. This does

not

mean

that the

problems which arise

to talk

about

out of the

"

14

human needs are simply

discussion of

issues can be dealt with

it is

terminological.

necessary

The problem with the discussion

But before the conceptual

be clear how the language

to

of "need" in

Durkheim

is that

is

used.

he often

appears to slide or jockey back and forth among the terms "need," "desire,"
"passion," and "appetite."

He sometimes equates these terms, and

this

equation lends support to the view of a rather irrational or non-rational being.
It

also confuses distinctly individual processes.
In the Division of

Labor

,

Durkheim distinguishes

biological needs as non-

expandable, from other needs which he generally views as endlessly expanding.

"Everyone recognizes

that the needs of the

body are limited, and

consequently, physical pleasure cannot increase indefinitely."

from his Lecons de Philosophie

,

I,

Durkheim writes: "Hunger

that,

Quoting Rabier
is satisfied

with

a determined quantity of food; reason cannot be satisfied with a determined

quantity of knowledge.
In Suicide,

Durkheim also distinguishes between

individual and animal needs

because man's needs are not dependent solely upon his body; "a wider margin
left for

the free combinations of the will."^'^

"A more awakened

reflection

suggests better conditions, seemingly desirable ends craving fulfillment."

'

Op.

cit.

^^Ibid

27

Op.

. ,

cit.

28
Ibid.

,

Durkheim, The Division

of

p. 479.

,

Durkheim, Suicide,

p. 247.

Labor

in Society , p. 238.

28

is
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Once Durkheim leaves

the ordered objective "need" realm of animal
life

him using a vocabulary reflecting the notions

we

find

of subjective irrational feeling—

"appetites," "desiring," "craving."

Durkheim

indirectly defines need in the Division of Labor .

As we go forward, however, work becomes a permanent occupation,
a habit, and indeed,

if this

habit is sufficiently strengthened,

a need.

Need then

largely defined in relation to what one has

is

become accustomed

socialized towards, but this does not grasp its meaning totally.

what we have become accustomed

to for

Durkheim, but more than

be accustomed to beatings, but not need them in any sense.
be a tendency or inclination toward some state which,
unsatisfied or frustrated.

and this

is partly

Need

if

Hence, for Durkheim a need

because of socialization

(thus,

is

that.

to,

or

partly

We

could

So a need must also

not fulfilled, leaves us
is

something we aim

we are accustomed

to

it)

at

and

something we gain satisfaction from.

The development

To appreciate new developments and goods one has

process.

tastes and desires.
tion.

of habits (needs) and tastes appears as a social and historical

30
If

to

develop new

The new tastes and habits develop as a process

of socializa-

one infers from the earlier statement that needs partially derive from

socialized patterns one can conclude from the above that needs also will develop
in relation to

new goods.

In other

words one can construct from Durkheim's

loose discussion of needs, desires, and habits, that new goods will further stimulate
29

Op.

cit.

30 Ibid.,

,

p.

Durkheim, The Division of Labor
240.

in Society , p. 394.

.
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new needs

in

an ongoing process.

Then, truly as the conditions of life are changed, the standard
according to which needs were regulated can no lons:er remain
the

same; for

it

varies with social resources

.

.

.

Social resources reflect the level of material development in the society.

important

to note that thus far the

discussion of need, tastes, and habits

largely linked to the realm of material goods.
to

It is

is

However, Durkheim does not seem

be self-conscious of this and although he links these desires with societal

forces

(to

a degree), he also grants them at points a universal status.

In Suicide

Durkheim more

fully

discusses his conception of need, as desire,

or passion, or feeling.
It is

not

human nature which can assign

the variable limits

necessary to our needs
They are thus unlimited so far as
they depend on the individual alone. Irrespective of any
.

external regulatory force, our capacity for feeling
itself an insatiable

is in

and bottomless abyss.

"Wants," "needs," and "passions" are used loosely and interchangeably by

Durkheim.

"Thus the more one has

the

more one wants,

since satisfaction

OA

received only stimulates instead of
".

.

.

the passions first

must be

the faculties and satisfied."

filling

needs

limited.

.

"

He continues

to

say that,

Only then can they be harmonized with

35

systematic analysis of needs as social and historical within the
economic sector one must move to Marx.
31pQj.

Op.

cit.

,

Durkheim, Suicide

33 Ibid., p. 247.
^^Ibid., p. 248.
^^Ibid

,

p.

253.
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The above quote on "passions" echoes

his statement on "needs."

"No

living

being can be happy or even exist unless his needs are
sufficiently proportional

means.

to his

36
"

If

you want

to

be happy you must limit your aspirations,

since Durkheim presumes a shortage of means.

need what you can have.
In Saint

To be happy you must learn

to

"^"^

Simon and Socialism, Durkheim continues

his equation of need

and appetite.

...

a need or appetite in a living being can be explained only
if it secures some satisfaction for the being who experiences
it.
But an appetite that nothing can appease can never be
satisfied.

From

this loose use of the

seems plausible

to infer

terms "need," "desire," and "appetite,"

from the statement: "no matter how one

it

acts, desires

have to depend upon resources to some extent; actual possessions are partly the
criterion of those aspired to, "

with "needs."

39

that desires are terminologically interchanged

Hence, "needs" are seen as expanded by habitual expectation of

objects in relation to resources and actual possessions.

Durkheim further

•"^^'

ibid

.

,

p. 246.

.37,

It is apparent that needs have to be sufficiently proportioned to means,
rather than means being proportioned to individual needs, because the means,
as part of the social structure, act as a limiting constraint for Durkheim.

The

individual need structure is a limitless abyss.

^^Emile Durkheim, Socialism and Saint Simon,
p. 197.

on

Op.

cit.

,

Durkheim, Suicide,

p. 254,

(Ohio:

Antioch Press, 1958),
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supports this view when he states

"The less one possesses

in

superfluity extends "needs" indefinitely.

the less he is inclined to extend endlessly
the range of

"^"^

his wants.

As

thfit

stated previously,

Durkheim

presented so

(as

And

concerns.

think that

I

it

is

much

of the discussion pertaining to needs

presents needs as largely tied to materialistic

far)

these needs for acquisition that are endlessly manipulable.

Durkheim's position

needs which are stimulated endlessly by the

is that

economic system must be controlled because the individual by himself
of limiting his "passions."

incapable

His muddled treatment of needs leads to his general-

izing about all needs as endless, requiring external regulation.
of controlling the individual is at the root of

the individual and society.

is

This necessity

Durkheim's dualistic conception

of

Society is in a transcendental relation to man.

Society can be interpreted transcendentally and extrinsically as
an entity different from and morally superior to individual men;
or it can be interpreted immanently as the extension of men,
the indwelling of
In trying to assess

men.

Durkheim's treatment

seems

to

me

must examine the relationship he posits between man and society

in

terms

way

his needs are defined and developed.

dualistic view of

man and

of needs

it

society he does not appear to conceive of a societal

40lbid.
02._crt.,

^^Op.

cit.

,

Durkheim

of the

Although Durkheim often poses the

"interest," in opposition to the individual's needs, and this

41

that one

in C.

John Horton,

W.

Mills, ed.

p. 289.

,

p. 456.

seems

to

be the

source of further trouble.
societally.

I

agree with the position that needs are defined

But this seems incomplete

in

and of

own priorities and "interests" and these may

itself.

Societies have their

be, and often are in conflict with

individual's needs.

It is

established order.

In other words, needs are limited by the established order,

in society's interest to restrain

man's needs

by those with interests in already existing arrangements.

Then,

that needs, to the extent they are developed through a social

it

to the

seems

to

me

framework are

structured by the "established interests" in a given society, and are not endlessly
ex]oandable.

Their expandability rests upon two elements.

The

first,

as already

mentioned, is that materialistic needs expand in relation to the interests
ruling elements in society, and

it

is not in their interests to

because severe discontent would most

An

The idea
is

to stimulate

unlimited desire suggests material desires.

purview of human behavior.

It is

of an unlimited desire,

stimulate endless needs

Secondly, needs can be

likely result.

expanded only as far as social resources exist

It is

them.

beyond the reasonable

a desire which no amount of

— "as much

'x'

of the

'x'

as one can get"

can satisfy.

— as boundless desire,

inadequate to the extent that individuals live in society and are products of

the confines and limitations of those systems.

Besides,

to the extent

man

is

rational there are bounds to his needs, and desires.

Desires are limited by the forces of everyday
individuals

life.

The

point is not that

do not have aspirations, but that they do not have endless desires,

needs, wants.

However, their inevitable expansion

theoretical framework.

is at the

crux of Durkheim's

20
It is

possibly necessary here for Durkheim to distinguish
between an

unlimited number of desires and desires with unlimited objects.

To

the extent that

men

are rooted in actual social arrangements, their

aspirations and desires have focal points.

as a bottomless abyss

view him

The tension one

with reality.
is

is to

in a

finds in

To conceive

of

man's need structure

vacuum, with no points

Durkheim

is that

much

of contact

of his social theory

based on the position that man's needs are forever expandable and therefore

constraint must be exercised to create

dimension of Durkheim

some

level of

moral order.

The ironic

he partially ties man's endless desires to societal

is that

forces acting upon him but he also partially treats needs in terms of the egoistic
natural tendencies of man.

Because

of the tension within his

social forces acting in

terms

own thought he seems

of privileged interests.

to exclude the role of

Such concerns are excluded

He, therefore, cannot view the fact, that

by his very definition of needs.

it

is

not in the interests of the ruling elements to develop needs without any sense of
limitation to them, as valid.

He would then see

that the endless

development of

needs could only breed widespread discontent and the possibilities of social
unrest for those in power.

This would be contrary

to the

purposes of those with

vested interests in existing arrangements.

And besides,

men

live

interestingly enough, Durldieim expresses himself that most

according to their established means.

Most adjust "successfully"

existing society,

always sufficient to make men
content, that there are some men whose desires go beyond

It

will be said that

it

is not

to

21
their faculties.

This

is true, these

are excep tionni nnr^, one
Normally, man finds happiness in
realizing his nature; his needs are in relation to
his means.

may

If

morbid cases.

say,

man's desires are extended beyond

his

means

only infrequently,

construct a sociological theory which posits that most

more than

are desirous of

they have? and construct a moral theory on the necessity
for

and constraint?
is

men

why does Durkheim

He draws

specific by his

own

at

solidarity

times universal tendencies from a condition which

definition to certain social and

universal tendencies appear to derive from his

Another major conceptual

difficulty in the

economic conditions.

initial

The

conception of man.

treatment of "needs," which the

terminological interchanges between desire, need, habit, etc., are only symptomatic
of,

is that

needs.

Durkheim

at

For instance,

no point makes a clear distinction between real or false

if

made

he

this distinction

between real and false needs, he

might have seen that false needs were most often related
materialistic desires, i.e.

Durkheim only

,

to his discussions of

endless abysses and infatuations.

hints at this faintly.

"There

is,

But as

it

is,

then a normal intensity of

all

our

needs, intellectual, moral, as well as physical, which cannot be exaggerated."'^'^
In Saint

Simon and Socialism

false need, or possibly,

,

Durkheim

hints at a distinction between real and

need and want, but he states clearly

that a

need

is

without cause which negates the differentiation.

To be sure, we can be certain

advance that the remedies are
not precisely those sought by the systems, just as the drink

43

Op.

cit.

,

Durkheim, Division

"^^Ibid., p. 240.

of

in

Labor

,

p. 376.

never

22

demanded by a feverish
needs.

patient is not necessarily what he
the needs that he does feel do not cease to

Still,

serve as some R-uide to treatment
They are never without
cause, and sometimes it is best to satisfy them ."^
.

Durkheim does

not assess needs as definitively false and therefore harmful
as

a guide to treatment.
In

order for one

Durkheim and

to state

to

uncover the conception of "person" which operates in

which are the most valued needs

involved in a discussion of the moral

been largely tied

to materialistic

life.

of

man, one must become

So far the discussion of needs has

concerns and to a lesser extent

to

man's egoistic

And hence, these needs are viewed as boundless. The moral

tendencies.

order,

derives from the concern that boundaries must be set to limit human needs.
derivative needs of order, constraint, solidarity,

all

contribute to the

These are termed derivative needs because they flow from

morality.

man which

conception of

,

is

The

life of

the initial

a blend of "natural" and social phenomena, held by

Durkheim.

The Moral Order as Resolution
The moral

life

creates the happy

life for

Durkheim.

Life is seen as

perpetual unhappiness unless the proper controls are developed and internalized.
His ultimate

commitment

is to the

happy

life

which reaches fruition through the

mora] order.
Let us first quickly examine what Durkheim means by happiness, because
of the direct relationship

45

Op.

cit.

,

it

has to the moral

life.

Durkheim, Socialism and Saint Simon,

p.

9.
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According

to

Joseph Neyer^^ Durkheim perceived
the uniqueness

quality of unhappiness that is associated
with freedom.

with their lot what is needed

is

not that they have

"For men

more or

to

of the

be contented

less but that they be

convinced they have no right to more. "47
Durkheim associated happiness with

order and controlled relations.

normlessness.

"No

That

is

living being can be

sufficiently proportioned to his

why anomie was conceived as

a state of

happy or even exist unless his needs are

means. "^^

To be

sure, once these needs are excited
they cannot be suspended
without pam
But our happiness is no greater because
they

are excited.

Happiness coincides with a healthy state, and
both happiness and the healthy
state are equated with the

"mean"

activity.

It is

not a function of

more

or less

pleasures (material goods, etc.) but a function of
satisfaction that one has no right
to

more.
appears fairly certain that happiness is something besides
a sum of pleasures. It is a general and constant
state
accompanying the regular activity of all our organic and
psychical functions.
It

46

Joseph Neyer, "Individualism and Socialism in Durkheim,"
Es^aj^s on Sociology and Philosophy by Emile Durkheim
et
Harper & Row, 1964), p. 58.

ed.

,

,

47
48

in
al,

Op._cit., Durkheim, Socialism and Saint Simon^
p. 200.

Op.

cit.

,

Durkheim, Suicide,

QP'

cit.

,

Durkheim, The Division of Labor

'

50
Ibid

.

,

p. 243.

p. 246.

in Society , p. 275.

Kurt Wolff,
(New York-
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Pleasure

is

seen as momentary in distinction from happiness
which

sustained condition.

is a

more

Therefore, happiness can be maintained over time with

the proper organization of society.

A

genuine regimen exists, therefore, although not always legally
formulated, which fixes with relative precision the maximum
degree of ease of living to which each social class may legitimately
aspire.

The class division

of society is then a functional

Individuals in the middle and lower classes

arrangement for Durkheim.

become bounded by

the social

circumstances which engulfs them.
This relative limitation and the moderation it involves makes men
contented with their lot while stimulating them moderately to
improve it; and this average contentment causes the feeling of
calm, active happiness, the pleasure in existing and living which
characterizes health for societies as well as tor individuals.^^

A

society organized around the priorities of happiness will therefore control for

"insatiable" desires.

Stability and order

Durkheim 's thought, as opposed
of

human

to

become

commitments

capacities, as in Karl Marx.

This

the privileged concerns in

to

freedom and the development

may be

tied

somewhat

to

Durkheim's

belief that there is a significant difference in individual's capacities for growth.

This

is not

so for Marx.

But primarily,

it is

within the context of man's

rulelessness, that rules become fundamental to "human happiness."

The problem

51

Op.

cit.

,

of ordered, solidary relationships is best

Durkheim, Suicide,

52
Ibid., p. 250.

p. 249.

expressed

in

25

Durkheim's Division of Labor. ^3

it is

here that the connections between happiness,

needs, and the moral order are established.

According

to

Durkheim

structure disappears

the division of labor develops as the segmental

as mechanical solidarity is transformed to organic

solidarity.

The division of labor varies in direct ratio with the volume and
density of societies, and, if it progresses in a continuous manner
in the course of social development, it is because societies
become regularly denser and generally more voluminous. 55
mechanical solidarity was responsible

In the past,

for the

moral order.

<;ohesiveness of society derives from the collective similarity within

The homogeneity

As

morality.

^vas lacking.

parts.

of society is the source of its solidarity, and therefore its

society changes through history

Durkheim sought an explanation

^jpecialize.

its

The

56
It is

to this

it

begins to differentiate and

for the "needed" cohesiveness

end that his discussion

^^The abnormal functions
E^bnormal forms are noted as,

which

of organic solidarity is directed.

examined as well. The
forced division of labor; when the occupational

of the division of labor are
1)

does not follow the distribution of talent, 2) when the functional activity
(|f each worker is insufficient, and, 3) the anomic division of labor.
It is interesting to note that these forms of abnormal division of labor parallel closely the
cjescription of the division of labor as stated by Marx. See_op. cit
Durkheim, The
Book Three, Chapters 1, 2, and 3.
]!)ivi sion of Labor in Society
clistribution

. ,

,

Op.

cit.

,

Durkheim, The Division of Labor

in Society , p. 256.

''^''^

Ibid

.

,

p. 262.

EC

Joachim Israel, Alienation from Marx to Modern
Durkheim,
^jOciology, (Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 1971), as well as op. cit.
]^he Division of Labor in Society

For

this discussion see

,

.

26
In organic solidarity relations

between individuals do not derive from

similarity but from social differentiation of function.

a result of the

moves from

way

its

different functions

Solidary relations form as

complement each other.

segmental stage the division of labor serves

society through fulfilling the role of the

common

through the interdependence of function

it

^'^

As society

to integrate

conscience, lending solidarity

perpetuates, and creates a moral

order by developing a dependency between the individual and society.
It

makes

individuals solidary.

.

.

activity of each, but also because

not only because

it

limits the

increases it. It adds to
the unity of the organism, solely through adding to its life. At
least, in its normal state, it does not produce one of these
effects without the other.

The division

it

of labor increases the individual's activity and in this

way creates

a fuller unity.

But if the division of labor produces solidarity it is not only
because it makes each individual an exchangist as the
economists say; it is because it creates among men an
entire system of rights and duties which \\vtk them together
in a desirable way.
Tliis

system devises an orderly regularized structure

the "division of labor unites at the

activities

it

same time

differentiates converge;

it

that

it

to operate within.

opposes;

brings together those

it

it

makes

Then,

the

separates."

60

equation of the individual and the "function" that the individual performs
results from Durkheim's priorities with the performance of tasks necessary to
the development of the moral order.
'^'^The

'"^^Op cit.

,

Durkheim, The Division

59
Ibid ., p. 406.

^^Ibid., p. 276.

of

Labor

in Society, p. 395.

The social

solidarity created is at the foundation of the

solidarity is a completely

"divisions of labor
at the

same time

statement

moral phenomenon

becomes

.

.

.

moral order.

"^^ And
since the

the chief source of social solidarity,

the foundation of the

"Social

it

becomes

moral order. "^^ Durkheim's key

is this:

Everything which is a source of solidarity is moral, everything
which forces man to take account of other men is moral,
everything which forces him to regulate his conduct through
something other than the striving of his ego is moral, and
morality is as solid as these ties are numerous and strong. ^"^
Morality for Durkheim appears as a "system of rules of conduct.

And

the

primary characteristic

of these rules of conduct is that they enunciate

the fundamental conditions of social solidarity.

order and harmony.
"Authority in

its

Order

relation to

is

"^"^

Solidarity, and morality involve

established through relations of authority.

man, not only buttresses moral

life; it is

moral

life."^'^

^

hbid

^^

., p.

64.

.

,

p. 401.

^^Ibid.

,

p. 398.

Ibid

Emile Durkheim, Sociology and Philosophy

,

(New York:

Free Press,

1953), p. 35.
^'^^Robert
'^Robert Nisbet,

1965), p. 151.

Emile Durkheim,

(New Jersey: Prentice

Hall,
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Involved in Durkheim's conception of the moral
ideal of a person.

Although

it

The concerns with
is

life is his

authority, order and

calm remain.

important to note that both Durkheim's and Marx's

discussions of morality and species being, respectively, are
their

the

models of persons,

it is

way these conceptions

conception of morality
than

is

view of an

is

heart of

interesting to view a fundamental difference in

relate to the authors ideas on "persons."

much more

Durkheim's

closely tied to his discussion of needs

Marx's conception of species being.

meet human needs, and

at the

in this sense derives

The moral order

is

organized to

from them, whereas species being

reflects upon the potentialities of the individual as opposed to the manifested

needs of the human being.

The moral order

is

derived from the human needs

of solidarity, interdependence, order and control.

on potentiality as will become evident.
attuned to concerns of

man

The discussion

of morality is

is not

more

human happiness than human development.

Durkheim and Marx agree
is

The emphasis here

that

man

only because he lives in society.

is a social being.

"And indeed, man

Take away from man

all that

has a

social origin and nothing is left but an animal on a par with other animals. "^^

However, they view the relationship between individuals and the individual and
society differently.

It is

the nature of this relationship which reflects the meaning

Durkheim.

of morality in

It is,

therefore, important to clarify the

are related to one another and to society in his thought.

Op.
p. 60.

cit.

,

Durkheim,

Professional Ethics and Civic Morals ,

way persons

,
,
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Durkheim sees man

in a

dependent relationship to society.

Because the individual

is not sufficient unto himself,
it is from
society that he receives everything
necessary to him, as it is
for society that he works. Thus
is formed a very strongsentiment of the state of dependence in
which he finds himself.

So one estimates oneself as a part of a
whole

...

as an "organ of an organism.

Durldieim does peripherally mention a concern
with individual's

"autonomy." "One cannot give oneself too completely
abandoning oneself. "^^ And he states further

to others without

that:

To be a person

is to be an autonomous source of action.
Man
acquires this quality only in so far as there is something
in
him which is his alone and which individualizes him . . . S9

However, he appears

to give priority to the necessity for solidary
relations.

most complete relation which can exist between a thing
and a person is that which makes the former entirely dependent
•

•

•

the

upon the

latter.

Durkheim believes
the individual

that as society

becomes freer

to his

becomes extended and concentrated

own detriment.

of the organic solidarity loses its hold.

And

it

The common conscience

is in this

way

that the social

division of labor "lifts the collective yoke" off of the individual.

However, the

division of labor does not isolate the individual because one relates to several

^"^Ibid

.

p. 228.

^^Ibid

.

p. 239.

Ibid

.

p. 403.

''^Ibid

.

p.

117,

[The emphasis

is

my

own.

]
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functions within any given procedure.

The division

presumes that the worker, far from
by his task, does not lose sight of his
collaborators, that he acts upon them, and reacts to
them.

being

of labor,

hemmed
'

in

-'

Durkheim does

not see the division of labor as fostering an
incompleteness in

the individual.

He

finds no tension

between the regulation and the development

of the individual.

It is

because this special structure allows society

the individual

more

tightly, holding

to enclose

him strongly attached

to

his domestic environment and consequently, to traditions and
finally contributing to the limitation of his social horizon, it

also contributes to

He does

not view

man

make

it

concrete and defined.

as dissected by the division of labor.

and differentiation are the key

to the solidarity

Specialization

necessary for the ordered

life.

Why would

there be more dignity in being complete and mediocre,
rather than in living a more specialized, but more intense life,
particularly if it is thus possible for us to find what we have lost
in this specialization, through our association with other beings

who have what we lack and who complete us?
Durkheim
to a

feels that specialization develops individuality and also is conducive

sense of completeness through social association and cohesion.

Harry Alport

in

discussing Durkheim's treatment of the individual,

focuses on the sacred element of the individual in the organic division of labor.

However,

it

rather seems as though the individual has not become

Ibid

. ,

p. 372.

Ibid

. ,

p. 302.

Ibid

. ,

p. 403.

more
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important but that his function, as specialization,
has.

mechanical division of labor
characteristics, yet, the
is the unity of the

it

is stated that

more marked

In the discussion of the

each organ has

own

its

the individuality of the parts, the
greater

organism. ^^Individuality here means specialization,
not the

development of the uniqueness of the individual.

It

seems

that

when society

evolves from mechanical to organic solidarity functional
specialization occurs,

and not the development of the potentiality of the person,
as person.
In light of the above discussion

Durkheim simply as

for

it

seems possible

the outgrowth of specialization.

that

autonomy

is

expressed

The relations which

derive from the differentiation of tasks create the controlled atmosphere
necessary
to the

moral order.

autonomous person

If

it

we

try to distinguish between the autonomous and non-

would be that the former

while the latter is driven to unachievable ends.

is able to limit his

One becomes autonomous

sense through a system of differentiation and specialization.

networks one learns

needs and desires

to function within boundaries.

in this

Through such

Such individuals, not driven

by inner compulsions, would be autonomous within Durkheim' s system and would
therefore be important to solidary and moral relations.

The key

to

Durkheim's belief that the division of labor creates unity

is the

balance between the individual's dependency on society and his individuality
(specialization), his autonomy.

tliis

The

critical question

becomes whether or

relationship between autonomy and dependency is balanced.

Dependency

(through differentiation) appears to be an integral part of autonomy, for

74
Ibid., p. 182.

not

32

Durkheim, with

all priorities

given in the direction of the ordered,
solid, moral

life.

In Professional Ethics and Civic Morals,
he states that "the

forms part

of the physical and social mileu; he is

autonomy can be only relative.

bound up with

it

human person
and his

Durkheim's statement on autonomy deals

with the difficult relationship of the individual in his
society.

However, one can

question whether he has captured the proper essence of the
relationship.

connection between

man and

The

society need not be conceived in terms of

dependence, but rather in terms of an exchange or reciprocating interaction.

Durkheim's conception of education constructs autonomous individuals as

who

those
witli

relate to

moral and solidary behavior.

commitments toward human development.

speaks of the necessity
given.

to

They must learn

This appears to be in conflict

In

Education and Sociology he

educate children to accept their roles as they are

to accept the idea of

circumscribed tasks and limited

horizons.
Society can survive only

if

among

there exists

its

members

a

sufficient degree of homogeneity; education perpetuates and
reinforces this homogeneity by fixing in the child, from the

beginning, the essential similarities that collective

demands.

75

Op.

cit.

,

Durkheim, Professional Ethics and Civic Morals

vSteven Lukes,

Philosophy
p.

,

"Anomie and Alienation,

" in Laslett

Op.

Politics and Society , 3rd Series; (New York:

cit.

,

Durkheim, Education and Sociology

,

,

p.

68.

and Runciman,

141.

77

life

''"^

p. 70,

Barnes & Noble, 1967),
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The idea

that one fulfills a determinate
function is in conflict with a
view

focuses upon the potentialities of the
individual, as

The importance
tion create tensions
ing.

To

we

which

shall see.

of solidarity, functional
interdependence, and specializa-

when posed against

the extent that morality for

the view of person as free and
experiment-

Durkheim

is tied to the

idea of solidarity

as created in the division of labor, his
conception of morality

exclusive of free and deliberative
solidarity which derives

from

human

beings.

may

The necessity

also be

for constraint and

his conception of needs and desires
exclude such

possibilities.

It

has so far been posited that Durkheim' s concern with
the moral

commitments

tied to his

the

to a solidary

and ordered existence, rather than with

development of potential capacities

important in that

it

life is

in

persons.

In other

words morality

is

circumscribes the individual and cements the society.

These are the priorities

in distinction

from how

it

could stimulate individual

growth and press for social change.

Durkheim then does have

outlines of an ideal of a person which can be

derived from his discussion of the moral

life,

(including his treatment of

education and autonomy) which derives from the ideal of mechanical solidarity.

However,

it

appears that this discussion of morality derives largely from his

treatment of needs.

encompass
If

And

the idea of

morality

regularity, etc.

,

is

to the extent that

human

does

it is

difficult for

it

to

possibility.

defined by the

it is

it

human and

societal needs of solidarity and

limited to those needs (as well as the conditions which

develop the needs) which have already been manifested.

Hence, that which

men

tend towards, in terms of objects in a specific
society, which is the partial

determination of a need for Durkheim, appear endless.

Constructed from this

are the derivative needs necessitating order, control,
and security.
the

moral order basically reflects only these tendencies

assesses society
scope.

in

terms

of the

Because

the perspective

which

moral order becomes extremely limited

in

Afterall needs are social and historical to a considerable extent for

Durkheim and

this

means they can

o pposed to the full range of

Even

if

human

only express tendencies within society as
potentialities .

one views Durkheim' s treatment of egoistic desires as innate

tendencies (or as initially this) the narrowness of the moral order as a standard
for appraising societal

arrangements

still

holds.

For one

still is

working from

manifested drives or needs, as opposed to standards of development not
or necessarily manifested in

Below
It

is

felt

fully

needs.

the construction of Durkheim' s morality as a set of relationships.

expresses the closed circle which excludes a futuristic model of individual

development.
desires
needs
passions
solidarity

^
>/
social man
(egoistic
strains)'

>^

control
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If

value is

society develops or prods the
desires for multiple acquisitions,
of what
it

to

assess the individual in terms of the
need

Besides Durkheim's
discussed in relation

illicit shifting

from society

to the place of

egoism

in

man

is at the

curb the desires?

to individual (which has

been

Durkheim's thought) the internal

structure of the question leads to a closed
circle.

"needing"

to

Durkheim's conception

of

foundation of the moral order and, therefore,
defines

The moral order becomes t he

it.

activity of the resolution of needs; for
security,

order, and control.

Within Durkheim's framework the moral order does
not deal with what
could be outside of the ordered, stable, relation.
the
the

moral order cannot be employed

in a critical sense.

moral order as ideal 78 that anomie

anomie as

in the

moral order,

is the

This

is

is not,

however,

Afterall,

posed as a problem.

it is

But involved

in

theory about man; that his needs are

again shows on what level the critical eye

The

say

to

against

bottomless, and therefore controls are necessary, and valued as "good."

78

men

is to

operate.

This

Both anomie and the

Durkheim is the society bound by mechanical, as
opposed to organic solidarity. His Division of Labor deals with the problem
of
the changing nature of order in that he wishes to organize society
so that it will
approach his lost ideal. This position elaborates further my contention that
Durkheim's sense of ideal is limited to that which has already been established.
ARerall, mechanical solidarity is a historical phenomena. Durkheim's sense of
ideal society for

ideal, therefore, clearly is not Utopian in meaning. "But we
shall attain this ideal
only after observing reality, and separating it from the ideal. But is it possible
to proceed otherwise? Even the most excessive idealists cannot proceed in
any
other fashion; for the ideal rests on notliing if it does not keep its roots in reality."

See Emile Durkheim, op.

cit.

,

The Division

of

Labor

i_n

Society

,

(p.

34).
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moral order are too closely
calls

Durkheim a

tied to the discussion of needs.

critical conservative, his historical perspective

him from a complete acceptance

whatever

of

In all of the discussion so far the

interchangeably.

Harrington Moore

This

is

alone saving

is.''^^

terms man and individual have been used

because Durkheim has been speaking

of

Women

men.

are excluded from his discussions of needs and the related theory
of anomie.

The Sexes and
The process
origins for Durkheim.

moral
lie

of the

the

Moral Order

development of the moral order has historical

He used

the history of the conjugal society to

effect of the division of labor

between

man

and woman.

By

show

this

the

method

attempts to show how the division along sex lines provides solidarity for the

society.

One has

first to

understand the way persons need one another

Durkheim, which differs significantly from Marx.
person

is crucial;

but in different

ways

in

In both theories the "other"

for different ends.

Precisely because man and woman are different, they seek each
other passionately
only those differences which require
each other for their mutual function can have this quality. In
short man and woman isolated from each other are only different
parts of the same concrete universal which they reform when
they unite. In other words the sexual division of labour is the
source of conjugal solidarity and that is why psychologists have
very justly seen in the separation of the sexes an event of
tremendous importance in the evolution of emotions.
.

.

.

,

79

Barrington Moore, Jr. Political Power and Social Theory
Harper Torchbooks, 1958), p. 134.
,

80

Op

.

cit.

,

Durkheim, The Division of Labor

,

(New York:

in Society , p. 56.
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In discussing the differentiation

between

man

and woman, Durkheim states that

historically there are fewer differences
anatomically and, therefore, fewer

resulting differences in the division of labor.

For example, he speaks

of the

greater differentiation in brain sizes that has
developed over time, believing
that

man's brain size has enlarged

to a

greater degree than woman's.

Historically, the slighter differentiation between the
sexes posed a problem for

Durkheim.

"The

state of

marriage

in societies

where

the two sexes are only

weakly differentiated, thus evinces conjugal solidarity which

weak." 8

Through history, as differences become more

is itself

very

stark, the solidary

relationship increases.

The union

of two people has ceased to be ephemeral; it is no longer
an external contact, temporary and partial, but an intimate

association lasting, often even indissoluble during the whole life-

time of the two parties. 82
interesting to note here the shift from Durkheim' s earlier position that

It is

historically, mechanical solidarity (which is the

a)i

model

that he

works from) was

outgrowth of homogeneous and like characteristics within society.

Durkheim

to construct

new source

In order for

moral relations between men and women he must

find a

of solidarity, and this is so because of the differences he declares

exists between them.

Therefore, he shifts on the question of women, and

discusses the lack of differentiation (historically) as problematic.

Men and v/omen

were

was

less capable of solidary relations

^"^npid

.

82 Ibid.

,

p. 59.

when sexual

differentiation

not as

38
significant.

Durkheim

with discomfort that

specifically gpeaks of brain sizes here.

women

are moving into literary and artistic fields.

he holds that "even in this sphere of action,

and her role

is

He acknowledges

woman

However,

carries out her own nature

very specialized, very different from that of
man. "^^

For Durkheim there are significant differences between
men and women
both in their existing orientations and their potential, for
example, to experience

Women

anomie.

are seen largely in terms of their affective capabilities while

men are viewed more

in

terms

of their intellectual capacities.

as they are conceived by Durkheim are partial people.
m;in and

woman

tion creates their

of the

moral

The relationship between

solid because of this very incompleteness.

is

dependency on the other.

life is the

Both, however,

Their differentia-

The paradigm case for Durkheim

case of partial people, incomplete beings, finding their

completion outside of themselves.

Instead of interdependence between complete

persons the relationship becomes one of dependence through deficiency.

"It

suggests two beings mutually dependent because they are each incomplete, and
translates this mutual dependence outwardly. "

complete persons would

still

84

"need" each other

is

The question

of

whether two

never dealt with or even

questioned.

This division of labor

harmony and

GO

Ibid., p. 60.

84
. ,

moral for Durkheim because the needs

social solidarity are moral.

Durkheim extends

Ibid

is

p. 61.

of order,

This sexual division of labor, and

this analysis to the social division of labor, is important because

39

through

it

one individual

is linked to

another.

"Only those differences which

require each other for their mutual
fruition can have this quality. "85

Morality flows from partial persons

fulfilling

each other through

ties of

mutual

dependence.

Durkheim views marriage as an important
of the

moral order.

on man.

However,

Its

it

institution for the

maintenance

importance derives from the regulating effects

does not operate

in the identical

For women are regulated and controlled bv "natura."

manner
It is

the

for

it

has

women.

man who

necessitates marriage by "needing" restraints
placed upon his desires.

Marriage regulates the

life of

passion for men.

This is the function of marriage. It completely
regulates the life
of passion, and monogamous marriage more
strictly than
any
himself forever to the
same woman it assigns a strictly definite object to the need for
love, and closes the horizons.
other.

Durkheim does
to

For by forcing a man

not conceive of

women

to attach

as passionate, although one expects her

be conceived as such, as a result of her definition as an
"affective" being.
Speaking generally, we now have the cause of that antagonism
of the sexes which prevents marriage favoring them equally:
their int|^ests are contrary, one needs restraint and the other
liberty.

Tlie

woman

does

)U)t,

^^Op.

is

constrained internally and

therefore, need the external controls of marriage.

8f

^Ibid

has less need of marriage because she

. ,

p. 56

cit.

,

Durkheim, Suicide,

87
Ibid ., p. 274.

p. 270.
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supposed to have been originated for
the wife to protect
her weakness against masculine
caprice. Monogamy, especially
IS often represented as a
sacrifice made by man of his
It is

polygamous instincts, to raise and improve
condition
m marriage. Actually, whatever historical woman's
causes may have
made him accept this restriction, he benefits
more by it The
liberty he thus renounces could only
be a source of torment
him. °o

to

Durkheim's discussion of women accepts stark
differences between men
and
in

women and

he understands the characteristics of

her "nature. "

He states

in the Division of

significantly different existences

and her role

is

from man.

,

that

"Woman

to be "inherent"

women

live

carries out her own nature,

very specialized, very different from that of man."^^
The

differences in the lives they live have

movement

Labor

women

of civilization.

in collective life than

left

He concludes

women
that

largely separate from the

women

are

much

less involved

men.

Today among cultivated people the woman leads a completely
different existence from that of the man. One might say that the
two great functions of the psychic life are thus disassociated,
that one of the sexes takes care of the affective functions and
the other of intellectual functions. ^1

The above

88

is

a description of the

way Durkheim views women as operating

Ibid., pp. 275-276.

89
'Op.

cit.

,

Durkheim, The Division of Labor

^"ibid., p. 247.
Ibid

. ,

p. 60.

in Society , p. 60.

s
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Within society.
Tt

Such an account does no more than
describe existing situations.

reflects the biases of the social
system.

Any evaluation
involve one in

of

what ought to be woman's position

much more

mere

than

description.

in society should

However, Durkheim does

not distinguish between description
(as explanation) and justification

dealing with the question of

same time

he justifies

it

women.

He explains woman's condition

when
at the

because woman's position and the role she
plays

is

the inevitable conclusion of her initial
design and biological nature for him.

The inequities and differences

in life style

which he describes as the woman's

fulfillment of her "nature" are used to collapse
explanation and justification.

Durkheim considers

the present arrangements to be natural aad therefore

justified.

Although Durkheim accepted the societal perspective and studied
anomie
as a social phenomena in terms of his general theory he believes

women

are

by "nature" inherently constrained and ordered and, therefore,
incapable of

endless desires.
ijiclusive

Women

are excluded from the theory of anomie and

statement of needs.

The reason

and above anomie instead of incapable of
of

women

is that

she

is

I

it

do not say that
is

because Durkheim' s

abysmally simple minded.

her development due to the fact that she

women

is free of

its

are free from,
initial

view

He has no higher ideals for
anomie.

Her simplicity,

which spares her endless cravings, "spares" her also from a deliberative
Again we see, although
thought.

This time

it is

in

much more

flagrant

form the tension

the denial of a sociological perspective.

It

in

life.

Durkheim'

is ironic

42
that a sociologist should deal
with

of their social and

men's needs

at least partially as a
condition

economic surroundings, see

that

women

by their social

sexual role are largely subject to
quite different social and economic
conditions,

and then conclude that the observed
differences between
to

some

his

are due

inherent difference in the underlying
permanent nature of women.

own description

to the

men and women

same degree

of

women's lack

By

of collective living she could not
be open

of socialization as

men,

in

terms

of

needs and desires.

Such

an exiolanation would be thought to logically flow
from his own perspective.

Rather than viewing
find a

to

woman

as ordered by social pressures from childhood
on to

mate and marry, he chooses

to

view her condition as pre-social, necessary

her essential make-up, a natural phenomena.
Nisbet has written of Durkheim that as a sociologist he rejected
biologism.

He was negative toward a nalytical individualism, toward the idea
toward~biologism, which means the tendency to
reduce social phenomena to biological phenomena, to exi^lain
social events in terms of individual, biologically founded motivation.
of progress, and

But clearly Durkheim reduces the explanation of

women

in society to biological

phenomena.

When one

takes account of the strain in Durkheim's social theory which

emphasizes egoism as an inherent tendency

,

does not resign himself to egoistic behaArior.
of

men, biologically rooted, are

processes.

92

it

is

clear that Durkheim

For Durkheim

to be corrected

,

still

the egoistic tendencies

and constrained by socialization

But for women, the causal stream flows in another direction:

Joachim

Israel, op. cit.

,

po 134.

A
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woman's

biolog-y

spares her anomie. but that very biology
impedes her capacity

for development and individuality.

Women's sexual needs have less of a mental
character because
generally speaking, her mental life is less
developed. These
needs are more closely related to the needs
of the organism,
following rather than leading them, and
consequently find in'

them an efficient restraint. Being a more instinctive
creature
than man, woman has only to follow hor
instincts to find
calmness and peace.
'

'

The difference between men and women

is this:

Men

are too complex and,

therefore, need constraint and rules.

Women

iDlu^rontly constrained.

different theoretical

peace and security for
alt hough the

jiro

Durkheim has

men and women. The

are so placid that they are

starting points arc quite different

end results appear to be somewhat similar

men

ordered, while

methods for creating

.

Women

by "nature"

are ordered by society, through marriage and the division

of labor.

women

In discussing

in relation to the incidence of suicide

Durkheim

states:

her sensibility

rudimentary rather th;m highly developed.
community existence more than man, she
is less penetrated by it; society is less necessary to her because
she is less impregnated with sociability. She has few needs
in this direction and satisfies them easily with a few devotional
practices and some animais to care for, the old unmarried
woman's lile is full. If she remains faithfully attached to
religious traditions and thus finds ready protection against suicide,
it is because these very simple social forms satisfy all her needs.
.

.

.

As she

93

94

Op.
Ibid

cit .

. ,

,

is

lives outside of

Durkheim, Suicide,

p. 215,

p. 272, [The

[The emphasis is

my

own].

emphasis

is

my

own],
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As

for

man, because he

is

viewed a. more complex and
involved,

to the

he is a social animal, "he can
maintain his equilibrium only by
finding
points of support outside himself. "95

marriage and the division
by the natural serenity of

From
from

of labor

women

(i,

The moral order
e.

,

1)

The conception

differentiated

2)

established via

on the other hand.

of

Durkheim excludes women

women's needs as "naturally"

limited excludes them from Durkheim's
larger theoretical

and manipulable desires.

more

sexual and work) on the one hand
and

the above discussion one can
conclude that

his social theory.

is

degree

His theory of anomie

from the placid woman.

3)

The view

is

schema

of endless

rooted in a view of

of a natural

woman

man

is in

clear contradiction with his earlier commitments,
although fluctuating, to a social

and flexible individual.

However, the ultimate organization of the moral order requires
the
division of labor.

formed through

Women

is,

this division,

therefore, necessary to the solidary relationsliip

and through marriage.

part of the arrangements necessary to the moral

life.

excluded from Durkheim's theoretical formulations.

Hence,

woman remains

Women

creation and

Men and women
the

moral order.

If

its

She herself

is not

Ibid

. ,

p. 216.

Her importance

sustenance.

both are in the end assessed in terms of their relation to

man, or woman

is to

be seen in terms of their potential for

growth or creativity or human excellence, one will have

^^

a

are otherwise

theoretically constructed as an active force within the moral life.
is in its

sex-ual

to

move

outside of the

framework Durkheim has constructed.
sv,ch within his

moral order.

The priorities are not organized
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CHAPTER
KARL MARX: HUMAN POTENTIALITY

II

IN

THE THEORY OF ALIENATION

The various shaping of material life is
of course in every
case dependent on the needs which are
already developed
and both the production and the satisfaction
of these needs
is an historical process.
-Karl Marx

From the character of this relationship follows how
much
man as a sjoccics bcino; as man, has come to be himself
,

and
is

comprehend himself; the relation of man to woman
the most natural relation of human being
to human being.
to

-Karl Marx

Having examined the pivotal position Durkheim's discussion
of need plays
within the theory of anomie and the conception of the
moral order

move

to an analysis of

In i:)urkheim

Marx's competing

ideolog-y about

I

now want

"Mensch"^ and

to

society.

an unresolved tension was uncovered between his
treatment of

universal needs, as tendencies in man, and their particularistic
definition

for

For the purposes of this discussion the German word "Mensch'^ will be
used
Marx's use of the word "man." "Mensch" in its generic sense means human

being, either

man

or

woman, although

it docs have a masculine gender.
Marx's
apply to both men and women in terms of his formulation of them and
MuM-cfore should be discussed whenever possible by a language which expresses
this concern. However, when the ideas which I am trying to
exT>ress become
confusing as I try to write equally of men and women I revert back to male

i(l(>as

dominated language. Hopefully, at least the root ideas may then be communicated.
Therefore, with the exception of the use of "Mensch" the structure of the male
dominated language remains the same.
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as molded in and through soeiety.

As a

result the

moral order primarily becomes

the resolution of the needs for
security, order and the controlled
life.

Marx, however,

crucial to our analysis in that
his treatment of the

is

individual is clearly a result of a
social and historical perspective.

Marx

This involves

in a descriptive analysis of
the individual (also through a
theory of needs)

OS social, cultural and historical.

human development

to the

He. however, does not limit his
appraisal of

"needs" generated by existing society.

Marx's discussion of needs goes beyond the limited
description
society.

Through

in the quality of

his

model

needs.

He

is able to

only allows critical analysis, as

It is

I

of

"Mensch"

in

of species being he is able to express
a differentiation

speak of real as opposed

need; crude as opposed to human, need.

possibility which

But even

we

will discuss as

The conception

shall see, but

it

to

manipulated

of species being not

poses a model of human

human development.

important to note though that although species being functions

theoretically as an ideal, in

some sense expressing human

potentiality, and

therefore is not limited to social and historical phenomena,

it

is

through

social and historical processes that species being develops to
fruition.

When

T

pose the concern with potentiality as distinct from a social and historical

perspective this
in

is not to

deny the fact that human potential, for Marx, develops

and through social and historical settings.

by existing and pre-existing arrangements

.

Marx

is

not tied to and limited

Ilcnce, societal

arrangements

and history do not set up the outer limits for his theoretical framework.
It is

this

dynamic relationship which Marx poses

that

I

want

to explore:
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1)

2)

"Mensch-^ as a "needing- animal;
as a product of society and
history, and

"Mensch" as a species being as a universal

possibility resulting

from

societal and historical change,
expressing the potential capacities
of

development.

This analytic distinction

is not

meant

to dichotomize

thought, since the species being
is not totally devoid of
needs.

human

Marx's

More broadly

speaking, Marx's theoretical framework
integrates descriptive analysis and

normative appraisals.

For example, as

will be shown, alienation is

descriptive of a series of relationships
within the capitalist system, indicative
of society and history.

But involved

the appraisal that one is alienated

by the society

itself, but

very description of alienation

in the

from his species being, which

is

is not indicated

by Marx's conceptual framework.

"Mensch" as a needing animal

is

primarily limited to the view of how the

individual actually functions in the labor process,
as a product of social and
historical forces.

The individual becomes separated from

capacities and other fellow

human beings, and

his productive

described as such.

is

"Mensch"

as a species animal reflects the theoretical conceptions of
human possibility
the contrast

model

The question

to alienating society.

I

want to explore here

is if

relative to society and, therefore, plastic,
critical stance?

The answer

is

uncovered

Marx's treatment

of needs is

how does Marx derive
in the

his radically

examination of the relationship

between the concept of species being and the theory of alienation.
in

;

As

will be shown,

order that the condition of alienation be described as such Marx must

pose the condition of non-alienation (species

life).

first
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I

will elaborate

upon the dimension of human possibility

treating species being in terms of

a person .

Marx through

specific import for deriving a

its

There are only fragments

in

of

spoke seldomly on an individual level.

model

of

such an ideal because Marx himself
His model was species

life.

Theoretical Foundations of Alienation

One cannot begin

understand the theory of alienation without an under-

to

lying understanding of Marx's social and historical view of
"Mensch. "

These

positions are at the base of his theory and one's feelings about them as
initial

assumptions reflect upon the acceptance or rejection

"The theory

of alienation is

based on a certain theory of man; therefore the

Interpretations of the origin of alienation and of the

upon the theory of

man from which

they start.

way

overcome

to

The theory

the foundation of Marx's view of alienation is that the

historical and laboring.

of the theory of alienation.

of

dimensions through Marx's theory of labor.

depend

"Mensch" laying

human being

"Mensch," society and history receive

it

is social,

their

dynamic

The conceptual web which Marx

forms, as well as the interconnections which develop through "activity" between
the social, historical and laboring dimensions of "Mensch"

makes

it

difficult to

analyze these elements separately.

Viewing the human being as an historical animal involves the idea

Ivan Svitak,

Man and

Delta, 1968), p. 123.

His World

— A Marxian View

,

(New York:

of

^
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"Mensch" as laborer because Marx saw "history
as man's action and
The individual labors

in

order to meet his needs and, hence,

labor that he molds his "nature" to

fulfill

his needs.

it is

labor.

through

-Man's needs are

historical and. the pursuit of their satisfaction
is historical development."'^

The process

of labor is social as well as historical.

One individual by himself

cannot meet his needs, especially since one of the
most important needs

human

other

beings.

"Mensch" must cooperate with others

to

meet

is for

his physical

needs.

"Mensch" as laborer
Therefore, labor
with others.

In

is the individual

is social activity

working

and the laborer

in relation to others.

is

social while he

works

working socially "Mensch" controls nature by meeting and

developing new needs.

It is

in this

sense that the laboring "Mensch"

is

historical as well as social.

3

Loyd Easton and Kurt Guddat, eds. Writings o£the Young Marx on
Philosophy and Society, (New York: Anchor Books, 1967),
p. 21.
,

4

Shlomo Avineri, The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx,
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1968), p. 73.
Marx's discussion of the "need for others" is differentiated from his other
treatments of need in that he appears to lend it a universal quality. There
are two meanings of the phrase "need for others" in Marx. As we shall see
later

it

human

derives from the model of species being and in this sense reflects
same time it reflects itself as a necessity

potentiality and at the

for survival.

51

History involves the changing means
of production^ organized around
the

meeting of needs and the development of new
needs.
differs

from

that of

own "nature"

The human being's history

animals because through one's labor one
can alter one's

(as needs).

History is not only the story of the satisfaction
of human needs
but also the story of their emergence and
development.

Whereas animal needs are constant and determined
by nature,
man's needs are social and historical, i.e., determined
last resort

Marx saw

by

man

in the

himself.

historical progress in the emancipation and growing
control of

"Mensch" from and over nature.

^

At the same time, however, Marx's

philosophy of history has been said to be his theory of alienation.

Marx's

theory of history understands the individual to master nature through
labor

and at the same time the individual

When Marx speaks
"Mensch"

in society

of the

is

mastered by external forces.

human nature

and as a part of history.

of

It

"Mensch" he

is

speaking of

does not signify inherent

tendencies within the individual, devoid of social impact.

Marx was opposed

to two positions: the unhistorical one that the
a substance present from the very beginning of
history, and the relativistic position that man's nature has no
inherent quality whatsoever and is nothing but the reflex of social

nature of

man

is

conditions. ^

Alasdair Maclntyre, Marxism and Christianity

,

(New York: Schocken

Books, 1968), p. 62.
Op.

cit.

,

Shlomo Avineri,

p. 79.

Karl Marx, Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations,
(New York: International Publishers, 1964), p. 13.
9

Adam

Schaff,

Hill, 1970), p.

88.

Marxism and

the

Human

I ndividual ,

ed.

,

E

.

J.

(New York:

Hobsbawn,

McGraw
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Marx's view

of the

human being as a

social individual constructs the
individual

as developing in and with society, as
primarily a societal product.
the phrase "'Mensch' as social" can
also be understood to

needs other "Menschen."

"Mensch"
survive.

a)

But

of social in

that

"Mensch"

Marx's writing signifies

that

reflects his social environment, as well
as b) needs others to
it

is

others for species

"Mensch"
from

The idea

mean

Secondly,

also prescriptive in that

it

reflects c) the need each has of

life.

is to

be conceived of in relation to society and not in
isolation

it.

Society docs not consist of individuals; it expresses the
sum of
connections and relationships in which individuals find themselves.
Man A is not a slave as such. He is a slave within society and

because of
If

it.

the individual is viewed as an integral part of the society in
constant relation

to the forces within society,

of

it

eliminates an "a priori" conception of the essence

"Mensch." Man "A" would not be viewed as a slave because

of

some

individual inadequacy but as a result of established social institutions which

allow and justify slavery.

Within Marx's perspective one cannot construct in

abstraction a view of the individual without the appropriate discussion and

placement of the individual

"'"^T.

B. Bottomo ce

Philosophy

,

,

in society.

ed.

,

Karl Marx; Selected Writings

(New York: McGraw

Hill,

i_n

Sociology and Social

1964), p. 62.

11

Karl Marx, The Grundrisse
Harper & Row, 1971), p. 76.

,

ed.

,

David McLellan,

(New York:

It is

important, however, to note that the above
discussion

to categorize

Marx as

a

mere

characterize him as such.

relativist, although

1st van

Meszaros

is not

meant

some Marxist scholars

states that Marx:

Denies that man is an essentially egoistic being,
for he does
not accept such a thing as a fixed human nature
(or, indeed,
a fixed anything). In Marx's view man is by
nature neither'
egoistic nor altruistic. He is made, by his own

activity, into

what he

The above

is

^'^

any given time.

incomplete in that

to discriminate

and

is at

Marx does

adopt a "fixed" standard, a standard

between true and false consciousness and between the alienated

fulfilled life.

To

the extent that

Marx

indicts existing

arrangements he

cannot be a pure relativist.
Let us now examine the actual problem of alienation so that

more

clearly to see

how

the

model

of

the idea of species being, operates in

we can come

human development, expressed through
Marx's thought.

It is

the theory of

alienation which expresses the interrelationship between "Mensch" as a
historical being and

"Mensch" as

potentiality.

The Problem

of Alienation

Alienation, then, is a social condition rooted in a series of relationships

which are ultimately assessed
species

life.

It

in

terms

will eventually be

species consciousness

is

of their relation to creative labor and

shown

that

it is

through creative labor that

realized.

12
1st van

Meszaros, Marx's Theory

Press, 1970), p. 148.

of Alienation,

(London:

Merlin

,

Before exploring the idea of species
understanding of the problem

itself.

concrete relationship between

life,

Alienation for

man and

useful to have a broad

it is

Marx

his products. "^^

important to see that Marx's discussion of
alienation

worker, or the proletariat as a class.
is

resides "in the

However,

is not

it

is

limited to the

Although his treatment of alienation

rooted in the worker's relation to his product, to
the process of production,

to other

"Menschen," and

to his species being, these relations as well

relations of private property,

commodity production, and wage labor.

relations of private property and

worker.

The

become
These

commodity production involve more than

the

capitalist is also directly involved.

First

it

has to be noted that everything which appears in

worker as an activity of alienation, of estrangement,
appears in the non-worker as a state of alienation, of

the

estrangement.

The discussion
ing that both

of alienation as presented

by Istvan Meszaros

worker and employer are involved

is helpful in explain-

in the relations of alienation.

He has interpreted the theory

of alienation as a condition arising

of second order mediations.

The second order mediations are private property,

13

Op.

cit.

,

from a

set

Avineri, p. 98.

14

Karl Marx, The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, ed.
D. Struik, (New York: International Publishers, 1964), p. 119. According to
Avineri, 0£. cit. the proletariat for Marx represents the paradigm case of
,

the

human

condition within capitalist society.

Chiss Consciousness

,

George Lukacs

History and

in his

(London: Merlin Press, 1968), also states that the proletariat's
human beings are alienated in modern

alienation is different in kind but that all
society.

The worker's alienation

of mental labor or responsibility.

is

only

more stark because there

The difference

with the alien commodity, while the capitalist

is that the

is not.

is

worker

no facade
faced

is

6

55
the division of labor and exchange.

worker; they relate

to private

These clearly

affect both

employer and

property through exchange.

Man's productive activity cannot bring him
fulfillment because
the mstitutionalized second order
mediations interpose
themselves between man and his activity,
between man and
nature and between
In

man

and man.

other words, "Mensch" is forced to relate to
"Mensch" through exchange,

rather than labor, or through private property rather
than nature.

mediations "interpose themselves between

him from finding

1

The theory

human appropriation

of alienation extends

the relationships created

"Menschen" and

his activity and prevent

fulfillment in his labor, in the exercise of his productive

(creative) abilities, and in the

activity."

man and

These

between "Mensch"

of the products of his

from the division

of labor

in labor to his products to other

his species being through to the second order of

resulting from these relationships.

and

phenomena

These second order relations or mediations,

build on private property and exchange.

The non-mediated, or non-alienated form

when "Mensch"

is in

of

human

relationship is

a reciprocating triad with his labor and the forces of

"nature," as demonstrated below.

Mensch

Nature

Labor

15
^

Op.

%id

cit.
. ,

,

Meszaros,

p. 78.

^'^Ibid., p.

104.

p. 83.

In the alienated

Mor is
end

in

form, the triad of "Mensch" controlling
nature through one's

replaced by the relations of

"

Mensch, " property and labor, which

an antagonistic relationship between property
and labor.

M-Mensch
P-Private Property and

its

owner

L-Wage Labor and worker
AN-Alienated Nature
AI-Alienated Industry

In

The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts

the alienation of

"Mensch" from

his product

,

Marx discusses

at length

and the process of production and

the consequences of this estrangement as the alienation of

other "Menschen" and from his species being.

More

"Mensch" from

specifically, alienation is

seen m:

The relation

worker to the product of labor as an alien
object exercising power over him. This relation is at the same
1)

of the

time the relation to the sensuous external world, to the objects
of nature, as an alien world economically opposed to him. 19
2)

The relation

of labor to the art of production

within

the

labor process.

This relation is the relation of the worker
to his own activity as an alien activity not belonging to him.

20
.

.

Ibid., p. 108.
19

Cp. cit., KarlMarx,

Ibid.

The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts

of 1844, p. 111.
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The result

of the above relations turns:
3) Man's_s2cciesbeino-, both nature and his
spiritual species
property, into a being alien to him,
into a means to his
individual existence. It estranges from
man his own body
as well as extremal nature and his
spiritual essence, his
human being. '^^

And these

relations culminate with the following
consequence.

An immediate consequence of the
from the product of his labor, from

4)

fact that

man

is

his life activity,

estranged

from

species being, is the estrangement of man from
man.
man confronts himself, he confronts the other manT^
In

terms

of the

problem

of alienation the

his

When

estrangement from one's product

ofjabor becomes intertwined with the separation from the
labor process, the
art of production itself.

1)

This aspect of alienation reflects the laborer's side of commodity

production.

The worker's

life

exists outside of him.

He confronts

his labor

as a stranger.

The alienation

worker in his product means not only
becomes an object, an external existence,
it exists outside him independently as something
him and that it becomes a power on its own confrontof the

that his labor

but that
alien to

ing him.

The more one produces,

the

more

the world

becomes

filled

with alien objects.

Instead of a worker with control over his productive capacities he becomes an

21

Ibid

.

,

p. 114.

,

p. 108.

22
Ibid.

Ibid

.
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"Objectless" being.
tion, i.e.
,

In present society ".

production) instead of helping

alienation.

."24
.

The division of

under which "Mensch"

is not

.

the creations of objects
(objectifica-

.

man

to realize

capitalist and

himself causes

worker creates

the conditions

free to produce without making
himself a slave.

worker sinks to the level of a commodity
.
.
.
and becomes
indeed the most wretched of
commodities; that the wretchedness
o the workers is in inverse
proportion to the power and magnitude
of his production; that the necessary
result of competition is the
accumulation of capital in a few hands, and
thus the restoration
of monopoly in a more terrible
form .
.
ending in society as
two classes
the property owners and the
propertyless workers. ^5
the

.

-

As

the worker's

into a

work

activity is

commodity26 because

it

more nor

less than sugar.

his labor

power also

becomes purchasable and

a pure element of exchange.

expression of alienation.

mechanized

is

translated

salable and, therefore,

Labor, as a commodity, becomes
a clear

"Labor power, therefore,

The former

is

is

measured by

a commodity, neither
the clock, the latter by

the scale. "28

In Capital

Marx speaks

of the conversion of products into

therefore the resulting conversion of

24
25

men

into

commodities and

producers of commodities.

O?'. cit,,

Avineri, p. 102.

Op.

Marx, The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts

cit.
,

of

184_4_.

p. 106.

'Marx defines a commodity as an object outside the individual, as a thing
wliich satisfies human wants of some sort or another, in Capital,
I, (New York:
International Publishers, 1967), p. 35.

27

Op.

cit.

,

Marx, Grundrisse,

p. 59.

28

Karl Marx, "Wage Labour and Capital" in Marx-Engels Selected Works
(Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1968), p. 79.

,

59

Relations

become commodity

relations as opposed to

human

relations.

The

exchange of products replaces the social
interchange among persons. 29 The
fact that capitalism

produces commodities

is not

what distinguishes

it

from

other modes of production, "but rather
the fact that being a commodity

dominant and determining characteristic of

products, "30

its

is the

is its distinctive

characteristic.

The products are no longer controlled by

him as

his.

relation of

2)

the worker, or recognized by

the separateness of the products, as
opposed to the integral

It is

worker and product, which defines

The second element

in

Marx'

s

the worker's existence.

discussion of alienation involves

the act of production, or the process of production.
activity itself.

In

terms of the actual activity

difficult not to treat the relationship

process of production as integral

the

summary

of production

to one another.

worker

to

in the creation of the product.

of the activity of production.

alienation, production itself

must be active

activity, the activity of alienation.

involves the producting
it

becomes

between "Mensch" and his labor and the

alienation as rooted in the relation of

process involved

It

If

It

would be

difficult to

assess

product without including the

"The product

is after all but

then the product of labor is

alienation, the alienation of

""^"^

29

Op.

cit.

,

Marx, Capital,

I,

p. 72.

30

Karl Marx, Capital

,

III,

(New York: International Publishers,

1967), p. 879.

31

Op.

cit.

,

Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts

,

p.

110.
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The process

of production is external to
the

worker

in

much

same way

the

that the product is external.

The work process confronts the worker
as pre-

established and autonomous.

The worker then

pre-existing and self-sufficient,

conform
3)

The

4)

"Mensch" from
"Mensch.

"

work process "already

functions independently of

laws whether he likes

to its

and

it

finds the

it

him and he has

to

or not. "32

effects of the above conditions result
in the alienation of

his species being^S and therefore

The species

understanding alienation

must be

"Mensch"

life,

then,

is to

grasp the ideal of species

is

separated from

the unalienated life , and the key to
life to

which

it

refers. 34

Species being involves the consciousness of oneself
and one's species
relations.

32

Op.

In other

cit.

terms species being could be expressed as a collective

Lukacs,

,

p.

self-

89.

33

Marx's use of species being can be traced back to Ludwig Feuerbach.
For
Feuerbach the individual is incomplete without others. He spoke in The
Essence
oj Christianity (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1957), of species being
in terms
,

of the consciousness of oneself as a member of the species.
"Consciousness
in the strictest sense is present only in a being to whom his
species, his essential
nature, is an object of thought. The brute is indeed conscious of himself as an

individual—and he has accordingly the feeling of self as common centre
successive sensations but not as a species ..." (p.l.)

—

of

34

Adam Schaff sees species being as used in the four following ways within
Marx's thought: 1) Species being meaning social being, 2) as a being constituting
a specimen of the species, 3) as a being engaged in a conscious life activity,
and 4) as a being which corresponds to the model of man. See Adam Schaff,
Marxism and the Human Individual (New York: McGraw Hill, 1970), p. 82.
I do not think that these are four separate or distinct meanings of species being.
They all are involved in the concept, but in an interrelated fashion. Conscious,

ness and social living are integrally related for Marx. His model of "Mensch"
as species being is related and combined with (1), (2), and (3).

61

consciousness.

This necessitates being aware
that others share qualities
with

you, and that these qualities cannot
be shared by humans and
animals but only

among human

beings.

HMensch'< experiences things
completely his own which

he does not share with animal

"Mensch"

life.

(Gattungswesen) because "Mensch"

is

a species being

is:

distinguished from animals not by
"consciousness"as such, but
by a particular kind of consciousness.
Man is not only conscious
of himself as an individual; he is also
conscious

m ember

of

human

of the

essence" which

is the

same

A

species being then

is

directly with its individuality. "^^

essence of
reality

tlie

it

man

is the

is

"...

a being

m the

German

of oneself in relation

whose essence does not coincide
Ideology

ensemble (aggregate) of social relations.

Marx

states that "the

"^"^

In its

"Mensch"

hence,

is,

and this involves not only the involvement

with others, but the consciousness of these connections.
the consciousness of one's species ties.

For Marx

this

would be

Consciousness becomes an integral part

of the interaction between persons because
for

"humnn

no abstraction inherent in each separate individual.

totality of his social connections

becomes

,

himself and in other men.^^

in

Consciousness of one's species being involves awareness
to others.

himself as a

species, and so he nppr-p].^n^.

"... man's

him objective and actual through

relation to himself only

his relation to other

men.

"*^^

35

Op. cit., Marx, "On the Jewish Question,
emphasis is my own.

" in

Bottomore,

p. 13.

[The

]

36

37

Op.

cit.

,

Meszaros,

p. 81.

Karl Marx, German Ideology

,

(New York: International Publishers,

1947), p. 198.

38

Op.
p. 116.

cit.

,

Marx, The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts

o_f

1844

,
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Consciousness distinguishes
"Mensch" from anin>als and
therefore

•Mensoh" "apprehends a human
essence which

me„."39 ^he self-consciousness

in other

is the

same

in

himself and

of the individual can be
transformed

into the self-consciousness
of "nature" within him,

and this develops into awareness

of his species being.

But

man knows

m other beings,
themselves

m man,
A
use of

he

himself, he is conscious of
himself.
the natural instincts and
energies

in isolation

manifest
and unconsciously, they are united

aware of them

is

.

.

.^^

difficulty With the discussion of
species consciousness in

to distinguish

it

when he

quotation

Whereas

"Mensch" from animal.

This

is

Marx

is his

seen in a previous

states that consciousness in and of
itself does not distinguish

"Mensch" from "animal,

" but it is

species consciousness which does so.

"ideal" sense this distinction is valuable.

species consciousness

is

most

However,

in capitalist society

In

some

where

often replaced by an atomized individualistic

consciousness, what distinguishes

man from animal?

I

do not think he means to

collapse the distinction between "Mensch"
and animal in non-species relationships
(i.e.
,

is

capitalist society) but he does not construct
a picture of societal life that

apart from animal

consciousness.

animal

39

40

I

life in all

.

Ibid

cit.

.

,

,

p.

involving conscious

life

experience, and yet not species

would think that consciousness would distinguish
human and
societies and that species consciousness is a
possible distinction

Og._cit., Marx,

Op

life

"On

German
102.

the Jewish Question, " in Bottomore,
p. 13, footnote 2.

Ideology

,

p. 103.
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""ly wiUUn „„„-.,ionaCo<i
.soeioUas.
"nly

a,

,>„,s.si[,imy an<l not

Species being

as actual

model

iu the

ol

T,.

„,„„.,

hum.m
what

fruition.

i..

o^-^'vo relation
othor.s

p„„sil,le l„r "Mons.^h" in tho
to

can develop a species consciousness.

products, to „is

w..,-R

and to

Thl» set of relationships n^entionod

iho actual activity of species
life.

is

Species being- expresses what
•-I
it

„„,„^ ^^^^^^^

in this

is

sense expresses an ideal.

possible as opposed to what already
exists

However,

it is

no "utopian" ideal

can be realized lor Marx th.-ough
revolutionary activity.

in that

"Through

revolutionary activity one becomes
conscious of the collective roots of
his Being,
iic'volutionary activity

.-•'^iu.-.lity.

pushes the possibility of species

life to

become an

Through history and praxis tho "potential"
becomes "reality" via

activity of the

the

'^'"^

])rol(!tari;i,t.

Species being expresses the universal dimension
of "Mensch," while class
existence can only express
lias

a,

th(^ ])a,rtial

aspect of "Mensch."

Species "Mensch"

unity with himself and with others and,
hence, is able to form a

of fcillow

human beings.

The partial existence

community

of class society excludes such

possibilities.

The

idea that the

human being creates

objects through his labor, the

view of labor as a social pi-ocess. as well as the
conscrious activity are

all

notioii of

labor as

important to tho conception of species being.

'^^James Glass. "Marx, Kaflca and Jung: The Appearance of Species Being."
and Society, II (Winter, 1972), ]). 256.

i^)litics

AO

The posing of species existence against class existence
by James Glass, ibid., pp. 256-2G4.

is

elaborated on

"

,
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One

of the

major distinguishing elements
between ^Mensch" and animal

idea of productive, objectifying
labor.

This

is integrally

related to his

previous discussions of "consciousness.''
"The object of labor
'""^

^^^^^^^^^^^i^^^

.

."44 and

it

is the

is,

is therefore,

hence, logical to

believe that in tearing away from
individuals the object of their
production,

one tears away from them their
species life."45
In alienated labor the

"Mensch" then conceives
species

life.

worker sees himself

in isolation

from others.

of the "others" as strangers,
rather than part of his

Instead of seeing himself in others he
onfy sees the other "Mensch."

Marx extends

his discussion of species being and,
therefore, the

of alienation to the "Declaration of
the Rights of

th^ J.ewish Questi^

Marx

Man and

problem

of the Citizen, " in

On

deals here with how he thinks society is
organized

around a conception of the individual which ignores
and perverts the very idea
of species being.

In his critical examination of the "Rights of

Man,

"

he rejects

the accepted usage of the specific "rights" of
"liberty," "property," "equality"

and "security.
"Liberty," as discussed in the declaration
views the individual as atomistic

and isolated.
with

man

"Liberty as a right of

but rather on the separation of

0£._cit., Marx,
Ibid

man

is not

based on the association of

man from man. "^^

The

The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts

right of

of 1844. p. 114.

.

46

Karl Marx, "On the Jewish Question," in Guddat and Easton,
eds.
tjie Young Marx on Philosophy and Society
(New York: Anchor
Books, 1967), p. 235.
Writings_o_f

,

man

.
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Marx

property,

also views as a right to
self-aggrandizement with the acquisition

of possessions as the privileged
value.

"The

right of property is thus the
right

to enjoy

and dispose of one's possessions
as one wills, without regard
for other

men and

independently of society.

to liberty,

"48 ^j^i^j^

nomad." According

Equality, Marx views as "the
equal right

theoretically treats the individual
as a "self-sufficient
to

Marx, security guarantees the

state of alienation.

It_

protects liberty and property .
In essence, the values underlying the
organization of society presuppose

an atomistic human being.

They become an integral part

of the societal

condition of alienation.

Thus none of the so-called rights
egoistic man, the man withdrawn

of

man

goes beyond the

into himself, his private

interest and his private choice, and separated from
the
community, as a member of civil society. Far from

viewing man here in his species being, his species life
itself— society rather appears to be an external frame-

work

for the individual, limiting his original independence.

In order to help sort out the crucial dimensions of alienation,

designed the construct below.

It

I

Alienation exists when the relationship between
a
b
established in
c
prevents the
ability to do, be or have,
x

^'^Ibid

. ,

p. 236.

48ibid
Ibid ., p. 237.

have

reveals the pivotal position of species

being within the theory of alienation.

'^^
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The elements applying

Some

to "a"

and

'^b"

are divided into two separate
groups.

of the elements for "a" and
"b" apply to "Mensch'' in the
labor process:

the others apply to the relations
between an activity and the
institutions in
society.

1.

The elements

"Mensch"

in "a"

in the labor

and "b" flow respectively from
"a"

process.

"^^^^^"^

product
labor

proletariat

(object)

(activity)

capitalist

wo^k^r

2.

to "b".

worker

Relations between activities and institutions.

property

use

wage labor

needs

exchange or consumption

creation of false needs

nature by "Mensch"

Elements from group one and two should not be interchanged.

Elements for

group "c" can be work, political economy and commodity
production.

Elements

for group "X" can be

humanly free, creative through labor, social "Mensch."

These are

statements of the entire notion of species being.

all partial

in its largest

meaning

When one
relationships.

fills

is

species

"X"

life itself.

out the construct alienation stands as a series of social

For example: Alienation

wage labor and needs, established

exists

in political

when

the relationship between

economy undermines

the ability
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^ol^eere^ti^^
between
political

Or:

Alienation exists

when

the relationship

^rW^ie^ro^ and the use^fnatne.^^
economy, prevents species

life.

Or:

^^^^.^.^^^^

Alienation exists

when

the

relationship between worker and
product, established in commodity

production, prevents the ability to be
a species being .

As

this construct

alienatio^^

shows, species being ^as "x'n

poses the necessary c ontrast model

relationships already existinp-.
not

encompass

vital to the

web.

a series of social

The social and Economic conditions alone
do

the theory of alienation.

built into the conceptual

to

theory^

Marx's model of human capacity

Alienation has a social and historical aspect
and

a dimension that stands outside or above
particular social arrangements.

order words, alienation
historical)

make

is

is

In

said to exist because a series of relations
(social and

un-alienated (species)

life

impossible.

The mere description

of a set of relationships does not necessitate
the conclusion that alienation exists
in

any specific instance.

A whole

set of assumptions about

involved here as is a model about a preferred style of

We saw
tightly

for

Durkheim

woven circle

that

from

life.

need statements and the moral order formed a

limiting the ideal of the moral order to the resolution of

the needs for security, order and the controlled life.
to operate as

"Mensch" are

such for Marx.

the ideal of species life.

Marx's treatment

For support of

examination of the analysis of need in Marx.

Needs are clearly unable

of needs is severely differentiated

this position let us

move

to

an
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The Vocabulary

Alienation,

"Mensch"

human

we have

in that species

possibility.

seen, is

more

being which

"Needs"

of

would

Marx

than a social and historical
view of

is integral to the

theory focuses upon

(This is not to deny that the fruition
of species being is

through social and historical processes,
e.g.
I

in

like to support further the

,

revolutionary activity.)

above claim by showing how Marx's

theory of human needs camiot in and by
itself express either his concern
with

humanpotentiality or his critical stance .

own

This will involve uncovering Marx's

definition of needs as reflective of society
in

of development.

And as Marx's treatment

evident that he does not bestow the

He terms some needs
crude.

And such

of evaluation.

If

same

true, others false;

distinctions cannot be

of

terms

needs

not.

some human, while

if

flexible

Species being
in

is

to distinguish

become

others are termed
external standard

and completely relative,

as merely inclinations

among them, on

the basis

He, therefore, must have external criteria for evaluation.
not derived from expressed needs as

Durkheim's theory—the moral order.

This

is not

society) are not related to the

however
model

to

is its

closest parallel

In alienated society there

need (inclination toward) for creative labor and yet
of species being.

will

the basis of the felt need itself?

Marx assessed needs

toward given objects he would be unable
of needs themselves.

it

made unless he has an

human needs are thoroughly

For instance,

studied

validity to all the needs he identifies.

how could one distinguish a need as true or not on
One could

is

of the society's stage

may

this is a part of the

be no

model

say that needs (as reflective of

of species being.

For instance, the "need

69
for others" is at once
both a product of social
necessity and a part of

social

community necessary

to species life.

inconsistent in his terminology

it

when he speaks

seems as though Marx

processes.

is

of the necessity of
"others"

as a need, because he treats
this necessity as a
universal duality.
at all other

h«

Needs are

times for him reflective of
particular societies and
historical
Although his language

may

not express

it

clearly,

I

think that the

"necessity for other beings" can
be explained as involving two
dimensions:
1)

a condition necessary for
survival, (the gathering of food,
shelter, clothing)

and, 2) as a partial model of
a preferred social form Integral
to the concept

species being.

The "needing

of others"

is

used by Marx

to

express both reality

(necessity as actual) and possibility,
in terms of an ideal form of

human

relationship.

Because the idea
needs

it

is able to

of species being is not simply
derived

from manifested

operate as a contrast model to existing
societal tendencies

expressed through individual needs.

We

shall see that

it is

through Marx's

discussion of needs that he develops a systematic
attack on the political economy.

From where

does the force of such criticism come?

Clearly not from the needs

themselves which not only reflect but structure society.

Marx's appraisal of hum^m needs

to see

how

the

Let us then examine

model of species being operates

to

50
In Marx's discussion of Feuerbach in the
German Ideology op. cit. he
treats the notion of "being social" as persons needing
one another. "Feuerbach's
,

,

whole deductions with regard to the relation of men to one another
goes only so
far as to prove that men need and always have needed each
"
.
other
(p.

the "Theses on Feuerbach,"

Marx

inherent in each single individual.
relations." See,
p. 26.

Adam

Schaff,

states that "the
In its reality

A Philosophy

of

human essence

is

33)

In

no abstraction

is the ensemble of the social
Man. (New York: Delta, 1963),
it
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guide the appraisal.

An examination

of the usage of need in the

andPhiloso^c

Ideology. Th_e

the Grundrisse, the
introduction

PoliticaLEcono^ and
relation to

German

Capital,

volume

1,

will uncover

^

Marx's view

social and historical dimensions
in terms of origin,

1) its

Economic

of

need in

2)

the

mode

of production, 3) the capitalist's
definition of the worker's need,
and 4) the idea
of a "state need.

as expressed in
set of felt

Durkheim

"

3)

and

4)

human needs.

is

unable to

make

distinctions between needs such

because of his basic reduction of the
moral order

The

critical stance

which

is

evident in the following

discussion reflects the underlying commitments
of Marx
social and

human

Marx

to a

to a different

form

of

organization, i.e., species being.

states clearly in Capital, volume

1,

that

workers have needs which

are defined by the level of social advancement of the
society.

Needs reflect the

level of the development of production which involves
economic, technological

and social advancement.

Wants are also reflective

of such

processes for Marx,

and at several key points he uses need and want interchangeably.

The labourer needs time

for satisfying his intellectual and
social wants, the extent and number of which are conditioned
by the general state of social advancement.
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Contemporary distinctions between "needs" as a constant, universal, asocial, quality and "want" as a flexible

more

pliable notion clearly will not

apply to Marx.

For Marx, both "need" and "want" are flexible phenomena,
open to society and history. Although he does seem to use need and want interchangeably at times, and would be amenable to the notion that all needs are wants
at

at

some
some

stage;

I

hesitate to say that he would hold the position that all wants are

point needs.

52

Op.

cit.

,

Marx, Capital,

1,

p. 232.

[The emphasis

is

my

own.]

Categories most often thought of
as physical necessities are
also defined and

tempered
appear

to

in relation to the stage of
historical

development.

Physical needs

be defined culturally.
His natural wants such as food,
clothing,
vary according to the climatic and
other

and housing
physical conditions
of his country. On the other hand,
the number and extent
so -called necessarv wants, as
°^
also the modes of
satisfying them, are themselves the
product of hist orical
devclopmentjmdd cp^nd therefore to7";^ ^^r^^^^^^;r:;^
^
fuel

^

degree of civilizat_ion_ofj^countr^
morel)articularly on
the conditions under which, and
consequently on the habits
and degree of comfort in which, the class
of free labourers
has been formed. ^"^

Natural and necessary wants (expressing the
same phenomena) as reflective
of biological necessity (food, clothing, housing)
are contingent to a great

degree on the historical development of a country.

For instance, the less

developed a society the fewer nutrients define a balanced

diet.

The more

technologically developed the society the larger the differentiation
there

between what
living.

is

necessary for survival and what

In the United States three

(although this does not

mean

is

necessary for comfortabl

balanced meals are defined as necessary

that all, or

most people have

this)

Bengladesh water and a bowl of rice are defined as a necessary

Marx

whereas

German

Ideology .

History

is

in

diet.

also discusses the relationship between needs and the

production in the

is

mode

of

then seen as the development

the productive forces, necessary to the process of society.

But life involves before everything else, eating and drinking,
a habitation, clothing and many other things. The first
historical act is thus the production of the

these needs, the production of material

^^Ibid., p. 171.

^^

Op.

cit.

,

Marx, German Ideology

,

p. 16.

means

to satisfy

life itself.
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Marx

further states that the needs that
are already established structure
the

social and historical processes.

Needs, once established, begin
to define

They become self-sustaining.

possibilities.

The various shaping of material life is of
course in every case
dependent on the needs which are already
developed, and both
the production and the satisfaction of
these needs is an
historical process.

Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, Marx
discusses

In the

the idea of

"manipulated need," termed as "imaginary appetite";
an example of an imaginary

need being the need

to

and "human need.

"Crude need,

need"
of

is

shown

"

possess.

He
"

as well distinguishes between "crude need"

viewed as the inhuman and unnatural, "human

in its relation to private property.

Crude need

is the

debasement

human need.
Subjectively, this is partly manifested in that the extension of
products and needs falls into contriving and ever calculating

subservience to inhuman, unnatural and imaginary appetites.
Private property does not know how to change crude need into
"
into

Marx makes

human

~

need.

clear that private property and the necessity of capital are givens

within the context of the political economy.
to

be a living capital, and therefore a capital with needs—one which loses

[and hence

^

"But the worker has the misfortune

its livelihood,

every moment

economy defines human needs

in

terms

it

is

of its

not working."^'''

The

its

interest

political

own requirements and

it

therefore

^^Ibid., p. 71.

^^ Op.

cit.

,

[The emphasis

Marx, The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts
is

my

^7
Ibid., p. 120.

own.

]

of 1844 , p. 147.

much upon

counts as

The

political

the refinement of needs as

economy

.

.

.

it

does upon their crudeness.

defines the worker's needs along
these narrow lines.

economy knows

political

animal~as

the worker only as a workina beast reduced to the strictest
bodily needs. ^8

Crude need prevails and bodily needs are redefined

into subsistence

the capitalists within the context of the
capitalist society.

structures the worker's situation because he
level.

He earns enough

to

hours to secure even this.
structured by crude need,

This

is

an example on an

is

needs by

Crude need

forced to live on a subsistence

barely have his family eat and he must work
long

According

to

human beings

Marx's analysis

,

in a society

suffer from fatigue and malnutrition.

initial level of the

debasement of the human needs

nutritional food, leisure and r^st.

The minimum limit of the value of labour power is determined
by the value of the commodities, without the daily supply of
which the labourer cannot renew his vital energy, consequently
by the value of those means of subsistence that are physically
indispensable.

The condition

of necessity , or subsistence defines need within the political

economy.

The value

of labour

power

determined by the value of the
life habitually required by the average
labourer. The quantity of these necessaries is Imown at
any given epoch of a given society and can, therefore be
treated as a constant magnitude.
is

necessaries of

^^Ibid

. ,

p. 73.

59
I

Op.

cit.

,

Karl Marx, Capital

60
Ibid

.

,

p.

519.

,

2> P* 1^3.

for
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Hence, within the political economy
there
for the

worker, and that

is that he,

is

only one need that

recognized

is

or she, be able to work.

The

cheat-thief, swindler, beggar and
unemployed; the
starvmg, wretched and criminal
workingman-these are
figures who do not exist for political
economy

but only for

other eyes, those of the doctor, the
judge, the gravedigger and bumbailiff, etc.
such figures are specters
outside its domain. For it, therefore,
the worker's
needs are but one need— to maintain him
whilst he is
working in so far as may be necessary to prevent
the
race of labourers from dying out.
:

"Mensch"

is

seen merely as worker and as a worker he only
has crude needs

defined by the political economy as a subsistence

Marx

life.

finds such treatment detrimental to the development
of

His conception of "Mensch" as a
the present political

human being capable

human

beings.

of species relations outside

economy has him constantly posing "Mensch" as worker

within capitalist society against "Mensch" as

human being

potentially capable

of species relations.

Marx

continues to examine the relationship between the

and "human wants"

Economy

.

mode

of production

in detail in his Introduction to the Critique of Political

Although the discussion employs the language of "want"

it is

clearly

indicated that the discussion extends to "needs" as well.
It is

clear that while production furnishes the material object

of consumption, consumption provides the ideal object of

production, as
It

its

image,

cit.

want,

its

impulse, and

its

purpose.

furnishes the object of production in

No wants, no production.

Op.

its

,

its subjective form.
But consumption reproduces the want.

Marx, The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts

62

of 1884

,

p.

121.

Karl Marx, "Introduction to the Critique of Political Economy," in David
Horowitz, ed. Marx and Modern Economics (New York: Modern Reader, 1968),
,

p. 30.

,

.
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Hence, production
Although

is in the position of

Marx uses

developing and defining human
wants.

the language of wants here,

I

think this discussion is

understood most clearly as an explication of
the development of manipulated
need, or false need.

According

to

Marx, as "wants" are further refined by
production they

necessitate further production.

production which

Marx

It is

this relationship

between wants and

calls "consumptive production. "^^

"Production creates

the material as the outward object of consumption,
consumption creates the
of production. "^^

want as the inward object, the purpose
tion creates

new wants

(false needs) as

it

mind.

But there

is not

produc-

of

organizes to satisfy old ones.

and products are in a consumer relationship as each
in

The mode

is

People

developed with the other

a one to one relationship here.

The priorities are

with production; the false needs (manufactured wants) must be created as a

necessary force for production, but these needs are most often not met.
Capitalist society for

Marx develops needs which

As demonstrated
its

in the above,

Marx

it

can not meet.

deals with

human need

social and historical origin via relationships with the

and the political economy in general.
of Political Econoniy , the

Ideology, and Capital,

^^Ibid., p. 31.
S'^Ibid

In quotations taken

mode

the

terms

of

of production

from The Critique

Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts,

Marx uses

in

terms "natural wants,

"

the

German

and "human need"

"
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to apply to the concept of

for

Marx

need as authentic or "real" need.

include food, housing, clothing,
social living.

partial degree his broader

model

of species being.

These authentic needs

They express only

He uses "imaginary

"want," and "crude need" to apply to false
or manipulated need.
to be tied to Interests

of

manufactured by the political economy.

need one sees that he distinguishes between

political

economy and

potentiality as

reality, as

"human need"

in a

appetite,

These appear

In his di;
iscussion

manipulated need

in

reflective of species being.

Clearly, species being functions throughout the
discussion of need as that model
of social life

which would be

the conceptual distinctions

Although Marx

it

may

the

realm

"human needs." Without such

Marx makes between needs

may be somewhat

of needs, he clearly does

Even within

in tune with

make a

a model

could not be drawn.

loose in his terminology on the question

distinction between real and manipulated need.

of "real" need

Marx accounts

manifest itself due to societal forces.

for differences in the

For example, hunger

is

way

seen as

a "real," or "natural" need, according to Marx, although there are different

kinds of hunger.

Hunger is hunger; but the hunger that is satisfied with cooked
meat eaten with fork and knife is a different kind of hunger
from the one that devours raw meat with the aid of hands,
nails and teeth.

"Needs,"

in

Marx, whether they be related

to the

worker, the mode of

production, or "productive consumption," reflect the social and historical

dimension of their origin.

Social distinctions are even drawn in relation to the

"real" (as authentic) need of hunger.

^^Ibid., p. 30.

However, several statements by Marx

in

.
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relation to his treatment of need
raiee the question as to what
degree needs

are social and historical and, therefore,
manipulable.
Philosophic Manuscripts

Marx

In the

Economic and

writes:

This estrangement manifests itself in
part in that it produces
sophistication of needs and of their means
on the one hand,
and a bestial barbarization, a complete
unrefined, abstract
simplicity of need on the other . . . even
the need for fresh
~
air ceases for the worker ^6
'

.

... it actually reaches the point where it spares man the
need of either fresh air or physical exercise. ^'^
These statements seem

to

pose the idea of a totally flexible individual.

The

view of "Mensch" as completely molded by external forces
leaves room for
total dehumanization.

It is

not only that

needs cease

man

to exist.

has no human

needs— even

his animal

The Irishman no longer knows any need

now

but the need to eat, and indeed only the need to eat
potatoes ---and scabby potatoes at that, the worst kind of
potatoes.

The

political

economy debases

neither enjoyment or activity.

an insensible being lacking
abstraction from

66
p.

Op.

cit.

,

all activity. "

Ibid

^^Ibid
Ibid

., p.

. ,

"He

(the capitalist)

worker needs

changes the worker into

needs, just as he changes his activity into a pure
69
In the political

economy, "self-renunciation.

Marx, The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts

148.

67

all

the individual to the point that the

150.

p. 149

of 1844 ,

78
the renunciation of life, and of all

human needs,

The above treatment by Marx interprets
terms

of the consciousness of the need.

is its

"'^^

principle thesis.

the presence of a need in

For example, when the workers

are no longer conscious of their needs, the needs
themselves disappear .
In other words,
In the

when

the conscious desire ends for fresh air,
the need ends.

above quotations, the consciousness of one's needs
appears

to

be

directly tied to their being "felt" and to the possibility
of their fulfillment.
In essence, then,

when

worker eats nothing but potatoes, and learns

the

expect nothing but potatoes, he no longer needs anything but
potatoes.

to

A

similar approach applies

to

for travel,

— that is no real and self-realizing need— to travel.

I

have no need

Marx's statement on travel.

Because the travel can not be actualized,

For Marx,
a)

some

in

it is

"If

I

have no money
"'^^

no longer a need.

order for a need to be classed as such there must be

level of consciousness in regard to an end, and b) there

possibility of fulfilling

it.

"For Marx

for something, usually something

must be some

'need' refers to the desire one feels

which

is not

immediately available.

"'^^

jj-

involves a conative state, a desire or tendency toward something.

The above explanation

of the use of need in

Marx as a

"Mensch" as a completely socialized product.

defines

totally pliable concept

The problem arises not

70
Ibid ., p. 150.

71

Ibid., p. 108.

Oilman, Alienation; Marx's Conception of Man in Capitalist
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1971), p. 77.

'^^Bertell

Society

,

in the conceptualization of

"Mensch" as a social animal, but

in

terms

of the

dimensions and impact society levels on
"Mensch." Does the classification
of

"Mensch" as a social animal mean

that he is completely plastic,

needs created by the society which nurtures
him?

Marx which can

with his

There are statements

lead one to interpret his conception of
"Mensch" as totally

pliable and, therefore, open to severe social
manipulation; that the

becomes passive

that

"Mensch"

in the light of social

me

there seems to

in

is

to

and economic pressures.

worker

However,

be more of an overriding commitment to the position

an active force within society.

Afterall, he has a constant

and underlying commitment to the possibilities of human potential
which

undergirds his whole criticism of political economy.

If

"Mensch" were con-

ceived by him as totally plastic where would his commitment to the possibilities
of

human development stem from? We have seen him move

position as he

makes

distinctions between needs.

only what society and history

Marx speaks

of

Although

make them

would be impossible
it

If

outside the relativist

"Mensch" and

the differentiation

his needs are

among needs which

to construct.

has not been discussed yet, one familiar with Marx's thought

might think that the discussion of false consciousness lends support
that

"Mensch"

is not totally pliable, in that

However, the discussion relating
helpful

when dealing with

to false consciousness

is

view

possible.

does not prove too

the question of the manipulability of

Marx because Marx's conception
class consciousness.

a true consciousness

to the

human need

in

of false consciousness relates to the idea of

Class consciousness

is distinguished

from individual

80

consciousness because

member

of a class.

it

It is

primarily involves being conscious
about

bcin,- a

not consciousness about individual
needs; "but

it

is.

on the contrary, the sense, become conscious,
of the historical role of the
class.

"'^•^

However,

of individual needs

consciousness?

"Mensch"

still

if

"Mensch" were completely manipulate on

how could there ever be

Even though

this also

must stand apart from

the question

the possibility of revolutionary

expresses

itself

as a class phenomena,

the social and historical manipuhiting

forces of the political economy for revolutionary
consciousness ever to appear.

This

is

not to involve us in the substantive issue of the
possibility of revolution-

ary consciousness, but rather to expose the incompatibility
within the same
theory, of a language of needs as completely open to total manipulation
and the
idea of revolutionary consciousness.
If it is

phiusiblc to say that

Marx

posits "Mensch" as an active force in

social activity and also has a conception of

human

potential (which operates as

an ideal of sorts not limited by social and historical arrangements) then
question the terminology used by

more accurate

to

"Mcnschcn," but thoy may
is in

in his

discussion of need.

It

would seem

speak of the "worker's no longer wanting, fresh air although

they might really need it."

two cases

Marx

I

"Workers may no longer want relationships
still

need them.

The assessment of need

terms of the model of species being.

in

to other

these

Needs are assessed

in

relation to species life; person "a" needs "x" in order to experience species

life.

73

Marx's assessments stand outside "need" and

Op.

cit.

,

Lukacs, p. 73.

in the

model

of the un-alicnated

society .

Further Outlines of the Un-Alienated
Perseon
5

My
model

of

initial

discussion of species being only begins
to point toward Marx's

human development.

Now

potentiality does operate within

His model can be

of creative labor as

Creative labor
jDotcntialities within

it

is

clear that a model of

human

Marx's theory of alienation, which camiot
be

captured by a language of needs,

dcyelopmcnt.

that

I

want to further explore his notion of human

more

fully

assessed

in

terms of

his treatment

assists species consciousness.

it

in its integral relationship

human development, while

with species being expresses
alienated labor and isolation

express reality for Marx.

Through the process and
of his "species being."

actualized.

It

is the

objectification of labor one

becomes conscious

Without the activity of labor species being cannot be

necessity to form social ties for the development of a

consciousness about one's

life

and activity which supplies the standard for

criticism of a political economy which alienates "Mensch" from his product

and the process of production, and from other "Menschen." As capitalist
society perverts social relationships species consciousness

However,

it

assessment

is

the

model

of species being

of the existing condition.

which

is the

Therefore,

is

not possible.

very idea active

Marx may say

in the

that well

developed "rich human beings" have certain needs, deriving from the broader

model

of species being,

whereas the alienated person may

not.

.
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The rich human being is simultaneously
the human beinneed of a totality of human
manifestations

in

man

whom

in

sity,

of life~the

his

own realization

as need.

The conception

of a

person which

is

exists as an inner neces-

reflected through Marx's model
of

species being and creative (objectifying)
labor

character of the human being,
tion of labor, and

3)

2)

is

one of the

1)

social

the creative element through the
objectifica-

the dimension of consciousness, or
a conceptual apparatus

which distinguishes "Mensch" from animals.

Marx expresses
of the

the

meaning of species being sometimes through

term "natural," and hence a series

which encompass

its

the use

of "natural" relationships are postulated

meaning.

From

the character of this relationship follows how much
"^-^P as a species being, as man , has come to be
himself

and to comprehend himself; the relation of man to woman
is the most natural relation of human being to human
being.
It therefore reveals the extent to which man's
natural
behavior has become human, or the extent to which the human
essence in him has become a natural essence the extent to
which his human nature has come to be nature to him. In
this relationship is revealed too, the extent, to which, therefore,
the other person has become for him a need—the extent to
which he in his individual existence is at the same time a

—

social being.

'^^

This direct, natural, and necessary relation of person to

person

is

the relation of

man

to

woman

.

Iji

this natural

species relationship man's relation to nature
his relation to

man,

just as his relation to

his relation to nature

— his

own natural

immediately
man is immediately
is

destination.

74

Op.

cit.

'^^Ibid.

^^Ibid

,

,

Marx, The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts

p. 134,

of 1844 , p. 144.
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The interesting use
because

it

as integral

is also

of -^naturaP^ in relation
to species being is
noted here

used somewhat differently by
Marx.

to, but at the

same time

in

mediated and society
But "nature"

Nature

is

is n.ost often

conHict with, the individual.

the Grundrisse discusses labor,
the ultimate in

appropriation of nature to

Nature

human wants.

Labor

human

moMs

Marx

seen

in

activity, as the

nature.

Nature

is socially

mediated through nature.

in this context is to

is not only

human

be overcome, to be controlled.

an immense material present under

all

social conditions of existence in all
its modes of
appearance, but also a potential, whose
extensive or
mtensive actualization takes place according
to the measure
of the existing level of the forces of
production.

Marx's treatment of "natural"

is quite different

species relations.

Marx has been quoted

In the earlier quote

Marx

relations

when

states that

the "natural" and the

is

expressing

at length to

expose this difference.

man and woman

are involved in species

human combine; and

individual acknowledges the need for other persons.

woman

when he

they combine

In other words,

reflect the species relation because they need one
another.

socially conscious beings.

discussion of
necessity.

They become necessary

Marx one concludes

But for Marx, as

than necessity.

It is

77

I

Alfred Schmidt, The Concept of
Review, 1971), p. 79.
Ibid.

,

p. 162.

man and

From

is

.

Natu^

(London:

this

meaning

have mentioned, the "needing" of others

what ought to be

the

They become

to one another.

that he is speaking of natural as

when

New

Left

more

84

On

this level "natural" involves for

consciousness of others.

Marx

living in relation to and with

Nature does not mean "the accepted flow
of

events"; but rather, a preferred st yle of
living .

Necessity derives from the fact that "Mensch"
cannot survive without

Beyond

others.

this level of

and the others who make
social ties.
In this

way

it

necessity-needing food, shelter and clothing,

possible-is the model

of social

consciousness and

Species beings must incorporate both levels of social
existence.
the

model

of species being, which reflects concerns
of

human

potentiality within an alienated society, is itself in
structure a combination of
the forces of reality and possibility.

Species being in

structure combines wliat is and what possibly can be.

no Utopian ideal.

because

it

can

(Earlier

I

its

own conceptual

In this

stated that species being is

sense also

it

is

not a Utopian ideal

be achieved through revolutionary activity.

Social living and

)

social consciousness are perverted under the conditions of alienation so that

"Mensch"

social

It is to

:

needs.

is

no longer a reality, and only a possibility.

this extent that species being

outside the statement of existing

Otherwise the problem of consciousness as necessary

of "need"

would enter

example,

if

in

moves

into the discussions of alienation,

and

it

to the recognition

does not.

For

species being could be completely explicated by a discussion of need

Marx, alienation would become dependent upon

of his alienation.

the individual's consciousness

But in Marx, as has been shown through the earlier construct,

alienation is an objective condition rooted in a series of social relationships,

existing regardless of the awareness of the individual, because of the model of

human development used.

The idea

of potentiality and

human development are focused
upon

discussion of "Mensch" as laborer.
crucial to the idea of species being.

The very idea

of

in

Marx's

"Mensch" as laborer

is

The individual becomes a social being

through labor and differentiates himself
from the animal world by conscious
creation of objects.

throughout
It is

finds

Marx

This view of labor as creative and
purposive

The idea

within the discussions of "Mensch" as
creative laborer that one

to

Marx

of objectification is that one's labor

throughout his works.

human labor

outlined, though sketchily.

the objectification of labor is anthropologically
necessary.

the creation of "objects. "

of

contrasted

against alienated labor.

Marx's concerns with human development

According

is

He discusses

In the

'

must be concretized through

the uniquely

human property

of labor

Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, bespeaks

as the re-affirmation of oneself.

for he duplicates himself not only, as in consciousness,
.
.
.
intellectually, but also actively, in reality, and therefore

he contemplates himself in a world that he has created.
In Capital,

volume

distinguishes

1,

human

labor is discussed as conscious creation, which

labor from animal labor.

Wc presuppose labour in a form that stamps it as exclusively
human. A spider conducts operations that resemble those of
a weaver, and a bee puts to shame many an architect in the
construction of her cells. But what distinguishes the worst
architect from the best of bees is this, that the architect
raises his structure in imagination before he erects

it

as

At the end of every labour process we get a result
that already existed in the imagination of the labourer at its
reality.

commencement.
79
80

Op.

cit.

,

Marx, The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts

Op.

cit.

,

Marx, Capital,

I.

p. 178,

of 1844, p. 114.

86

"Mensoh" concretizes

life in

a conscious

manner through labor and

this is. then,

a major source for his creativity.

The animal is one mth its life activity. It
does not distinguish
aim itself. It is its activity. But man makes
his life
activity itself an object of his will and
consciousness. He
the

has a conscious

"Mensch"

is

life activity

.

.

.

distinguished from animal

life

consciousness involved in the laboring process.

by his level of reflection and

The creation

of things through

labor involves "Mensch" in the act of creation and
development.
realization is

its objectification.

"^^

"Labour's

The objective world becomes friendly through

the labor process.

... it is only when the objective world becomes everywhere
man in society the world of man's essential powers— that all

for

objects become for him the objectification of himself, become
objects which confirm and realize his individuality, become his
objects; that is man himself becomes the object.
In the Grundrisse ,

Marx

states that

"work

is

a positive creative, activity. "^^

Marx's involvement with the question of productive labor relates

to his

with "man's world shaping capacity, "^^ his labor creating ability.

concern

He defines

labor in Capital as the ability of "Mensch" to mold and shape nature to

human

concerns.
81

Ernst Fischer and Franz Marek, The Essential Marx
Herder, 1970), p. 31.
82
83

Op.

cit.

,

,

Op.

cit.

Op.

cit.

,

,

of 1844, p. 108.

Marxist Social Thought, (New York: Harcourt, Brace

Marx, Grundrisse

or
,

(New York: Herder and

Marx, The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts

Robert Freedman, ed.
& World, 1968), p. 286.
84

,

Avineri, p. 153.

,

p. 126.
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Labour is in the first place, a process
in which both man
and nature participate and in which
man of his own accord
starts, regulates, and controls
the material relations
between himself and nature. He opposes
himself to Nature
as one of her own forces, setting in
motion arms and legs
head and hands, the natural forces of
his body, in order to
appropriate Nature's productions in a form
adapted to his
own wants. By thus acting on the external world
and
changing it, he at the same time changes
his

own nature.

Creative labor involves both mental and
physical capacities for the worker.

order to labor one uses his hands, and in order

In

conceive of the project to

to

be created one must engage in thought.

By labour power or capacity

for labour is to be understood the
aggregate of those mental and physical capabilities
existing in
a human being which he exercises whenever he
produces a use-value
of any description. ^'^

This view of labor as objectifying, in that

it

involves the laborer in object

creating activity which realizes a previous mental conception of
the object,

Marx's view

human

of unalienated, creative labor.

a major source of developing

It is

potential.

It is

necessary

to note here,

however, that Marx uses the term

"objectification" in two ways in his writings.

as the truly

human element

Op.

cit.

,

One way has

of creation in labor.

as the resolution of alienation.

86

is

Marx, Capital,

The other way

I,

it

just

been discussed

Objectification is seen here
is

used by Marx

is to

mean

p. 177,

87
Ibid

. ,

p. 67.

88

Because of the distinction in Marx between objectification as creativity
and objectification as alienation, it is important to distinguish between
"Lebensausserung" as the manifestation of life and "Lebensentausserung"' as the
alienation of

life.

This distinction

is

noted by Istvan Meszaros, o£.

cit.

,

p. 91.

88

alienation itself.

Here, objectification i^ alienation
in capitalist society. 89

Objectification, therefore, which is
a necessary characteristic
of an labour (involving the
transference of labour power to the
object which is created by it) becomes
in capitalism, identical
with alienation.
In

On

the Jewish Question,

religion as alienation.

alien being.

also discusses objectification through

In religion one objectifies one's
essence through an

In this sense too, objectification can

To disregard
is to

Marx

mean

alienation.

the distinction between objectification and
alienation in

lose the entire impact of his concern with labor
as creativity.

was not important
capacities,

to the

development of persons,

why be concerned about

i.e.

,

If

the tapping of

a condition of alienation?

labor

human

Afterall,

creative labor (as a partial statement) that workers are alienated
from.

I

also through creative labor that one

becomes conscious

Marx

it

is

It is

of one's species being,

since unalienated labor requires working with others as well as
necessitates a

deliberativeness related to the product.
It is

in

Marx's further discussion of the laborer

related to a model of a person.

labor conditions.

The model

that one finds fragments

Such concerns arise as he criticizes prevailing

of creative labor

and species

life

operate in the

assessments he makes, as they do throughout, about alienation.

89

Hegel always equated alienation and objectification.
processes for him.

They were not

distinct

Anthony Giddens, Capitalism and Modern Social Theory an analysis of
Marx, Durkheim and Max Weber (New York: Cambridge University Press,
;

,

1971), p. 12.

89
In

Coital Marx speaks

of the intellectual needs of the

these against the society's view of what

is intellectually

workers and poses

necessary for the

laborer.

The labourer needs time

for satisfying his intellectual and
social wants, the extent and number of which
are conditioned
by the general state of social advancement. 91

The problem

of the development of intellectual capacities
in

briefly in his "Theses on Feuerbach" in the

German

workers

He notes the

of the division of physical and mental activity for the
laborer.

division of labor "only

becomes

truly such

noted

Here he discusses

Ideology .

the division of labor as the division of material and
mental labor.

problem

is

The

from the moment when a division

of

material and mental labour appears. "^^ The integration, or rather the separation
of thought and action derives from the

problem

of alienated labor.

because the division of labour implies the possibility,
.
.
.
nay the fact that intellectual and material activity enjoyment
and labour production and consumption devolve on different
individuals, and that the only possibility of their not coming

—

—

into contradiction lies in the negation in its turn of the division

of labour.

The result according

to

Marx

is that

there appears a class of "thinl<;ers" while

other laborers are forced to be involved in mindless physical activity.

It

is

not until there is an integration of both thought and activity that the capacities
of individuals are truly being tapped.

Hence, the isolation of physical activity from mental involvement results
in alienating labor.

91

Op.

cit .

,

^^Op.

cit.

,

The "truly" human

Marx, Capital

,

I,

quality which develops through the

p. 232.

Marx, German Ideology,

^^Ibid., p. 21.

p. 20

90
objectification of labor is that of
consciousness, viewed as the
development of

thought processes,

m-^iessj^^^^^

^^^^^^^^-^^^^i^^^^^^

The possibility

of creative labor as well as species
life create the theoretical

makes

it

possible to indicate alienating labor for
severing

The theoretical framework

of

Marx which poses

framework which

human processes.

the ideas of

human

potentiality (through creative labor and
species being) extends to both

women.

Marx, unlike Durkheim does not have

areas of competence.

between
though,

He never seeks

men and women

differential theories about their

to justify social

and economic inequalities

on the basis of biological difference.

Marx does seem

physical strength between

men and

As we

shall see

to believe that there are significant differences
in

men and women and from

this he justifies the division

of labor along sex lines.

Although Marx's statement on

women

important to us because of his commitment
life aiid

is limited in

to

alienated forms of social experience.

depth his thought is

uncover tensions between species

Marx's theoretical framework

which poses existing conditions against other possible forms
tion is valuable for an analysis of
itself

which

is

with existing

women.

It is

also the model of species

valuable in constructing a model of

life styles of

women, as we

"bourgeois" family.

He

of

women

human development

life

to contrast

shall see in the later chapters.

Species Life and

Marx's discussion

of social organiza-

Women

centers largely around the analysis of the

is critical of the

bourgeois family in

its

oppressive

,

91

arrangements towards the woman,
especially
oppression and familial servitude.
question of

women

Most

in relation to

of his writings dealing
with the

are directly related to the
alienated conditions resulting

from marriage within a

capitalist society.

However, Marx did

years write on questions concerning
the family
lead to believe that he, in
principle,
institution.

This

her economic

may be why

was

in

in his early

such a way that one

is

not opposed to marriage
as an

he never questioned the basic
division of labor

along sex lines, especially within the
family.

When Marx wrote

his article for the Rheinische
Zeitung,

Divorce Law," he was approximately twenty
years
not, of course, written his Paris

the
of

German

Manus^^

the

old.

"On a Proposed

At that time he had

Coimnun^

or

Ideology, all of which later contain partial
statements on the question

women and

the institution of marriage.

These later statements on marriage

deal with a description and criticism of the
practice of "bourgeois" marriage,

whereas the earlier statement

in the

Rheinische Zeitung speaks of marriage as

potentially a kind of species relationship.
In his article

"On

that "implicitly and in

the Divorce

Laws" he

accordance with

indissoluble but only implicitly, that

its

is,

states in

agreement with Hegel

concept, marriage should be

only in accordance with its concept. "^^

words, so long as marriage remains an ethical arrangement

In other

indissoluble.

In

accord with the seriousness

in

it is

which he thought about marriage

he finds the Prussian divorce laws too numerous and frivolous.

94

Karl Marx, "On a Proposed Divorce Law,"

op. cit.

,

p.

140.

in

Guddat and Easton, eds.
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It is

self-evident of course
Will of the legislator
nor

a"^41wm

that

Ze

^-u

oTr'^'^f
person, but only the essence
°
of the
whether a carriage ildiSTor
not f^r
is' weU t
that a declaration of
death depend on the
fa^t
case a.^
e on the wishes
of the parties con
c rned''
But If
the case of physical
death you demand precise
and unmistakable proofs,
must not a legislator fav dol
a moraldeaih only after

7"?

"0^^

m

the

Marx sees
ship.

s^tls,

the ending of a marriage
partnership as the ending of
a mora, relation-

involves a serious breach of
faith in the social
relationship.

It

Just What
the

most incontestable

Marx means by

marriage relationship

"incontestable

For Marx, divorce
the breaking of

family, as

is not

is

made

moral death"

of

in

terms of

clear.

much more

commitments

symptoms

However,

than the separation of two
people.

not only between the

man and woman

It is

but within the

affects the children.

it

They think only of the two individuals and
They forget that nearly every dissolution

forget the family
of a marri^i^Tsthe

dissolution of a family and that the children
and what belon-s
them should not be dependent on arbitrary
whim even from
a purely legal point of view.
to

This view of marriage as an ethical relationship
involving the family provides the
contrast model for his later writings in 1844
and 1848.
ship between

man and woman

For Marx, the relation-

as paradigmatic of species relations reflects this

sense.

From
"^^t"^

95

the character of this relationship follows how much
as a species being , as man, has come to be himself

Eugene Kamenka, Ethical Foundations

of

Marxism, (New York: Praeger,

1962), p, 33.

Op.
p. 139.

cit.

,

Marx, "On a Proposed Divorce Law,"

in

Guddat and Easton, eds.

relation of

human being

hei^ir^

The direct a.d necessary
relations between person,

man and wo.an

in

species

lite.

The idea

to

human

is the relationship

of obligation and
responsibility i„

hun^an relationships as retlective
of species relations
never disappears
writing.

«

is

afterallaueypart of species

model posed against

between

living

and therefore

Marx.s

in

a part of the

the bourgeois family.

Marx never denounces

or restates his views on
divorce, and this

because he thought ethical relationships
outside of alienated society.

However,

in

marriage were

may

be

in principle possible

in alienated society

where marriage

relationships reHect dehumanized
relations between "things" as
opposed to

persons, divorce does not represent
the severing of huma. ethical
relationships.
It

merely means the end
Let us

of an

economic and

now examine Marx's discussion

often, exploitative,

arrangement.

of the bourgeois family.

Marx makes

clear in the quote below from the
Communist Manifesto that the family relation

has been reduced to a mere money relation.

The bourgeois sees

On what

in his wife a mere instrument of
production.
foundation is the present family, the bourgeois
family,

based? On capital, on private gain . . . .The
bourgeois claptrap about the family and education, about hallowed
co-relation
of parent and child, becomes all the more
disg-usting the more,
by the action of modern industry, all family ties among
the

proletarians are torn asunder, and then children transformed
into simple articles of commerce and instruments
of labour. 98
97

98

O^. cit., Marx, The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844

p. 134.

Karl Marx, The Communist Manifesto, (Chicago: Gateway Press,
1954),

pp. 48, 49.
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The relations

ment

of private property
beoon^e the

.ode

of exchange.

The develop-

of these bourgeois
priorities transform the
social relations in the
family,

and the fan^ily which Marx
sees as the

^^—-^

subordinate need.

—man

relations.

and woman, etc.
,

sold...iOO

only^ relationship becomes a

P-vate property and possession
pervade

--The species relations
itself, the relation
between

becomes an object

^^^^^^^^^

of

commerce.

Finally, this

opposmg

is

^^^^^ ^^^^^^^ relationships

ownership and domination; and
marriage

to private

The woman

into prostitution.

man

bought and

into those of

'

movement

of opposing universal
private property
property finds expression in the
animal form of

to

marriage (certainly a form of
exclusive private

a piece of communal and common
property
Just as
woman passes from marriage to general
prostitution, so
.

the

entire world of wealth (that is, of
man's subjective substance)
passes from the relationship of exclusive
marriage with the
oMoier of private property to a state
of universal prostitution
with the community.

Because Marx sees the problem of women
as arising from

mere instruments

of production, he thinks that

present system of production must bring
with
of

women

private."

Og,

102

the abolition of the

the abolition of the

community

But this analysis seems inadequate, as does Marx's
acceptance of

cit.,

^^^_0£. _cit.

,

101^
102

it

.

springing from that system, i.e., of prostitution,
both public and

the division of labor between

99

.

their status as

men and women

Marx, German Ideology

,

along sexual lines, especially

p. 17.

Marx, "On the Jewish Question,

" in

Guddat and Easton, eds.,

Op.

cit.,

Marx, The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts

Qp«

cit.

Marx, Communist Manifesto,

,

p. 50.

p. 246,

of 1844, p. 133

Within the fa.Uy.

along these lines.

He never questions

the assignment of

wo.en.s capacities

Further analysis of these
questions will wait

later chapter dealing specifically
with the question of

As stated earlier, the

specific importance of

existing theoretical constructions
pertaining to

until the

women.

Marx

women

for the analysis of

is not limited to his

actual statements on the problem,
which are inadequate.

Rather,

it is

his

theory of alienation, his model of
species being, the conception
of labor as
creativity,

which point toward a model

of a

person which

is

valuable in the

examination of the relationships between
theory and practice, for women
as
well as for men.

One

is not limited to

framework.

terms

descriptions of existing practices within
Marx's

The major concern

is

with assessing present arrangements
in

of the individual's potential for
development.

The priorities

change are intermeshed with assessments that
alienation prevails.
of social and historical

"Mensch" excludes

outgrowths of inevitable tendencies.
balance of the discussion.

for social

His view
vi(

the treatment of conditions as

This analysis will be valuable in the
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CHAPTER

III

ON APPRAISING STANDARDS OP
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
It

has been argued so far that
Durkhe^.s view of the ^oral
person

tied to (and limited by) his
theory of hun.an needs,
whereas.

species being

is not.

I

want

to

is

largely

Marx's „.odeI of

discuss how contemporary
behavioral social

science literature alters the use
of the concept of need and
builds

development from such need analysis.

its

models of

Representative samples of the contem-

porary research into the problem of
alienation and anomie
reflect the equation between need
fulfillment and

need statements and an ideal of a person.

And

will be

shown

to

human development; or between

this equation will be

shown

to be

faulty.

If

needs cannot function in a justificatory
manner

persons one

is still left

with the problem of justifying that model.

framework of alienation and
Durkheim's perspective
valid model of

in relation to a

of

the

model

model

of

The Marxian

of species being will be chosen here
above

anomie and the moral order, as supplying the most

human development.

I

will deal with the

Marxian perspective

through an examination of the consequences of both their
frameworks as well as
provide an explication of a model of persons which can and does
derive from
the priorities set

from Marx's thought.

This chapter will lay the foundations for the next which will demonstrate
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how

the discussion ot "needs.,
in relation to the
question of

society is an inadequate

way

of approaching the topic.

Within society is limited to
the discussion of needs

it

It

to

meeting the

felt

needs of

women

organisation and definition of their
lives.
potentiality of

Marx

women

is to

problem

move

to the

of

woman's

at large.

women

in industrial

women

self

To be oriented

to the present

To deal with the question of

as persons, one must

the

concerns expressed by

in the language of "species
being."

Ajie natioD,

Anomie and

Most contemporary American

the

Theory of Needs

social scientists

theme of alienation and anomie have tended

the

bind

the

limits a

understanding to the constructions
accepted by society

merely

women

who have seriously considered

to think in principle at least,
that,

these competing theories could be
clarified and tested through
empirical inquiry
into

human needs.

^

I

will discuss these approaches
here pointing to their

deficiencies, and suggest the beginnings
of an approach for dealing with these
issues

more

adequately.

1

In the

contemporary literature dealing with alienation and
anomie there has
been a collapsing of the two competing theories.
Although I will

be examinin- the
treatment of alienation, the same arguments hold for
anomie. For other contemporary literature on anomie and alienation see,
Wendell Bell, "Anomie, Social
Isolation and the Class Structure," Sociometry
20 (June, 1957), pp. 105-llG;
R. H. Brookes, "The Anatomy of Anomie, Political
"
Sciei^ 3(1951), pp. 44-51;
,

Jolin Clark,

"Measuring Alienation Within A Social System," American Sociological
Review, 24 (December, 1959), pp. 849-852; Dwight Dean, "Alienation:
Its Meaning
and Measurement, " American Sociological Review. 26 (October,
1961), pp. 753-75°8;
Erich Fromm, Escape From Freedom (New York: Holt, Rinehart and
Winston,
1955); Harold Laswell, "The Threat to Privacy" in Robert Maclver, ed.
Conflict
of Loyalties (New York: Harper & Row, 1952); Simon Marcson,
ed. Automation
Alienation and Anom ie,
(New York: Harper & Row, 1970); Robert Merton,
Social Theory and Social Structure, (New York: Free Press,
1968); Gwynn Nettler,
,

,

.

,

,

The discussions

of alienatio.

by A.itai Et.ioni,
Arnold Kaufman and

Erich Fro.„, ^ draw heavily
upon a theory of needs
and. therefore, ^i,
be treated as paradigmatic

of the social scientisfs
treatment of alienation.

Christian Bay. 3 ,,hough he
has no explicit theory of
alienation does have a
elearly stated position on
needs which is quite similar
to Etzionrs treatment,
a^cl.

therefore, will be examined
here.

will deal with

I

Bay and Et.ionl together

because they present a more
complete picture of the
perspective
ing than

When

of alienation.

I

find the

dealt with separately.

Bay more

While Etzionl

explicitly deals with the

above social scientists deficient

need theory),

it

Is

ties

iceman

On

Prejudice,

the

am examin-

to the theory

meaning of "needs." Although

in their

models of development

(via

Important to dlstlnghish their
discussions of alienation from

wHt? ^''"^y^SlSIioSRS^^

PP

needs

I

Meanmg

of Ahenatlon, "

American Journal

o_f

America

Soo^^

22 (December. 1957)

Sjx^^

24

62 (July, 1956). pp. 63-67.

hee

Amltai Etzionl, The Active Society: A Theory
of Societal and
£ohlie^ Process, (New York: Free Press,
1968). epUoi:^. 117-667;
(New York: Holt. Rinehart and Winston,
K^^f"*". "Oi Alienation, " Inquiry 8 (Summer,
1955).
PP 141^165

T?'

.

3

See, Christian Bay, "Politics and Pseudo
Politics," in Charles McCoy
and John Playford, eds., Apolitical Politics,
(New York: Thomas Y. Crowell
Co. 1967), and his more recent article "Needs,
Wants, and Political
Legitimacy," Canadian Journal of Political Sciennn,
1 (1968), pp. 241-260.
In his article "The Cheerful Science of Dismal
Politics," in Theodore
,

Roszak,

The Dissenting Academy. (New York: Pantheon,
1968), pp. 208-230,
he makes a plea for orienting political theory more
closely to human needs'.
ed.

,

"
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a merely psychological
analysis. ^
The'i^sychological" v.ew of
alienation does not focus
on the triadic relations
involved in the classical
formulation, which are:
a) a given set of
social

arrangements,
ment.

Rather

b) the

it

Uves of individuals and

may

a valid ideal of

not in the

For example,

same

role.

My

not implicated in the role of
worker
into isolated experiences

structure in which

all

within a set of roles.

I

e>^erience dissatisfaction

dissatisfactions are unique to

^a worker.

Social

and are, therefore, thought not

2)

my

in

work,

me; they are

phenomena are turned
to flow

from a social

are implicated but rather from
an individuated experience

Most

often

when one deals with

alienation in terms of its

triadic relationship one begins
to deal on another level with

problem,

human develop-

reduces the problem to one of
personal adjustment and

personalized discontent.
but you

c)

the effects or consequences of
the problem,

Such a view avoids the tendency to deal

in isolation with

3)

1)

the roots of the

and the remedies.

person^s

felt

grievances,

anxieties, and frustrations.
I

want

to

now examine those

of alienation avoid

some

theorists who,

of the above

problems.

when dealing with

As we

the question

shall see shortly,

Christian Bay, Amitai Etzioni and Arnold Kaufman
are weakest in their treat-

ment of a

valid ideal of

human development. One does

not grasp the

full

sense of

4

For statements of the psychological view of alienation see, John
P. Clark,
"Measuring Alienation Within a Social System, " American Sociological
Review
54 (December, 1959), pp. 849-852; Dwight Dean, "Alienation: Its Meaning
and Measurement," American So ciological Review, 26 (October,
1961, pp. 753,

Mary Josephson, eds. Man Alone Alienation in Modern Society
(New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1962); Gwynn Nettler, "A Measure of Alienation,
A merican Sociological Rejview. 22 (December, 1957), pp. 670-677; and Melvin
Seeman, "On the Meaning of Alienation," American Sociological Review 24
(December, 1959), pp. 783-791.
758; Eric and

,

:

.

,

I
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my crmc.s»

by acous.n, the. of
psycholog..,n, the use of
alienation because

they do deal with social
structure as

»
the

proMe™. However, one
™odel

shifts

it

relates to individual
manifestations of

away

fron. the social
structure

of persons because of
Et.ioni.s treatment of
need a.cl Kautaan-s

language of "satisfaction.

This emphasis

is

best examined and
criticised as an

outgrowth of need theory rather
than under the more
elusive
It

is

and the already

important

to note that

treat alienation in its triadic

classical meaning.

But

let

form there have been considerable

the social structure is

human needs although there

shifts

from

its

us first examine their analysis
of the problem.
situation

which

of the actor and, hence,
unresponsive to his basic jeeds.
if

psychologism.

even though Etzioni and
Kaufman implicitly

For Etsioni alienation means "a
social

seen as remediable

title of

is

beyond the control

Alienation is then

made more responsive

to these

is an,

irreducible source of alienation in
.
.
.
the tension amonthese needs-responding fully to one,
such as the need for
security, is incompatible with fully
responding to others
such as the need for variety and creativity. 7
Etzioni's view is that there are autonomous,
basic
of society, culture or history.

human needs

And these autonomous needs provide

,

irrespective

a standard

against which specific social arrangements can be
appraised.

Theories without a conception of human needs (which have
specific
attributes of their own) are open to a conservative
interpretation,

5

Amitai Etzioni, "Basic Human Needs, Alienation and Inauthenticity, "
American Sociological Review, 33 (December, 1968), p. 879. [The emphasis
is my own.
]

^Ibid

.

,

p. 880.

'^Ibid

.

.

p. 879.
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mdwidunls and groups

of

that are expected to
adapt to the

compare socijSSnTSISir^iteT;^^^
or
w,th bas.c human needs, and
they lead

less

cllonant

one to e^ect
pressure to chanse existing
societies and cultures
toward
ti^waiu
more responsive ones. ^

The theory
Marx.
lor

Need

Marx

no longer seen as a social and
historical phenomena as

is

ai.d to

a-social;
.

of needs ftmetions here
as the theory of species
being does in

some

it

was

extent for Durkheim, but
is seen as a-cultural
and

.that there is a universal set
of basic

hum^m needs which

have attributes of their own which
are not determined by the
social structure,
^
cultural patterns or socialization
processes."

The priorities

of the behavioral

Christian Bay's conception of need.

mode

Need

create likenesses in Amitai Etzioni's

for Etzioni is clarified in

need deprivation; "that the person can
be denied a specified kind

terms

of experience

only at the cost of an ultra-personal
tension. "^^ Ultra-personal tension

terms

in

of malaise, no matter

is

is

defined similarly.

"'Need'

might

initially

whose

satisfaction benefits the organism and the person. "^^
However, for

be defined as referring to any urge or drive
or behavior tendency

,

p. H7H.

,

p. 871.

('I'he

emphasis

is

my

own.]

9

Ibid

.

Ibid

.

judged

how vague.

Bay's concept of need, also operational ized,

Ibid_.

of

'christian Bay, "Needs, Wants and Political Legitimacy,"
Journal of Political Science 1 (1968), p. 242.
'

,

Canadian
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CHMlieal Wtnes_s.. he modifies
'

much

this definition

too vague for purposes of
empirical utility

Bay also equates

We

because the "formulation
.

.

is

12

.

the treatment of needs with
a model of person.

camiot get

tive t^heory of

much further toward an adequate
normagovernment, as Hobbes taught
us, without

a model of man. or at least
a conception of priorities
needs.

among man's most pressing
He arrives

at

an "operational- definition of
needs defined as "any behaviour

tendency whose continued denial or
frustration leads to pathological
responses.

Bay moves
with

it

in

from dealing with need as benefiting

then,

terms

the person, to dealing

of pathological responses,
and this shift involves a reconstitu-

tion of the earlier classical
concerns of

concerns of empirical
relation to need.

utility.

Bay has

Bay whittles down

neuroses, severe addiction
to

Because

of the

the dimensions he will handle in

difficulty explicating "pathological";
instead he

settles for several indicators of the

Bay's effort

Durkheim and Marx.

term

to alcohol

.

.

.

suicide, psychosis, severe

and drugs.

ope rationalize the concept need

is

misleading because the

definition of what constitutes a pathological
response smuggles in a normative

claim.

What constitutes mental and

social health and sickness is not simply

an issue that can be resolved by examining the empirical
facts without Bay's

employment

Ibid

.

Ibid

.

Ibid

. .

of an implicit

14
p. 242.

Ibid., pp. 243-244.

normative model of health.

Need

,s Cenioc,

a. soeio.o.ie., roots
by doaUng wa„ a

i„

ro..u,.„

manifestation, as i„ciiv,dua,i.„„.
ato.i.ed sy„pto„s.

Bay dea,« with
pathological behavior hy
inferring that his
indicators are representative
such behavior anU further
inierring
deprivation...

<,r

that this is linKed
to the question of
.,,eed

,«s use of patho.ogical
hehavior as inferring need
deprivation

is

further troubioso^e because
„f the n,uitip,o causes
involved in n.u,y of his
indicators. A human being
eould easily suffer from
several lorms of this

behavior

an.i the

deprivation...

reasons involved might
sometimes be unrelated to
"need

By

definitional fiat he sets up
his behavioral n.ode.

by delinition, pathological
responses are linlced to our
hy|>,.thetK-al construct of
-.need," then it maizes
II-

assume that the most obviously and
grossly
nds 01 bohavmr indicate that
relatively

to

i)eon

denied or frustrated.

Bay himself notes some

sense

pathological
crucial needs have

of the disadvantages of his
position.

First, he

notes the problem that needs
cannot be readily recognized until
after
pathological behavior has l,een
manifested.
this criticism is that

Bay does not

unmet needs. A need

in

it

only

loi iu

moans

<lcal

A

mo,-e serious v.av of stating

with the realm of needs, but rather
with

Bay.s language becomes very vague

in

meaning because

the lack of tension, or the presence
of alcoholism, or

of deviant behavior.

It

lias

no positivi. lorce.

some other

liesides, the idea that all

pathological behavior derives from need
deprivation appears problematic at
best.

There are a maze of intervening elements

Ibid .

,

p. 24:).

to be accounted for.

And

because no

^
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sUna,-.. or personal
development

is

funcUon., . .eco.es

impossible to say that such
negative behavior results
fro. the manifestation
of
false or manipulated needs.
This leads to the second
major criticism of Bay.

His scheme docs not

involve an explicit mode, of
personal development, although
an implicit one

deriving from a view of mental
health operates.
inquiry
of

is in

To

the extent that

hi,

relation to needs he spends
little time trying to
construct a view

person separate and apart from

his treatment of needs.

hierarchy of needs as inclusive of
a model of person, but
the

most of

framework

it

Bay adopts Mas.oWs
operates only within

of tension reduction.

Needs are construed by Bay, Etzioni,
and Maslow as conative dispositions.

The assumption

is that

needs are nn infn nsie part of human

nni.nr. nn.i ... .

product of one's society and history as both
Durkheim nnd Mn^^

vp^

p^^pie

then need, (i.e., have drives toward)
affection, security and love independent
of any societal conceptualization of
goals and purposes.

away from the classical concerns

of

as vague malaise and tension.

is

a sharp

move

Marx, here.

So long as models of development operate
evaluation remain problematic.

There

illicitly,

explicit standards of

Hence, Bay and Etzioni deal with unmet need

But what happens when the question

is

person

17

Maslow's hierarchy of needs involves
2) safety

needs,

1)

physical, biological needs,

or belongingness needs, 4) self-esteem needs,
and, 5) self-actualizing or developing needs. See: Abraham
Maslow,
Toward a PsychologY of Being. (New York: Van Nostrand, 1968), and his

article,

3) affection

"A Theory of Human Motivation," Psychological Review

pp. 370-396.

,

50 (1943),
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development a.d not si.p,y
„eed ft.,„„„o„t,

This creates a problem,
Tor

"under some eonditions human
beings may not need.

i„

any sense otneed

as a behavioral tendency,
to develop their
deliberative capacities

pitch."" What

I

am

posing here

"tension tree" people

who can

The largest problem here
needs are met.
content and

And

wc might

acceptable.

yet

be deficient

still

is that if

may be

it

still

is the theoretical
possibility of

in

terms of

to

a high

having

h„m^

development.

there is no "tension"
one assumes that

all

the case that an individual
is perfectly

have good reason to say
that conditions are not
totally

Contentment and satisfaction are
paralleled here with tension

reduction but this implies that the
tension free

One wonders about
needs met and

still

the counter example.

Is

it

only

ITowever,

sometimes increase

I

it

is not possible

life to

be prized.

not possible to have one's

experience levels of tension? According

Et.ioni's definition of need

unmet need.

life is the

to

Bay's and

because tension results from ,m

would have to argue that the meeting
of needs may

levels of tension.

Developed individuals are not necessarily
tension

frcG.

Arnold Kaufman
social scientists

urgings.

That

who

is,

in his

discussion of alienation moves further
than the

limit their theory of needs to
behavioral inclinations, or

need

is not

equivalent for Kaufman, to an urging or
conative

disposition of any sort currently experienced
by the person.

might not yearn,

etc.

,

for state 'A' and yet find

it

For person "x"

satisfying upon experiencing

18

William Connolly, "Comment on Bay, " Inquiry, 14
(Autumn. 1971)
p. 239.

"
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This is quite different fron.
Bay and Et^ioni, even though
the

it.

is

Similar.

final criterion

Kauft.a..s treatment of alienation
conceives of possible satisfactions

for Which there are not
urgings.

The problem here derives from
the vocabulary

of "satisfaction.
In

Kaufman's discussion alienation ca£
involve

they arise out of particular social
conditions.

between belief and awareness.
out being

aware of it-for

if

feelings, and/or beliefs as

To make

this point he distinguishes

"Clearly a person can believe
something with-

what he believes

is false in

what sense

is he

aware

of anything?""'"^

Kaufman speaks
person

alienated

is

of alienation in the following

is to

manner.

"To claim

that a

claim that his relationship to something
else has certain

features which result in avoidable discontent
or loss of satisfaction . "^^ Although

Kaufman seems

to say that alienation

need not involve consciousness

of feeling

his conception of alienation does involve
manifested conscious behavior, that is

discontent or loss of possible satisfaction.

The language of satisfaction
not grasp the idea of a

19

is

problematic in and of

model of human development.

Arnold Kaufman, "On Alienation,

" Inquiry , 13

itself

because

it

does

However, Kaufman does

(Summer, 1965),

p.

144.

20
Ibid

.

,

p. 143.

21

Paul Diesing and Paul Piccone criticize Kaufman's language of satisfaction.
According to them, "Kaufman's basic difficulty is that he thinl<s in terms of a
psychological theory of satisfactions and frustrations, desires and aversions, wants
and needs, while the concept of alienation is part of an entirely different theory,
a theory of self-realization." See Paul Diesing and Paul Piccone, "Kaufman
on Alienation, " Inquiry 10 (Summer, 1967), p. 208,
,
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move

further than Etzioni in grasping
portions of the theory of
alienation.

Kaufman acknowledges
a

human being as a

the dimensions of alienation
which involve the "notion of

deliberative creature, as one
potentially capable of exercis-

ing intelligent control over his

own destiny.-^^ At

the

same time

that

Kaufman

stresses the "moral dimension" of
alienation he also uses a language
of the
utilitarian school stressing the
importance of satisfactions.

satisfaction functions

more

And

the idea of

in line with the idea of
tension reduction or a

bliss than with the concerns of say.
developing deliberative capacities.
latter

may

happy

For the

require a certain degree of tension.

According

to

Kaufman,

if

a person seeks something, but once
attained

it

docs not bring satisfaction, then the individual
did not know what he really wanted.

Real wants, or needs then, are measured
If

in

terms

of the satisfaction they supply.

needs are met, there will be satisfaction, and when
there

is sufficient satis-

faction there is not alienation.

The whole point

of discussing alienation for

undesirable situation which

is

Kaufman

is to

describe an

subject to remedy.

Though we are in a position to claim that what he thought
he wanted was not what he really wanted, we are not in
a position to describe what he does really want except in
terms of the almost empty formula, whatever would satisfy
his yearnings (or cravings, or painful feelings).

However, that which
of

human growth.
22

Op.

^^Ibid

cit.

. ,

24
Ibid.

,

is

most satisfying

is

often not related to the larger concerns

Drugs are often satisfying and they also are

Kaufman,

p. 156.

p. 151,

often at the root

Ofp ,u
the expression of alienation,
not the resolution of
It

ICS
it.

appears then that many
contemporary soeial scientists
treat

"neec... in a
behavioralized form as tension
reduction or in relation to the
language of satis-

The

faction.

ideal of species being is
dropped

from contemporary discussions

of alienation.

Their constructions have taken
the form of viewing the
individual
of a hierarchical need structure
which

person

made

assumes

that the total

in

terms

development of a

accounted for within the need structure. 25
Attempts also have been

is

to justify certain humaii rights

from the assumption of certain human
needs.

Behavioral concerns have caused conceptual
shifts from Marx and Durkheim
so
that

need

As
of

I

defined as tension reduction or

felt

tendency.

have argued, the classical theory of alienation
develops out of a theory

"Mensch" centered

theory of
is

is

in a distinct historical

human needs derives from

and social perspective.

Marx's

the social and historical framework.

And

it

through the activity of "Mensch" as laborer that history
and society progress

and needs are formulated and reformulated.

The above perspective, within the

context of capitalist society becomes the theory of
exploitation and commodity

production.

framework
One

Contemporary social science

literature transforms this theoretical

into a loose perspective structured

is at this

by need as behavioral inclination.

point dealing with indicators as opposed to the conceptual clarifica-

tion of need.

25

Maslow's hierarchical need structure
"Theory of Human Motivation, " o£. cit.

is

an example of

this.

See Maslow,

26

See, Christian Bay, "Foundations of the Liberal Make-Believe" Inquiry 14
(Autumn, 1971), for this discussion of deriving human rights from human needs.
,

,
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Needs and the Mndel
in order to clarify the
l.sues raised one

of

Person

™ust deal with the structure

concept "need." In this way
the problem of assessing
needs

most usemi

const^nact

be "y".

•y

is

nail,

which best expresses

this forn, is.

"A" needs "x"

in

order to do

'

or

27
In this triadic

scheme, "a"

the objective or end state.

"A" needs a creative work

is

s eems

studied as verb torn.s they
cannot be viewed as self-justifying.

is the agent,

viewed in

its

verb form

life to

its

"x"

is

what

is

needed, and

For example: "A" needs a
hammer
develop as a deliberative being.

choices in terms of the end state desired; "y"

need

,t

n.e to deal with need in
its verb for. ,as
opposed to as a noun,

to-

When "needs" are
The

is clarified.

of the

use

in

is

to drive a

One makes

clearly the crucial element.

If

contexts specifically pertinent tor

alienation and anomie is assessed always
in relation to "y," the model of
a person

derived from species being or the moral order.

The dependency

of "x" in relation to "y"

makes need a

relational concept in

27

A similar construct is that of the triadic relationship of freedom
as explicated
by Gerald MacCallum, Jr. in "Negative and Positive
Freedom," in Anthony
de Crespigny and Alan Wertheimer, eds.
Contemporary PojiUcal Theory (New
York: Atherton, 1970). The triadic relationship involves
freedom of something,
from something, to do or not do or become or not become
something, (p. 109)
"Whenever the freedom of some agent or agents is in question, it is always
freedom
from some constraint or restriction on, interference with, or
barrier to doing,
not doing, becoming, or not becoming something."
(p. 109) It is interesting
,

,

to

note that most differences about what freedom is, are really
differences about
what persons are. "It would be far better to insist that the same concept of freedom
is operating throughout and that the differences, rather than
being about what

freedom is, are for example, about what persons are, and about what can count
as an obstacle to or interference with the freedom of persons so conceived."
(p.

114.)

110
that

.V

.annot be evaluated in
isolation fro.

c~eito.

Need, functioning here

were read as species bein, or
person
need within

this

framework

is a

in its

^^^ee^^^r^^

verb for. clearly shows
how

if

.y

neither could be equated
with need, because

^eans

to that end.

Needs are assessed

in

ter.s

of end states, not vice
versa.

Now,

I

previously argued that in Marx
"need"

the idea of species life.

The richest use

is the analysis of alienation
with its

Marx

work

-.b" to

assessed

form of "need, "

in relation to

in

instrumental ties to species being.

tacitly adopts fits the construct

creative

of the verb

is often

achieve species

proposed here,
life

"c."

i.e.

In other

,

the

my

opinion

The usage

worker "A" needs

words, his conception of

alienation involves the assessment
of certain needs as harmful or
necessary to
the development of species being. ^8

order

to

to other

For instance, the form 'W' needs "x"

bring about "x" can be read as:

human beings

in

A human being needs

in

ties of mutualitv

order to foster (or experience) species

life .

Marx

could just as easily state and has stated, that the
human being needs creative labor
in

order

to

bring about species being .

And

this construct also enables the

28

Agnes Heller is one of the few Marxists who deals with the question
of "needs"
her paper "Theory and Practice: Their Relation to
Human Needs," delivered
at the Conference for the Study of Political Thought
Spring, 1971. She differs
from the need theorists previously reviewed in her commitment to a social
and
in

,

historical orientation to needs.

Secondly, she distinguishes between alienated
existential needs, whereas needs are

human needs, human needs proper and

treated in an undifferentiated manner, i.e., tension reduction, by Bay and Etzioni.
The problem with Heller is that she never spells out a justification for differentiating

among needs which

is

independent of the needs themselves.

assessment

that the

iu™aj^ does not need HSUnuoHS^n,^^

to bring about species life.
It is

Which

also important to recognize
that

is to

Marx

first deals

deal with the origin and
derivation of the need.

with needs socially.

He then assesses

these need statements in relation
to the ends they serve,
as
the goals and purposes needs
serve derive

an historical society.

Brian Barry

-y" For Marx

from -Mensch-. as species being

Marx, then, deals with the origin
andjustmcation

in his

book Political

itself a justificatory principle

Argur^ also

and that one must move

argues that "need"
to the

living in

of needs.

is not

"ends" involved

before any assessment can be made,
"No special account has to be taken
of
'need'

...

Need then
end, or

or not.

is

the only interesting questions
arise in connection with the ends."^^

never an independent justificatory principle.

It

presupposes some

some standard by which we can assess

if

something

"Whenever someone says

it

always makes sense

'x is

needed'

is

a necessary
to

means

ask

^"Although Marx is unique in his two pronged
approach to needs he does have
problems m his usage of need, as demonstrated in the
previous chapter. There
are times when he does not treat needs within
the verb framework,
this the exception to the rule.

althouo-h

There are points

at

which he states

I

find

when
His model here

that

consciousness of a need does not exist, the need no longer
exists.
could be stated as "a" needs "x" in order to relieve
felt suffering.
This has been
interpreted by Bertell Oilman, in Alienation Marx's
Conception of Man in
Capitalist^Society, (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1971), as".
man
not only has needs, he feels them. They exist in him
as felt drives, as wants."
However, this interpretation is in clear conflict with Marx's recognition
(p. 77.)
that one can be alienated and not be aware of it. For
Marx, remember, alienation
is a condition which can be separate and apart from
individual consciousness.
:

.

.

30

Brian Barry, Political Argument, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965),
p. 49.
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what purpose
the idea of

matter

.31

needed for."

it is

Onoo the end
Once
^

.

is given,

species being or the model
of a
person
^ person.

to find out

what conditions are necessary

in this triadic relationship

it

is

it
It

which

our case

in

is

h...
becomes an objective

to bring

it

about. ^2

"y" which demands
examination.

However,
remains largely undercover within
"'^^
an atmosphere of "operational
exactitude.
However, if "y. is not clearly
stated it becomes impossible
to make
it

informed

judgments.

Only when "y"

"A nudist does not need

is explicitly

clothing, and a

does not need food or shelter.
If

noted can informed choices
be made.

person who has decided

to

commit suicide

""^^

assessments about needs must wait for
evaluation

in

terms

of the ends

they are comiected to, then, the
statement "x" needs "y" does not
automatically
lead to the position "x" ought to have "y."

Before a certain need can be assessed

and recommended for resolution or not, one

first

must assess

ends given, which are in some sense
separate from the need
the statement

assessed

t hat

until the

a

w oman

is

in

itself.

terms of

the

Thus,

needs to marry or to have children camiot be
properly

ends and p urposes of her

such a justification

it

life style

are iustified .

Only when

provided can the woman's needs be evaluated as real
or

false.

In the

treatment of "need" as

not necessarily follow that

•^-^

33

Ibid

. ,

Ibid

.

Op.

cit.

if

1)

simply something people try

"a" needs "x", "a" ought to have "x."

to get,

it

However,

p. 48.

,

Bay, p. 242.

•^^Paul Taylor,

"Need Statements," Analysis, 19

(April, 1959), p. 107.

does

113
"need., see. as

so^etMn, wMeh

.)

.

a

.eans

to

an end

(species being, etc.) does
connote the assessment
that

Or

at least

it is

n.ore plausible,

it

involves a normative claim
itseif.

usage When he argues that
to

have

for Nielsen

..a.,

ought to have

it

is

a

.'a',

is logically

ought to have

it

human needs and moral
"Need" seen as

it

Kai Nielsen must be
employing the second
odd to say

is

..x..

..a.,

needs

..x..

but

because there

is

..a.,

..a"

ought not

needing

purely contingent. 35
Therefore,

..linguistic logical oddity,
to

but they ought not have

.....

indeed be thought to
be trivial since

Nielsen rejects the position
that the relation between

..X...

and saying that

"K..

it

may

„MeH U .o.. ^.ng

say someone has a need for

..x'.

a logical relationship between
fundamental

appraisals.

1)

simply something people try

behavioral social science literature
because

it

to get, limits

contemporary

does not allow one to criticize

socialized behavioral tendencies on
the grounds that "real needs"
are not being
satisfied.

how one

2) of

is to establish

need

false

Usage

is

course does allow

this, but

what ends are worth having.

made here

in

terms of

because they do or do not yield ends

that

which

that are

is

leaves as problematic just

The

distinction of real and

worth having or not worth having

worth attaining.

Such distinctions are

possible only in terms of ends.

Contemporary social

scientists treat need as a noun; expressed as
behavioral

tendencies toward the object.

The same limitations press now

contemporary need analysis as they did
35

in

terms of

in evaluating Durldieim's social thought.

Kai Nielsen, "On Human Needs and Moral Appraisals," Inquiry

p. 171.
Ibid

. ,

p.

175.

,

6 (1963),
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of society.

Need, seen as

felt

behavioral tendency, U.its
itself to the society

and history of the time and
runs the -risk of celebrating
uncritically those
inclinations cultivated by
dominant socialization processes.

.

."37 one
becomes

locked into the circular process
of analyzing and supporting
society as

or as

it

exists,

has existed.

Let

me summarize my

discussion of needs in terms of
Durkheim and

as reflecting a social and historical
perspective on needs as opposed
a-historical view of contemporary social
scientists.

as historical relativists, but at the

opposed

it

to the

Durkheim and Marx are seen here

same time, human nature

to behavioral social scientists

Marx

who are human nature

objectivists (as
relativists).

"Mensch"

unfolds through history; but the ideal state
of the moral order or species being
is not defined

by society and history in and of

itself.

These are objective end

states only partially expressed through historical
relativism.

statement of needs, for

Marx

Therefore, the

especially, is only a partial statement of individual

potentiality, as species being.

For both Marx and Durkheim needs express concrete historical
relationships.
37

William Connolly, "On Interests in Politics,: unpublished
paper,
to be published in Politics and Society 1972.

p. 15,

,

38

One could speak of need as potentialities which do not exist in all societies
and none the less are a base from which to criticize society to the extent that
the
felt needs people are socialized with fail to reflect these
potentialities now
possible in this state of historical development. But I think that "need" has been too
closely tied to the tradition of conative dispositions for it to be extended meaningfully to the conception of potentiality. "Needs" to me are the paradigm case of
historical relativity; whereas, potentiality is tied

nature.

more

to an objective

human

Marx

posits a cross cultural
standard of

these historical relationships.

He runs

in

order

assess

He treats need, themselves
as a-historical and

He uses needs as the standard
for assessing social
arrangements.

the risk, therefore, of
justifying existing arrangements
by assessing

social processes in terms of
the ends generated by the
society itseif.

here

to

But Etzioni, typifying
contemporary social

science alters this relationship.
a-cultural.

hu^an develop„,e„t

is not in the a-historical,
a-cultural stance, but rather

shifting of the concept need to

with the

The problem
illicit

encompass concerns which are never
clearly

stated.

Marx's discussion of needs treats them
as socialfy developed and therefore,
relative to time and society while

characteristic.

39

(Durkheim

is

Bay and Etzioni

treat need as an innate

an uneasy mixture of the two.

)

The lang-uage

of

tension reduction which views needs as
universal examines needs in isolation

from societal impact.
opposed

Needs viewed as universal

to relative) operate in a self-justificatory

(as imiate

manner

and unchanging as

in relation to their

own

validity.

Behavioral need analysis excludes the standard of human
development which
is

so crucial for

Marx

in the

assessment of need

of the individual and the possibilities for society.

loses

much

39

of its import in the

in relation to both the capacities

"Need" as a critica l concept

same way anomie and

alienation have (in their

Marx systematically analyses

the development of needs in and through
Etzioni poses instead the idea of innate need. However, there seem
to be problems with his discussion. For example, one of
the primary needs
Etzioni speaks of is "recognition" which, in my opinion, is a highly social need;

society.

formation reflects societal definition. There is a difference between saying
individuals need others and that they need recognition. The very idea of
recognition is defined by the society.
its

"

concept or person
e.Ouaes the poss.tHt.es

the potent.aUt.es
0. the

Hu^an

being.

When
this

there

is

no visiMe tension,
alienation

assumption eoUapses

ai, the distinctions

is

assumed

Marx maUes. The proMe.

consciousness would account
for a tension tree
individual who
alienated,

however unlikely

the eo.hination

not to exist.

.ay

be.

The

in

terms of a lack of development

distinction between
if

alienation is

in relation to the
ideal of a

then alienation will be said
to exist when species

life

of faise

r..y be

still

real and false needs would
also explain the "happy
auton^aton. "

measured

But

person

does not exist.

What they

among

lack, though is the ability
to choose reflectively
alternative courses of conduct,
to act responsMy
°f

resentment,
gnef,
^rieTZl
guilt, remorse, and
outrage which we associate
with
the social life of the human
being. 40

To

the extent that the concerns
of species being are lacking
in contemporary

treatment of both alienation and need
we are limited

to a behaviorali.ed static

conception of "Mensch.
In conclusion one can see that

alienation literature primarily,
innate concept manifested in

felt-tendency,

3)

1)

need functions

in

contemporary need and

a-socially and a-historically,

2)

terms of tension reduction, behavioral

as an individual

inclination or

and primarily as a noun devoid of the
integral relationship

between "x" and "y," as needs and ends.

One can see then

40

Op.

cit.

.

that

need analysis

Connolly, p. 13.

in its

contemporary guise circumscribes

117

attempts to develop models or
criteria for assessing
established society.

„eed

If

analysis of this sort cam.ot supply
a theory of motivation,
a conception of a

person, or a justification for such
a conception, the choice
between Durkheim's

and Marx's models of persons
cannot be vindicated through
need analysis.
other words,
in

terms of

ends.

wc

it

,n

needs themselves can only be
judged or weighed as valid or
not

a given purpose or end. they
evidently cannot be used to
justify these

Hence, to further evaluate the
competing models of human
development

shall turn to an examination of
the consequences of both
Durkheim's and

Marx's thought.

Consequences of Models
If

the

of

Pe rsons

models of species being and the moral
order cannot be appraised

adequately by reference to a theory of
autonomous needs, how should we proceed

here?

What does each model allow you

What kind

of people do

Marx and Durkheim

between the models of human persons

Perhaps one's answer

mean

that evidence,

understand and what does
value, and

expresses commitments

to confirming or disconfirming tests.

arguments and reasoned speculation cannot
There are,

in

my

ultimate commitments.
for the judgment of one

If

to

But that does
heljD to

shape,

judgment, reasoned

explanations related to the consequences of thought that can be given

Marx's theory, as opposed

ignore?

that they present?

sharpen and justify these commitments.

of

it

how would one choose

to these questions ultimately

which are not fuU^ amenable
not

to

Durkheim's before one moves

in

defense

to the level of

one believes that appropriate standards can be set up

model

of

human development

against another then

it

beco.es i.ponaM

to construct

an ar^u^ent based on
the relevant reasons.

A reasoned ease can be .ade
purposes and goals are made

so long as underlying
commitments to

explicit.

Whether the reasons

as a justification is another,
although connected,
question.

arguments can be set up about
privileged values, although
that the choice can be

made

in

will

be accepted

Reasoned
this is far

from saying

terms of "objective" criteria."

Let us now examine the
consequences of Durkheim's and
Marx's root

assumptions.
If

one accepts Durkheim's view
of the importance of
solidarity and morality

in relation to the

needs of security and order one
must

position on the value of security
and order as
this decision is one's position
on the issues of
2)

needs are socially derived, and

needs

is valid.

of security.

goals.

whether

1)

be clear as

to one's

Involved in making

"Mensch"

is social,

the distinction between real
and false

All of these issues impinge on
one's attitude toward the necessity

As we saw

theory of anomie.
to the

3)

human

first

earlier, each is involved decisively
in Durkheim's

For instance, Durkheim's ideal

concerns of order and security.

whether

this is a valid ideal of a

whether

this is a "real

of a person gives priorities

But one cannot make a judgment as

person unless one

first takes

to

a position on

need," because needs and the model of person

in

Durkheim

41

Barrmgton Moore, Jr., in "Tolerance and the Scientific
Outlook " in
Wolff, Moore, Marcuse,
CriU^i^ of Pure
(Boston: Beacon Press,
lJ)Or,), supports the validity of
such enterprises. Moore states that "the problem
of evaluation, like that of objective knowledge
becomes one of trying to discover
if there are some aspects of what is loosely
called the human situation that
might provide a suitable point from which to argue ... the introduction
of a
subjective component does not lead to purely arbitrary results."

To^^

(p.

66)
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are equatable.

The lac. of a

distinction between real
and false needs causes
serious problem^

for Dur.heim.s social
theory and

them.
)

it

infects his

model

of person via his
theory of

Durkheim ends up distinguishing
very weaMy among needs

the fact that the needs
of security, order,
and control are in

(except for

some sense

givens).

His idea of insatiable or
endless desires stated in
his theory of anomie
are at the
root of the moral model of
person. They condition his
entire theory.

Marx, however, poses the
distinction between manipulated
and real needs42
and

it

then becomes possible to
decipher which

design.

needs^ endless by their own

Such manipulated or abstract needs
as private property and
possession

are considered inherently insatiable
with the only limits to them
those created

by the "states" interest.

proceeded

It is

to generalize about.

these needs which Durkheim to
a large degree

"Actual human needs and appetites,
whether

internal or external, can in fact, be
stilled whereas there is nothing
to limit an

Marx not only makes the distinction between real
and manipulated need but
he traces the development of manipulated
needs through commodity production
Proper y values and the accumulation of capital
(manipulated need) oppose human
values (real needs) in the political economy.
Marx

also

becomes involved

in

posing the needs of the worker against the need
of the state (the capitalists)
Durkheim does not deal with this level of distinction
because

he basically accepts
the Idea of hierarchy. He does not conceive
of a state interest in conflict with
the workers need. Needs are insatiable
for Durkheim. However, real needs are
not msatiable. But he does not treat needs
as such. Then again, Marx wants to
change the society to deal with curbing the development
of false needs. His
concern is not with controlling the individual but with ending
the insatiable desires
of changing the society.

"
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abstract need.

For example, one might
conclude,
and order are -.alse- needs

in contrast to

(at least in the

that security

way Dur.heim conceptualizes
them)

in relation to the total
picture of the individual.

believe that security and
order

Dur.heim

In other

may be worthwhile

words, one might

,on^

and to some degree,

but not merit the priority
they receive in Durkheim.

One seriously wonders who
I

it

is that

Durkheim generalizes about,
because

can see the goal of security in
conflict with other desired
ends human beings

To

hold.

the extent '.Mensch'. is a
conscious thinking being (Durkheim
accepts

and even fears

this)

and alternatives.

he

Why

may

a..d often

does seek new adventures and
involvements

do people yearn

to

move?

to travel? to

cultures? to experiment with the
unknown? to marry

more

read about other

than once?

humans are curious; because they change, and
there are no guarantees
want the same things tomorrow as today.

Evidence of these capacities

Because
they will
in

individuals can be seen throughout history
through different social movements,

and today

is

it

demonstrated

to

some degree by

the

Women's Liberation

Movement.

Durkheim poses quiescent security against
individual.

the view of the unrestrained

But the occurence of security and choices among
alternatives need

not be opposites.

One can

feel

secure

in the struggle to

master and develop

one's potential which involves the seeking out of alternatives,

chooses
43

if

he or she

this.

Istvan Meszaros, Marx's Theory of Alienation

1970), p. 176.

.

(London:

Merlin Press,
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People Who accept Durkheim's
view

of the necessity for
security

do not often include themselves
among those who have these
needs.

men exempt themselves

and decide that

general, theorists of security
think

it

women who

is

it

must be

and order

Sometimes

have these needs.

the other person

In

who operates

within these confines, or should
operate within them.

One can begin

to test the acceptability
of

the following questions:

my own

To

life?

accept Durkheim's constraints
as a ^ide for

I

the extent that

from the members
I

Would

Durkheim's theory, then, by posing

Iwould

of a "lower" class,

what distinguishes me, basically,

not,

from women, or from other groups
whom

view as appropriately guided by these
limits? And, what makes these
claimed

differences justify proposed differences
in
If

given the choice, would

I

enroll

life stvie

my

..^ r^...^^.J^^.

child in a highly disciplined school

with a philosophy of education which required
an extremely slow pace so that the
child would not

become confused by

the newness of material, or would

the child in a class which tapped his or
her utmost resources?

the choice,

I

think, they usually operate with

and for the potentiality of those close

Most
controlled

of the time then
life style

to

some regard

strict hierarchy if there

was no chance

The above discussion relates

to

For those given

them.

when one speaks

How many

register

for their potentiality

of the importance of an ordered,

structured by strict role orientations one

others; the other individual.

I

is

speaking of

individuals would choose to live within a
at all that they could get "to the top"?

Marx's conception

an object creating creature, as creative.

If

"Mensch"

is

of the

human being as

viewed as potentially
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creative, then

prodding.

it

appears plausible that this
creativity should receive
the proper

One can extend Marx's discussion

qualities of --Mensch.'
abilities,

of labor to

encompass the human

These would involve his or her
consciousness, conceptual

and the capacity for alternative
thinking.

dimension of "Mensch" develops through
the free
curiosity is even encouraged.

According

Marx

to

activity with others,

Once you grant the human being

this

where

his purposiveness

(seen specifically through one's labor
according to Marx) and capacities
for

thought (evidenced through language
and

human progress)

would be denying "Mensch" his distinctive
character
dimensions.
an effort
is

if

it

appears that one

one did not encourage these

Afterall a person has intentions and
purposes and should be allowed

at identification.

This conception of "Mensch" "determines
what

man

on the basis of what he really can be tomorrow. "^5

Durkheim works from

the position that

"Mensch," through

his capacities

for "thought," is capable of building
alternative actions and hence

As a matter

of fact

Durkheim's theory

is

new

structured around the fear that "Mensch"

might construct too many alternatives and hence
experience anomie.

"Mensch" must have limits placed upon

possibilities.

Therefore,

his endless desires to create

Durklieim fears the thought capacities of "Mensch" while
Marx sees

new horizons.

it

more

fully

as a force in the development of the individual and society.

The one thing

that

Durkheim did not account

for is that to the extent the

individual is conscious and can reason, to that extent, he or she can
handle

than a one-dimensional world.

more

Alternatives need not boggle his or her mind and

44

See Bernard William's treatment of this in his article "The Idea of Equality"
in Joel Feinberg, ed.
Moral Concepts (London: Oxford University Press, 1969).
,

,

45

Herbert Marcuse, Negations; Essays
Press, 1968), p. 155.

in Critical

Theory

,

(Boston:

Beacon
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create a situation of anomie.
to think that

the

On

the

same

plane,

it is

an oversimplification

you can construct a neat hierarchy
of fonctions and purposes
which

indmdual

will blindly accept.

Individuals can think of
alternative arrange-

ments.

As people

reflect more they question the
organization of
society and their place in it. If
they see it as a mere
product of the society; then they may
waat to change it
And this idea of necessity must be
eventually undermined
by the growth of people's reflective
consciousness about
their role, still more when it is
combined with the thought
that what they and the others
have always thought about
their role in the social system was
the product of the
social system itself. . .^^

One must decide whether an

individual's thought process gives

over the forces of his world or whether

which hold him captive within a
capacities of "Mensch"

make

it

him greater control

nourishes these boundless desires

it

state of anomie.

It

seems

to

me

that the

mental

possible for the individual to deal actively with

society and not be passively defined by existing
needs, i.e.

,

security, order and

The thought processes which Durkheim fears as creating
endless desires

calm.

are the very thought processes which

caji

and have been used to create patterns

of order.

Along a related

line let us

now examine Durkheim' s view

discussed in terms of his view of morality.

of the

person as

For Durkheim, as we have already

seen, the paradigm case of the moral relation is the relation of dependence

between men and women.

Durkheim's morality assumes partial people, each

dependent upon one another for completion.

46

Op

.

cit.

,

Williams, p. 161.

In his

view there are stark

124
differences between

men and women stemming from

the division of intellectual

and affective capacities which
necessitate this pooling into
one.

between man a.d woma.
to

is

Durkheim, could never

moral because

live a

moral

life

it is

ordered.

The

relation

The woman, according

independent of the social ties
relating

her to male intellectual dominance.

Durkheim's belief
and

women

in the

Marx, however, would

find such a

most problematic, because he poses an
underlying

women.

men

necessitates the above conception of
moral relations, as well as his

belief in hierarchical order.
life

severe differentiation in capacities
between

There

is

view of moral

equality between

men and

then no reason to establish relations
of dependence, based upon

an inequality between the sexes.

The relationships

of

dependence would not only

be suspect in and of themselves but would be
suspect in terms
societal inequalities and exploitation.

of

breeding further

Reciprocal relations displace dependent

relationships based on inequality in Marx's ideal
of species

life.

Durldieim's discussion of morality leads to a justification
of inequality

one does not posit
is

it

within one's premise.

needed for one's completion,

cannot be a dependent and

still

When

a person is partial and another

is inevitable that inequality will arise.

it

an equal

"One

"^"^
.

.

Inequality will arise also

.

because society will weigh and value the roles

of

men and women

differently.

Specifically in Durkheim's instance, the man, as intellectual, is most highly

valued and therefore attains

more

status and power.

47

Kate Millett, Sexua l Politics
p. 125.

,

if

(New York: Doubleday, 1970),
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The two sexes are necessary
to each other, but
this
necessity has never brought
about a condition of
reciprocity between them
women don't
make exchanges or agreements on
an equal footing. ^8
.

On what basis does Durkheim
a

.

.

justify this position of
reconciling

women

to

ordered by decisions she herself
does not make, being viewed
as incapable

life

of such activity?

The

"natural" design.
life-style for

justification of his view falls
upon the

It is

weak argument

woman's natural make-up which
structures her

of

resulting

Durkheim.

The question

of the development of
potential deliberativeness
cannot be

raised within Durkheim's framework
because the
of mental capacities.

To

the extent

woman

Durkheim denies her

is not

conceived

should be committed to the development of

human

terms

this he denies her

her uniquefy human quality of creative
activity and thought processes.
counterpart which will be developed more
fuUy shortly,

in

is that

Marx's

human existence

capacities to encourage

deliberative life styles.

Earlier

I

said that certain concerns related to persons
are

than others and that at

models

of thought

some

of ultimate

sure that we have arrived at that point yet.

48

privileged

point the choice between the Durkheimian and
Marxian

become a matter

"moral" relationships

more

is usually

commitment.

My

However,

I

am

not

point here is that the idea of

assigned to only certain prized forms of activity.

Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex

,

(New York: Bantam Books,

1952),

p. 401.

49

The root assumptions about "woman's nature," if not accepted, call these
moral relations between man and woman into serious question. But this will be
dealt with in detail in the chapter on women.
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Whether one aeeepts exploitation
as
position or not. one
inequality between

stiU

is

man

left

assessment or the outcome

as a moral relation.

eonoeptually United to the idea
of morality.
the unequal relations
have to
I£

of

Du..heim.s

with the dilemma of
posing the relations of

woman

and

the

And

for

it

to

Inequality

be Justified as moral,

be based on some defensible
reason,

one rejects the biological
inequality between

is^

like

eompetenee.

man and woman which Durkheim

posits then on what basis does
one Justily the definition of
moral relationships

as unequal, hierarchic, ordered
relations?
only the incompetence of the

woman

There seems

to

be no justification;

rooted in "natural design"

provided as a

is

justification.

Imagine a society

in

which the few social relationships
people were

involved in were based on a form of
dependence.

terms of some specified role or
The work each docs
to the

is

not

amount of solidarity

Would

it

function.

measured
it

surprise you

in

if

Afterall this society does not sound conducive to

difficult

in

medicine or social planning.

this is not really a description of

There must be some who lead and make

some are exempted from

must) handle the

freedom involved

in

One

how everyone

the decisions.

the ordered life because they (after all

someone

decision making and choice, why

can't all be (except for the mentally retarded or deranged)?

it

in relation

you were told that the society was stagnant and

might then logically assume that

if

Responsibilities are clearly outlined.

terms of creativity but rather

experimentation with new ideas, whether

But

to others in

creates through the interdependence of the
workers.

resistant to necessary change?

in the society operates.

Each relates

hard to accept that most humans have the potential

One should not

to deal with the choices

find

and

alternatives which

make
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life

exciting

if

they accept the idea that
"Mensch"

is

both a thinldng animal and a
social animal.

But here we are involved with a
model of persons which has
been insinuated
into

our discussion but not yet explicitly
stated and defended.

Model

of

Person as an OutgroAvth

The concerns with human
an accepted model of person.
or

final.

of Sp pni^c

T.,

fo

possibility are articulated through
the

The discussion here

However, as problematic as

it

may be

median of

will in no sense be complete

to state a

model

of

persons

an implicit or explicit conception of
person operates at the base of formulations

and assessments about individuals and society
and, therefore, should be stated
as self-consciously as possible.

model

of

to social

A

I

am

a social and historical being

persons will reflect ideological commitments which
are not

serious additional problem
is

is the limitation of the

language

deal with such ideals.

itself.

entirely contrary to
ideal of a

my

to

Furthermore, the male structured language

the discussion about persons appear to be primarily about

purpose,

I

will use the

person defended here

Marx's conception of species being.

50

immune

a paucity of literature which deals with the meaning of
species

or a model of person development language has not developed

The

fully

my

and individual limitations.^^

Because there
life

Because

To

adequately

will

men. Since

make

this is

term "person."

is, to

a significant degree, rooted in

the extent that species being is a view

See, Alasdair Maclntyre, Against the Self-images of the Age, (New York: Schocken,
1971), Chapter one, for a discussion of the role of ideology in individual thought.
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of ^'Mensch'^ in the non-alienated
society, the

ness of human possibilities.

The

yiew of person

is tied to the

open-

ideal of person focuses on the
tension between

presently organized society and the
capacities for deyelopment in
human beings.

Persons, as are species being, are conceived
of here

may

beings

in

terms of what human

be, or can be, but not necessarily
what they are.

emphasis on the individual developing through
and

in

With the

work, the model of a person

will incorporate the notions of gurposive
activity as well as aspects
important
to social

community

.

To be involved

in a life of

persons one has

to experience

creative process or as "purposive rational action,"

a)

labor as a

b) critical thinking

involving the exercise of consciousness of one's
interests, goals, and purposes,

and

c)

social living which includes the consciousness of
others integrated with

group experiences, forming a sense

of

human community. Because

thinking

and especially critical thought involves the exchange and
examination of ideas, and
both language and the exchange of ideas necessitate other
people, both group

experiences and active thought processes involve one another.
tive activity is not isolated activity, as

Creative produc-

we have already discussed.

Hence,

it

does appear that the three dimensions involved in the ideal of a person are
interrelated and interdependent.

a)

is

Labor

as creative activity has already

been discussed

at length, for

it

through objectifying labor that the individual becomes conscious of his species

being, in Marx.

51

The

individual through his

work

ejq)erience can be self-objectifying.

Stuart Hampshire in Thought and Action (New York: Viking Press, 1959),
Jurgen Habermas in Toward a Rational Society, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968),
,
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More .roaai,

stated.

one's

^^^^^-^Slone:^^^^^^^
Labor
sion.

,t

m

ttseir is

purposive behavior

it

in re.ation to others,

The very idea

and in this way

it

becomes conscious

activity.

of the integration of
thought and action is
involved in the view of

person as an object creating being.
distinct, but at the

is

dimen-

involves the person in
conceiving the object, in
deliberating about the

creation of

labor

in relation to its
objectiiyin,

same time

,

"Thinking and being are thus
no doubt

they are in unity with each
other. "52 Creative

an important paradigm case for
the discussion of persons
because

it

not

only involves the individual's
own consciousness and purposiveness
towards

himself, others, his product as
well as the process, but
integration of thought and action.

it

necessitates the

Creative labor clearly seems a
crucial link

to species consciousness because
in alienated labor one is
severed

from

all the

above relations.
b)

Critical thinking which involves the
consciousness of one's interests,

goals and purposes

is

termed as such because

the rejection of other statements of
what one's

are.

It

it

may and

often does require

own interests, needs, and purposes

involves the exercise of consciousness which
necessitates individual

choices specifically in relation to one's goals
and purposes.

Thought here

includes the ability to question established
arrangements, to consider alternatives

and Jurgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1971),
the importance of individual active participation; as
the concretiza.

who deals with

tion of the individual's ideas.

52

Karl Marx, The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. (New
York:
International Publishers, 1964), p. 138.
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to them, to ascertain

how these arrangements look
when questions are raised

and alternatives considered.

One may wonder why
critical thinker.

conceiving the
of this view.

it

The reason

important to deal with the idea
of "Mensch " as a

is

is that

human being as a

Marx

it

begins to point toward
the^roblem of

social animal.

It

did not deal per se with the
individual as a "mental, "

thinking being in an explicit self
conscious form.
that he

points to the incompleteness

may

It

be as a result of this

overplayed at times the societal
pressures on the individual as noted

his discussion of total manipulation.

Clearly, the

more

in

tied and manipulated

the individual is by society the
less he or she reflects upon his
or her own

thought capacities in terms of his (or
her) goals and purposes.

Although Marx

notes this tendency clearly he also always
maintains the possibility of revolutionary consciousness and the necessity
for social change.
reflect the

problem

of social and historical'Mensch."

reflective or conscious of one's

These two tendencies

How does

one become

own ends as a social being?

Thought and language are necessarily social.

But there are at the same

time different levels of consciousness and
deliberativeness which allow one
reflect upon one's ideas to different degrees.

individual

from

What

totally reflecting the surrounding society?

because he or she

is

I

prevents the
think the

answer

is

a thinking animal and potentially a critically thinking animal.

Thought, although a social process

itself,

can stand apart from societal and

historical pressures and be reflective of that which

Marx

is it that

to

in the 18th

Brumaire has written

that:

it

is

a product

of.
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Men make

their

own history, but they do not
make

it

Just

chosen by themselves, but under
circumstances directly
^
encountered, given and transmitted
53
from the
past.

Clearly then, when

But

I

in the

I

speak of the person in terms
of the capacity for
critical

do mean to say that

it

does allow one to see the
person as an active force

struggles of his or her time.

to society holds that the

person

This interpretation of the
person in relation

is not

a mn^reflection of his
or her society, but

can as well reflect upon the forces
which operate.
Reflection is possible because the
person conceptualizes as well as
inter-

prets his surroundings.

The construction and use

of concepts is part of the
thought

process of "IWenseh." Concepts help
us conceive and delimit

reality.

"He can

begin endlessly to question and to
criticize the vocabulary and the
forms of
language which he has learnt always
to use in considering alternative
ends of
54
action.
To the extent that concepts derive much
of their meaning from

larger

theories, they allow one to

draw upon relationships and inferences which
become

a vehicle for understanding relationships
between ideas and activity. ^5
53

Karl Marx, The Eighteenth

Br^^

International Publishers, 1963), p. 15.

^he active

(New York-

54

Op.

cit.

,

Hampshire,

p. 268.

55

For Marx language was an element of thought itself. As
Karl Marx states in
the German Ideology (New York: International
Publishers, 1947), "language is as
old as consciousness, language is practical
consciousness, as it exists for other
men, and for that reason is really beginning to exist for me
personally as well;
for language, like consciousness only arises from the
need, the necessity, of
intercourse with other men." (p. 19.) Also see Denis Lawton, Social
Class
,

Language and Education (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1968),
treatment of language as integral to social consciousness.
,

for his
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role conceptual thought can
play is that concepts can
create reality as well as
reflect

The person can construct "realities"
other than

it.

experiences.

"Beliefs and ideas influence
social

beliefs and ideas.

The problem

There
of

is a

life;

that

and social

where manipulation or socialization
ends and a
still exists.

This was a key problem for Marx.

difficult interrelationship

I

influences

The answer

reflective

The relationship

between individual consciousness and
socialization processes

which

life

two way causality. "56

conceptual structure or consciousness
begins

problem.

which one

is

a highly complex

lies at the root of the

between individual consciousness and
social pressures

cannot broach at this point.

There

is

evidence, however, in support of the
thesis that "Mensch"

capable of reflective critical thought processes.

conceive of alternate

life

styles there could be no

If

is

the individual could not

Women's Liberation Movement,

there could have been no Civil Rights Movement,
or the Black Panthers.

Consciousness of the possibilities for social
change would be impossible^^
"^^Alasdair Maclntyre, "A Mistake About
Causality in Social Science, " in Peter
Laslett and W. G. Runciman, eds.
Philosophy . Politics and Society, 2nd Series
(New York: Barnes and Noble, 1962),
p. 49.
,

57^^^^^^.^^^
j^^.^^ Mitchell in Woman's Estate. (New
York: Pantheon, 1971)
the development of a critical consciousness
would be possible within society. The'
forces at work create more than one dimensional
results. As Mitchell states:
"Expanding the consciousness of many (for the sake of expanding
consumerism)
does mean expanding their consciousness. And the products
of this expanded

consciousness are more elusive than those of the factory
conveyor belt." (p. 31.)
The values related to the free market of free choice can rebel in their
own term's.
The media can manipulate one to buy the whitest wash, but the
T. V. screen also
brings you Vietnam.

It is
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the aspect of a person
as a oHticaUy thirling
being which can open
up the

closed circle of Marcuse.

The social system

is not something
given in history, but is
a social object that is
selectively intexpreted

is acuU y
seen as the
"subject" and -object! "58

conceptuahzed by men in the here
and now;
product of the interaction of

and

it

is

Thought processes are part of the
potential of any given
individual, unless
mentally deranged or retarded.

The problem arises when

this potentiality is

ignored or perverted, as in the
case of alienation or false
consciousness.
ideal of a person then involves
the prospects of a conscious

human being deriving

from the possibility of thought,
deliberation, imagination and
those
which allow the person

to

be an active element

in defining his goals

activities

and purposes.

Closely tied to the ideal of person as
a critically thinking animal
related activity of choice.

If

The

is the

the person can construct ideas
actively out of what

otherwise would be passive experience
he or she starts to create the
possibility of
choice.

Choice follows from certain levels of
consciousness.

involves purposes, reasons, and goals.
in

what we do, most often neither

is

Human

Therefore, when choice

activity

is not

involved

there consciousness about one's purposes
or

goals.

Person's ends and purposes must be clearly stated

make choices which

will

in

order to be able to

push one toward an outward development.

The more

explicit a man is in formulating to himself the
ends of his action, and the grounds upon which his decisions
rest, the more he is aware of himself as having made choices
that are always subject to revision.

Alvin Gouldner, "Review of History and Class Consciousness, "

Times Book Review
59

Op

»

cit .

,

,

(July 18, 1971), p. 4.

Hampshire, p. 267.

New York
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To

the extent persons "act"
they always have ends.^"

"Their action

is

goal

oriented and their practical
reasoning concerns both the
proper ends of

and the appropriate means for
achieving those ends.""
Purposive
involves the choice between
alternatives.

acti,
ion

acti,
ion

"Purposive rational action

rcali:
izes

defined goals under given
conditions. "^^
It

is

important to note that

I

am

always incorporated into the lives
of
in this respect; but

it

is

not saying that the element
of choice

all

people.

An

alienated person

is

i.
is

deficient

involved in the ideal of a person.

Once consciousness

of ends

and goals are incorporated into
the model of

a person, as well as the resulting
activity of choice which results
from the

choosing of ends, one

is

dealing with the idea of conflict.

as a positive dimension in the

life of

persons.

Afterall

it

Conflict is viewed here
is

through conflict,

let

us say around ideas, that one becomes
more self-conscious of his or her own
ideas.

Differences normally arise when choices
between alternatives are

to

be

60.„,

he combmation of the concerns of both the
model of species being and the
language involved with "human action" is
fruitful in that it focuses upon the
specific
quality of social consciousness and social
living as well as providing clarity about
purposes, goals, and aims. Marx only begins in
his theory of labor to deal with
the question of human action. Of course, for those
who conceive of Marx as an
economic determinist this analysis will be troublesome,
but the trouble lies in
thoir classification of Marx. Further conscious treatment
of this area of human
action IS done by Alasdair Maclntyrc in his Self-images
Against the Ago op. cit
Peter Winch in The Jdea of A Social Science, (London: l^outledge
& Kegan PauTT*
19r)8); Charles Taylor in "Neutrality in
Political Science" in Laslett and Runciman,
cds.
Philosophy, Politics and Society , (New York: Barnes & Noble,
1967) and
Charles Taylor, "Interpretation and the Sciences of Man," Review of
Metaphysics
25 (September, 1971), pp. 3-51.
1

•

'

,

,

GX

Robert Paul Wolff, Poverty of Liberalism

,

(Boston:

Beacon Press,

p. 167.

G2

Op

.

cit.

,

Habermas, Toward A Rational Society

,

p. 92.

1968),
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made.

Through the conHict which arises

in these instances one
often

clearer about his or her own goals
or purposes.
will

most

becomes

Choices about human purposes

often involve conflict because they
reflect decisions arising out
of

alternative schemes.

Conflicts not only arise out of
differences about goals, but

differences relating to entire value
systems as well as differences of sex
and
age, and economic class.

Durldieim would not be able to accept this
position because of his underlying

commitment

Marx

is

to the

committed

need of order and security for the human
individual.
to the

development of persons he never directly
discusses the

positive force of conflict except in relation to
class conflict.

classes comes the resolution of conflict.

human choice

that

I

Although

It is

With the abolition of

because of the potential element

of

have to differ with Marx in his belief of the "genuine
resolution

of the conflict between

man

and nature and between

man and man,

resolution of the strife between existence and essence

.

.

."^^

(as) the true

Marx's

difficulty in

handling the problem of consciousness leads to a deflected treatment
of the individual
as "thinking" and therefore

a choosing animal experiencing conflicts other than

class conflicts.
c)

The

last aspect of the ideal of a

living, as species life, or the

here

is that

Op.

dimension of social community.

persons are social

cit.

,

Marx,

person involves the importance of social

The view

and that they therefore require relationships

p. 135.

64

However, most discussions of "persons" do not focus upon the social
dimension of the concepto P. F. Strawson in Individuals (New York: Doubleday,
1959), says that "person" is a social concept but the meaning of social is limited
here. He discusses in Chapter three of Individuals that consciousness of being
a person implies that the individual is aware of other persons. He further states
,
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With others for their total
developn^ent.

These relationships between
persons

involve certain levels of obligation
and responsibility toward
one another.
it

may

.
certainly be conceded that
.
.
the price I have
to pay for self-seeking
behavior is a loss of certain
kinds
of relationships. But if I
want to have a certain kind of

°f t^^t' friendship and
cooperation
wfth
with others, then my wanting
their good and my wanting
my
good are not two independent discernible
desires. 65
If

one aims

at a life lived in relationship
with others, one

into account in a systematic

way.

Hence, a

life

must take

the -'others"

which involves a social conscious-

ness means that the "other" persons
must always be viewed as important

group experience.

to the

Social living then would involve the
concept of social

responsibility; a person's actions therefore
being accountable to those with

they live.

Durkheim would be able

reciprocating responsible

life for

to accept

this-but for different ends.

him would be instrumental

in

whom
The

implementing

the solidary life rather than a creative
experimental life-style.

The above conception

of

person rules out the treatment of persons as things.

"Things are pre-empted for individuals own purposes, whereas
a person cannot
be used to serve someone's ends.

There

is

an unconditional worth and respect

we see each other as persons "if we think first of the fact that we act and
act on each other, and act in accordance with a common human nature."
(p. 109)
This dimension of "social" seems to merely mean that in order for one to

that

consider himself a person, he must identify those around him as persons also.
Strawson seems to think that "person" is a social concept in as much as it is a
genoralizable notion. The idea of "other" is involved in the preconception of
an individual seeing himself as a person, but the "other" is in no way conceived
as necessary to one's life in terms of the uniqueness or richness of social

community.
65
ed.

,

Alasdair Maclntyre, "Egoism and Altruism", Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Paul Edwards, 2 (1967), p. 466.
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extended to persons, which

is

never extended

to things.

Species consciousness involves a
different level of awareness
than one

experiences in alienated society.

This different level of
consciousness embraces

the idea of a collective unity;^^
a sense of

concern, of trust or friendship arise.
participation in a community of fellow
It

community with others.

One becomes involved

human

in

Feelings of

"meaningful

beings. "^^

has been made clear in the earlier
chapter on Marx that species
relations

are the truly human relations which
culminate out of a shared consciousness
and
social experience.

But clearly, feelings of love or hate
or friendship need not

always arise out of species
experiences.

living, although they do

always arise from social

Species living expresses a higher level of
development.

Obviously

the process of blaming, exhorting,
admiring, or esteeming takes place within
a

social

community with some

level of fundamental ties.

Otherwise such

communication would be impossible.

An emotion term

"shame" can only be explained by
reference to other concepts which in turn cannot be
understood without reference to shame. To understand
these concepts we have to be in a certain experience,
like

we have

to understand a certain language, not just of
words, but also a certain language of mutual action and
communication, by which we blame, exhort, admire,
esteem each other.

66

Arthur Danto, "Persons", Encyclopedia
6 (1967), p.

of Philosophy , ed.

James Glass, "Marx,
Politics and Society

,

Kafl^a and Jung:

2 (Winter,

69

Op.

. ,

Paul Edwards,

The Appearance of Species Being,"

1972), p. 258.

68
Ibid

,

110.

p. 266.

cit .

,

Taylor, Review of Metaphysics, p. 13,
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But

this level of activity is
not uniquely indicative
of unalienated as

alienated society.

so by definition.

opposed to

These relations can involve
species relations but do not
do
Within capitalist enterprises
individuals can be blanked
and

admired; blaming and admiring can
be alienated

The development

activity.

of the species character of

persons living together.

It

human existence

is

more than

involves living together in a socially
res.onsibl. way;

taking cognizance of the "otherperson.

commitments which includes

Each must

live up to his or

living with a concern for others.

her

Species relations

reflect a higher order conceptual field
which reflects the concerns of social

justice and social responsibility.

The feelings

want, hope, need, aspire, hate, shun.

from isolated

individual.

.

that

"men

desire, yearn, love,

distinguish

But the commitment

communal "Mensch"

to social justice or social

responsibility distinguishes a possible pattern for the
development of species

"Mensch."
If

one posits the varied human relationships on a continuum, species

relations will be the highest form of social community possible, while
atomized

class society will be the lowest.

One moves from casual

At the same time the community

here.

is

to intimate relations

developing the individuals involved

are growing, and experiencing truly human relationships.

Species relationships

do involve commitments and responsibility; but these operate as guarantees
for necessary

freedom

in distinction

order.

70

Op

.

cit., Wolff, p.

168.

from Durkheim's concerns with solidary
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U

should be clear from the above
dlseussion dealing with the
mode, of a

person that need
or

analy.sis doe. not begin to
deal with the issue of
the potentiality

"Menseh." The alienated individual
may

not express through
behavioral

inclination or tension that he is
dissatisfied.
I

would want

He may indeed not

to say that this individual
has not developed In

bo.

However.

terms of

his species

capacities.

Why

is

species being- vindieatcd here as the
form of humrm activity one

should try to attain?
it

in

Clearly

any behavioral sense.

Therefore,

let

species beings

is

it

And

not because people are always
inclined toward

it is

not the

most easily attained mode

of life.

us explore the possibility that i ndividuals
would choose
if

they could experience that

The problems which arise with

this

life.

approach are not as a result of the

choice criterion itself but rather with related
questions.

The

first

problem

arises when one tries to judge whether the
experiencing of alternatives has been

adequate prior to choosing.
individual has been "fully

One

is to

It

becomes

immersed"

in

difficult to

assess whether a given

competing and different experiences.

be exposed to a wide range of information before choices
are

made, but how does one loiow

comprehended?

In other

if

words,

the information has been adequate or basically
if

person "x" chooses

life style

examining and experiencing situations "a," "b," and "c," and

know

if

to be

"/,"

after

how does one

these alternatives were wide ranging enough to make a valid choice?

How does

one test to know

if

person "x" has really immersed himself or herself

140
in the different experiences?

The above diseussion leads one
towards

the other

major problem which

J^-^^J^eailrtllojHBO^ej^^
^^^^^
to truly

experience competing

lite

styles one

must immerse oneself

in a

variety of situations, and the
question is whether this emersion
does not in
the end change the original

human

being.

One does not walk

social Situation which involves
an entire conceptual set

walks

in

and out of a doorway.

in

in the

Does a real involvement

in

and out of a

same way one

competing social

situations require a different mental
set or at least a tremendously
self-

conscious sense of one's own perspective?

And would

this not

change the way

one looks at things; or the way one viewed
things previous to the expanded

information?
Let

me

elaborate by way of an example.

If

I

was asked whether

exiDloitative relations, specifically in this case,
slavery,

Very often the question

is

then filled out further to read:

I

I

condoned

would answer no.

if

you knew of a

relationship between two people "A" and "B, " where "A"
was dominated by "B, "
but

"A" was happy, would you

still

course the classical example of
that the slave has

When

be adamant

this is the

your condemnation

of it?

is

chosen his position.

the assessment of the person as "happy" is brought in one often

may

Of

happy slave, and the inference here

that this implies a certain degree of choice.

happiness

in

The point here

is that the individual's

not really be indicative of varied alternatives.

remain a slave may not be a

reflective choice.

assumes

The "choice"

to

The slave even when exposed

71Sce, Taylor, "Interpretations and the Science of Man," op.
Connolly, on "Interests in Politics, " o£. cit.

cit.

,

and

to

,
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differing experiences

may be

socialization into his role.

1)

unable to ehoose reflectively,
because of

Ms

Here again we are confronted
with the problem

total

of

trying to evaluate the value of
alternatives granted the
socialized being as

well as

2)

dealing with the issue of whether
he can really experience
these

alternatives.

The contemporary example

not want his newly
is the

won freedom.

First

I

often given is of the
prisoner

think

it is

who does

important to note that this

exception to the rule; otherwise
prisons would not need their guards.

However,

in this

case the prisoner camiot judge the
value of freedom within the

conceptual set of prisoner.
likely will not

Once he

choose imprisonment.

is

educated again to value freedom he
most

But then again,

is this the

same man choos-

ing as before his re-education?
It is

to

posited here that once individuals are allowed,
as well as prepared,

experience other situations

refl3ctively.
of conceptual

72

S and

(S

and S^) they are in a position

choose more

represent two competing social situations here inclusive

baggage as well as actual

life styles.

I

am assuming

anyone who would choose to be a slave or who would choose a
tion

to

here that

life of

exploita-

would do so out of false consciousness resulting from a lack of information

or a lack of awareness of competing alternatives or experience.

Although

troublesome,

I

I

do think the problems related to the activity of choice are

still

justification of the

think that the process of choice is important to the

model

of a person.

It

is a

possible

way

in

which the ideals

that characterize species life can be vindicated.

72

See, Steven Lukes, "Alienation and Anomie" in Laslett and Runciman, eds.
Philosophy , Politics and Society , 3rd series, (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1967).
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CHAPTER

IV

ANOM,E AND AUENATION AS
THEORETICAL PEHSPECTIVES rOH
WOMEN
Thus far

I

have e^a^ined two
classical perspectives
which purport to explain

the relationship of the
individual to society as
well as provide

ment.

I

have examined the role
..needs" play

m the anomie

Durld^elm and the alienation
framework of Marx.
is insufficient In

of social life.

framework of

have argued that need theory

both theories to provide
us with a comprehensive
understanding

Only by elaborating a model
of persons will any
perspective be able

to provide us with both
prescriptive

comprehend complex

and descriptive standards by
which

to

social reality.

The ultimate purpose
paradigms was

I

.odels of develop-

of

my

excursion into the anomie and
alienation

to provide us with a

framework

for the understanding of

women.

This concluding chapter will focus
again upon the two perspectives,
but with
particular emphasis upon their relevance
for the understanding of

contemporary society.

I

will

woman

In

examine both contemporary and classical
versions

of these frameworks and will finally
conclude that the alienation perspective

buttressed by a clear statement of the Ideal of
persons

is the only

approach

that is able to provide us with a sound
understanding of the issue of

persons .

women

as
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Women
The anomie perspective

in the Anor^i.

of

Durkheim connects a series

conception of a person, as ideal.

of claims to the

also presents the tightly

It

woman's biology and sexuality and
important to remember that

^^.^^^^^^^^^

woven assumptions

the resulting derivative
needs.

women

men and women. That

is,

although

frameworks, man as embroiled

leading to rootlessness,

woman

The

is

for

in a

market society

seen as the ideal fulfillment for both.

the rules of the society.

woman more

her biological make-up.

same

as passive and submissive by
"nature," the

end state of moral solidary relations

and stable, whereas

is the

men and women are understood

initially within different

The moral man has internalized

It is

are excluded from the condition
of anomie

by Durkheim although the end
state of the ideal moral
person
both

fully

is

ordered

derives her ordered moral condition from

person for Durkheim

ideal

His existence

is in

a passive relation-

ship with society because of Durkheim's
overriding concerns with stability,

security and moral dependence.

Without explicating Freud's position on women, Durkheim's
framework

is

distinguished here from the "biology as destiny" argument,
via his discussion
of

human needs. Although

he often resembles Freud in his treatment of women,

Durkheim does deal with woman's needs as they

relate to his

model

of a person

and the question of the moral order.

Woman

as Biological and Sexual Beings

Although Durkheim's general theory does contain a theory of needs which
distinguishes

it

of

from cruder forms

of biological determinism,

most conceptions
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of

wo^a.

toCay are tied very o.osely
to a

stereo«

.ew wMcH Ce.ves Tro. the
anoxic paradigm, and which
perceives wo.en as sexual
beings who are bound
by their biology and their
"nature."

Wo.en

they are defined and
described in terms of

Much contemporary
Of their bodies.

experimentation
passive.

literature in the

A developmental scheme
is

noticeably lacking.

are further tied to their
biology as

it

and as needs are derived
from

anomie mold binds women
for

women which

Rather,

Durkheim sees women as secure

it.

to the limits

involves freedom or

women are viewed

in their passivity

as "naturally-

whereas contemporary

atomic theory treats them as needin^^
further social constraints.

These necessary

constraints can be attained through
marriage and the fulfillment of the
"female

role."

They are seen as important

viewed as the good

for the "secure" life, and the
secure life is

^

life.

The needs of security which derive from
sexual role of both

woman

the dependence nurtured by the

and mother, and the resulting economic
dependence

feed into the derivative need of marriage. ^

Oftentimes those who discuss the problem of

women within an anomie paradio-m
from the classical meaning of anomie and adopt a
mixture of classical
and contemporary ideas. They retain the
classical statement
really stray

of needs, those of
security and order, but adopt a psychological,
subjective dimension, different from
that of Durkheim's treatment of anomie.
Woman, as anomie in contemporary theory
IS therefore abstracted from her social
context, (the economic and sexist surroundings). Therefore, the study of women, especially
by psychologists is with an overemphasis on innate characteristics rather than with the objective
social conditions

of the surrounding society.
2

As Simone de Beauvoir

in The Second Sex, (New York: Bantam Books,
1952),
notes, marriage basically is conceived in terms of the security which
it provides.

"Thus what bourgeois optimism has

to offer the engaged girl is certainly not love;
the bright ideal held up to her is that of happiness, which means the ideal
of quiet
equilibrium in a life of immanence and repetition." (p. 421.)

For these writers women are
largely determined by their
biology or
sexuality; their "determinate
taction" deriving from the fact
that they are the
child bearers.

sexual being.

Woman's purposes are
Her biology serves

defined in terms of her function
as a

to limit the

way what she does can even be

conceived or understood.

Women,

then, are viewed as "dependent,
passive, fragile, subjective,

emotional, unable to take risks.

her biology because the vagina

For Freud, woman's passivity

is the

passive recipient.

From

is

rooted in

the sexual

contours of woman's bodies to the biological
states of pregnancy, menopause,

and menstruation, contemporary writers move
easily to descriptions of

women

as passive, weak, ajid tender, although they might
not always agree with the
"specific" arguments of Freud.

Possible

life

styles are constructed

assessments; as different anatomies define different needs which
concerns with woman's potential.
fragile

woman

From

the biological

one else must be active.

must bring

If

woman

is

inhibit the

assessment of passive and

one derives the needs for order and security.

as dependent she needs someone else to depend upon.

from these

If

If

woman

woman
is

is

viewed

passive, some-

subjective and emotional someone else

the objective and rational into her life.

This conception of

women

has made

its

way

into notions of

mental health

Judith Bardwick and Elizabeth Douvan "Ambivalence: The Socialization of
Women," in Vivian Gornick and Barbara Moran, eds. , Woman in Sexist Society ,

(New York: Basic Books, 1971), p. 147. This kind of language partially
derives from the sexual-biological view of women as well as constructs the view
of women as sexual-biological beings. It not only reflects a view of woman,
it begins to define how women will be conceived in the future.
The language
becomes active in prescribing certain life styles as distinctly "feminine."

"

.

m Which a "healthy" woman differs
schema are

ca,

substantially from a "healthy"

differentiated according to sex.

man.

Theoreti-

As Inge a.d Donald Broverma.

argue:

a double standard of health exists
wherein ideal concepts
of health for a mature adult,
sex unspecifi^re meant
primarily for men, less so for
^

women.

the concepts of health for a
sex unspecified adult and for
a
will not differ, but that the
concepts of health for women
will differ significantly from
those of an adult. ^
.

.

.

man

"Man" and "adult" seem
to

to

be synonomous in the above,
whereas

woman appears

be differentiated significantly from the
idea of "adult.

For instance, among these items, clinicians
are more likely
to suggest that healthy women
differ from healthy men by

being more submissive, less independent,
less adventurous
more easily influenced, less aggressive, less
competitive

more

excitable

.

.

.

their feelings easily hurt

.

.

.

more

emotional
This constellation seems a most unusual way
.
^
of describing any mature, healthy,
individual.
.

The idea
nature as

it

is

of a

.

woman's "nature" has a

self-justifying role to play.

Woman's

defined in the anomie perspective presupposes a
whole set of needs

which differ from men's, ranging from the physical

to the

mental arena.

The

resulting organization of society which is structured to meet
these needs is

by the very

justified

fact that

it is

organized to meet the needs of woman.

needs (which derive from the treatment of

women

These

as biological-sexual beings)

4

Inge Broverman, Donald Broverman et al. "Sex Role Stereotypes and
Clinical Judgments of Mental Health, " Journal of Consulting and Clinical
Psychology 34 (1970), p. 2. These findings were a result of a survey which
Inge and Donald Broverman et al. , conducted themselves. The questionnaire
,

,

which tested the sex-role stereotyping was distributed among practicing
5

Ibid

^Ibid

.

,

p. 5.

clinicians.
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structure society.
beings.

Needs

As a

in this

Although often

result society deals with

women

sense become self-justifying

a^

in the actual practice
of their lives

as biological--sexual

self-sustaining.

men donot

have

fulfill ing

jobs and are not able to tap their
potential, they are at least
viewed as having
a potential and as requiring
a life with purpose, aims
and goals.

approach allows for a critical analysis
tap the potential or offer a
purpose.

of the

Such an

man's situation where

Women, however, are viewed

it

fails to

with purposes

biologicaUy and sexually defined and
therefore as having no potential
as persons
independent of these.
essential role of

On

this

model despite changes

women would remain impervious

in social structure the

to change.

Society camaot

therefore be criticized for failing to
allow women's development since
she
thought to be biologically motivated
and defined.
tive is

necessary (although not

A

is

social and historical perspec-

sufficient) if a critical

base

is to

be developed.

For example, most often the inequalities
between men and women are
justified by explaining their biological
differences

which eventually lead

to the

positing of psychological differences, and these
culminate in turn, in the conclusion
that

man

is better

prepared

to handle the difficulties

which

life

may

This leads to the inequalities which are inevitable
when one person
to

become more "complete" than

account for social inequalities.

another.

present.
is

allowed

But biological differences cannot alone

Issues of society and history must be accounted

for.

Strength, Sex Differentiation, and the Role of Inequality

There are several approaches

that

might be taken to assess the relevance

Of biology as the determiner
of appropriate sexual
roles.

First, using the

example

of differentials in strength,
one might question the extent
to which there is a
significant difference between
the sexes with regard
to physical ability.

We

might well begin with a very
suggestive quote from a black
slave,

Sojourner Truth, whose

life

suggests the irrelevance of
sexual differentiation

on the basis of strength:

The man over there says women need

to be helped into
carriages and lifted over ditches,
and to have the best
place everywhere. Nobody ever
helps me into carriages
or over puddles, or gives me the
best place-and ain't
I a woman?
Look at my arm! I have ploughed and
planted and gathered into barns and
no man could head
me~and ain't I a woman? I could work as much
and
eat as much as a man-when I could
get it-and bear the
lash as well! And ain't I a woman.
I have born
thirteen children and seen most of 'em
sold into slavery,
and when I cried out with my mother's
grief— none but
Jesus heard
and ain't I a woman?''

me—

As Truth would have
ing severe pain.

women

women

it,

Even

if

are capable of carrying great burdens and
suffer-

the strongest

man

obviously possess enough strength and ability to be
involved in a variety

of tasks

now denied

to

them.

And besides,

differentials are not as great as they are
It is

and

seriously open to question whether
if

stronger than the strongest woman,

is

when they are

it

is not

as

much

in

terms of average strength,

made

women

out to be between

man

and woman.

are as weak as often described

a reflection of social pressures as

biological make-up.

One may speculate

that if the delicate

woman

of the Victorian age suddenly

found herself in the position of slave, she would soon lose her societally developed

Eleanor Flexnor, Century of Struggle (New York: Antheneum, 1959), pp. 90-91.
,

.
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delicacy and instead develop
her physical capacities in
the interest of survival.
Yet. even
in strength

if

one posits that there remains
a modest ,or significant)
difference

between male a.d female, one
must

Whatever degree

it

ask

if

this difference (to

exists) should serve as the
basis for determining
appropriate

models of human development.
in a society

still

This question takes on even
greater importance

whose technology has attempted

male and female, as irrelevant

for the

to define

human

strength, of both

performance of most important and
valued

positions.
In a technologically advanced
society
for

human beings

it

to the forces of "nature."

is

impoverished to limit possibilities

Societies are organized for the

very purpose of controlling and molding
"nature"

to

human

designs.

However,

given the extent to which women's "frailties"
are continually discussed, one

would think that physical strength was a key
societies.

it

is

g

to

"success"

However important strength might have been

clearly not a key factor in the technocratic or

described by Galbraith's

New

in highly industrialized

in primitive societies,

programmed

societies

Industrial State. ^ or Alain Touraine's Post-

10

Industrial Society .

A

technological society by definition reflects the mastery of "nature"
towards

Woman's Estate . (New York: Pantheon. 1971), discusses
the role "woman's physical abilities" (or disabilities) play in socialist
thought
Juliet Mitchell in

through an examination of Bebel, Engels. Lenin and Marx.
9

John Kenneth Galbraith. New Industrial State

,

(Boston:

Houghton Mifflin Co.

1967).
"^^Alain Touraine.

1971).

The Post

Industrial Society .

(New York: Random House.
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conscious ends.

The entire discussion

Via Marx, has dealt with labor
as

.

of labor

.

labor, "IVIensch"

"Mensch"
ings,

molds nature

is Within this

is

tar

an indication of .an's growing
awareness

of his confrontation with and
differentiation

creation through technological forces

which has been presented so

from nature."" The idea of

expressed by the notion that through

into the preferred

forms thought necessary.

view not limited by his nature or
the natural surround-

because through social forces he combines

to control his life, in

whatever

measure.

And

yet, for those

who believe

idea of controlling one's

life

even

in the existence of a

in the

narrow terms

"woman's nature,"

the

of one's biology is dropped.

Societal forces, as technology, play no active
role in defining or redefining

biology (as "nature") for related

life

styles of

women.

between "nature" and human "possibility" here.

woman's body, therefore, defines
Finally, the one question

I

have not completely dealt with yet

as related to possible models of

is

if

we concede

necessary or

that they exist,

what

is

"good"

steps

First one has to define

meant by natural and secondly one must then ask.

'^'^Shlomo Avineri,

Realphilosophie, "

to

whether

is

human development. There are two

involved in dealing with this dimension of "natural. "
is that is

no differentiation

all.

should be used as guidelines either to what

it

is

Biology defines possibilities;

"natural" differences between male and female,

and explain what

There

"Labor, Alienation, and Social Classes in Hegel's
Philosophy and Public Affairs 1 (Fall, 1971), p. 10.
,
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or argue that what
Often,

is

natural is good. ^2

when

the "natural" is invoked,

wo are

left in the dark
explanation, a recon^mendation,
a claim
c ai^:; for determinism,
[ f
or simply a desperate appeal,
as
If the
na ural" were some sort of
metaphysical glue that
could hold our claims or values
together.

"

f

When

dealing with the question of

women such concerns

with an elaboration and

justification of "natural" are
dismissed; that which is, is seen
as

that

which

is

naturaUnd

natural, is good.

Biological differences clearly have led
to social and economic
inequality.

The question
this question

is

however, when should difference Icadjojnn,^^

Within

one should distinguish between asking
whether biological differences

must be assessed as biological "inequalities"
as well as asking whether

biological

differences must result in social and economic
inequalities.

As Kate

Millett notes "male

supremacy" does not reside alone

strength or biological make-up, but rather in a value
system which

mous

in

is

physical

semi-autono-

of such considerations.

The heavier musculature

of the male, a secondary sexual
characteristic and common among mammals, is biological
in origin but it is also culturally encouraged through

breeding, diet and exercise. Yet it is hardly an adequate
category on which to base political relations within
civilization.

Male supremacy

like other political

creeds,

docs not finally reside in physical strength but in the
acceptance of a value system which is not biological

.

12_

,.

.

Chnscian Pierce, in "Natural Law Language and Women, " Woman in Sexist
Society op cit. p. 160, elaborates on the concept "natural" for its implica.

,

,

tions for the issue of
Ibid

women.

.

14

Kate Millett, Sexual Politics

,

(New York: Doubleday & Co., 1970),

p. 27.
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inequality is evidently rooted in
social rules; society evaluates
differences as
inequalities via the standards that
are established.

between

men and women

Hence, biological differences

are evaluated societally as
biological inequalities .

Even once such assessments are made

this

by no means automatically justifies

resulting artifical inequalities.

Although the above discussion
I

want

to

demonstrate

American

society.

my

not limited to that of the United
States

is

point through an example

American society

is not

drawn from contemporary

organized around or structured by

the values which prize "the richness
of difference."
difficulty in valuing difference in

consequence
for this is

is,

if

The United States has

terms of the richness

people are different, inequality

because one right way of "being"

is

is

of its uniqueness.

then assumed.

Each

is not

The reason

viewed as the best way to be.

Hence, Blacks, Chicano's, women, children, old
people, are
of this restrictive ideal.

The

regarded as important

unique qualities as well as their universal human capacities.

all

unequal in terms

in relation to their

For instance, what

15^
See, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, "Discourse on the Origin and Foundations
of
Inequality Among Men, "in The First and Second Discourses, ed. Robert
Masters,
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964), Rousseau clearly distinguishes between
societal and natural inequalities in the "Origin of Inequality." He states:
"I
conceive of two sorts of inequality in the human species: one, which I call natural
or physical, because it is established by nature and consists in the differences of
,

ages, health, bodily strengths, and qualities of mind or soul; the other, which
may be called moral or political inequality, because it depends upon a sort of
convention and is established, or at least authorized, by the consent of men. The

some men enjoy to the prejudice of
more honored, more powerful than they, or even to

latter consists in the different privileges that

others, such as to be richer,

make themselves obeyed by them."

(p.

101.)

happens instead
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is that

and therefore good

because certain body structures
are valued as aggressive

(i.e.

the penis) in the

.

must be less valued; hence,
of inequality.

,

If it

Women

were not

then

is

and that

In a society with

difference.

between

when there

to try to attain;

and male.

biological differences

come

to

be assessed

one restrictive model which
is to

all individuals

one restrictive ideal, inequality

become variations on a theme

for the acceptance of this one

men and women would be assessed

is the

outgrowth of

of inequality.

model biological differences

as simply that-differences.

or the necessity for severely divergent

This

is not to

They

men

and obligationso

say that inequalities do not justifiably occur
through and in

may be

In

relevant differences which justify different rights

For instance, a parent's greater competence

in

making certain

decisions justifies his or her authority, in certain respects,
over the child.
point

I

wish

to

make here though

is that inequalities of this

in so far as they are limited to particular areas of

when

inequalities

and

life styles.

society, as opposed to "natural" or biological
differences of sex or race.

other words, there

are

be White. Anglo Saxon Protestant,
young

certainly would not be used as a
justification for the inequality between

women

terms

in

Differences are converted into
inequalities of status,
educational

opportunity, etc.

suppose

man, the woman's body
structures

become cumulative

sort are acceptable

competence.

they begin to define

The

life

However,

styles which are

detrimental to at least one of the individuals involved in the relationship, because
inequalities result which cannot be reasonably justified.

For example, from the difference

that

person "X"

is

bigger or taller than

the average individual one can justifiably account for the inequality of treatment

6
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which provides "X" with more
and are not

justifiable,

food.

Cumulative inequalities arise, however,

when person "X's"

which have no direct bearing upon

it.

size

becomes

the judge of decisions

Person "Y" may be extremely

intelligent

(which differentiates him or her from
other individuals not as gifted) and
therefore
is

able to get an extremely creative and
interesting job, which

is

unequal

treatment because most people would not
describe their job as such.
"Y's" competence justifies her right to the
job (although
others should be forced to do mundane work).

which are unjustifiable
salary

is

in this case;

It is

it

However.

does not justify that

the cumulative inequalities

"Y" not only has an interesting

job, but the

extremely high, and therefore "Y" enjoys a privileged
status,

Cumulative i nequalities result

in that

etc.

"Y's" life-style could be described as

privileged.

On

the

same

plane, man's greater strength (to the extent

it

exists) justifies

carrying loads that need to be carried, or justifies the sharing of the
load.

The

question of differential strength, however, should not be related to
justifying

sources of authority.
Although

I

have stated that particular relations of inequality can be justified

as the valued criteria are brought to bear on the individual instance.

mean

to

I

say that justification automatically flows from the explanation.

do not
Aftcrall,

there are cases when explanation will not invoke a justification because general

reasons and principles may be supplied for differential treatment such as
case of sexism and racism.

between persons
1

is

In

such cases the

undermined and ignored.

common humanity

My

in the

and equality

ultimate commitment here is to

See, Bernard Williams, "The Idea of Equality, " in Joel Feinberg. Moral Concepts , (London: Oxford University Press, 1969). pp. 151-154.
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the point that individuals
are equal in one respeet
whieh overrides any differences
(except possibly mental
derangement) and that is in terms
of their right to

experience the
in

full

range of alternatives society
can provide or they can
develop

community with others.

Relations which ignore or
subvert this

human

quality cannot be justified.

My argument

thus far has three dimensions.

First

I

see the biological

differences between the sexes, as
manifested for example by differences
in
strength, as primarily a result
of socialization, and therefore
less innate than

generally assumed.

Second,

physical ability, even

if

I

have argued that differences in
strength and

they do exist, are not as important
in an advanced

society whose technology has been
dedicated to freeing both sexes from
the limits
of "nature."

woman
it is

And

has a "basic nature" (inclusive of different
anatomies, needs and potentials),

changeable and can be molded by technological
advances and social conditions.
finally, that inequalities

justified.

not.

This includes the position which some hold
that states that although

The

must be rooted

inequalities attributed to

in relevant criteria if they are to be

women

Societal inequalities which ignore the

in relation to

human

men

are most often

capacities of some, can never be

justified.

Woman
Despite

my

note that these

as Sexual in Feminist Thought

arguments about the irrelevance

same

it is

interesting to

factors extensively define portions of the literature which

argue for the liberation of women.
of

of biology

One can see

women, even by feminists themselves,

all too

clearly that conceptions

too often reflect socialization patterns as
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severe pressures of the societies
in which they
I

mean

here.

Movement

reflect the conception of

I

anomie paradigm

to a

ment towards free

it

as sexual rather than

woman

a_s

s_exual being,

arises out of (although

Women's

woman

as a

it

and there are many

does move beyond) the

extent than one would expect.

love and sexual liberation.

it

According

with sex, for the

to

move-

Greer one should

more sex you have

the richer

Integral to this idea is Greer's conception
of "spontaneous association,

is the ideal

form

of social relations for her.

things alive and moving.

"Lovers who are free

always come back; lovers who are free

me

explain further what

for example, speaks of feminism,
in part, as the

abandon marriage and replace

to

me

think that to the extent a
good portion of the contemporary

much greater

Germaine Greer,

which

woman

literature reflects this view of

variations upon this theme,

you are.

Let

Particular statements within the
literature of the

person; a species being.

women's

live.

to

Spontaneous association keeps

to go

when they are restless

change remain interesting. "^^

that although spontaneity is an important part
of the

interact together

it

is

way

It

individuals

only a partial description of preferred socal interaction.

Spontaneity seems to describe relations encountered by sexual beings;

rather than expressing the

full

sense of relations between species beings.

17

See, Germaine Greer, The Female Eunuch .
1970-71).

18„

,

Ibid ., p. 240.

19„

.

,

Ibid., p. 242.

seems

(New York: McGraw

Hill,
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Dana Donsmore. also a writer
With this view of

woman

of the

Women's Movement,

sUxtes the

problem

as sexual.

The articulated assumption
behind

this misunderstandingare purely sexual beings,
bodies and sensuality, iuckmg machines.
Therefore freedom for
women could only mean sexual freedom.

women

is that

Shulamith Firestone, who accepts
the Freudian perspective
in

her Dialectic

the key

o_f

problem

S^,

of

modern

life

as sexuality.

Sex classes for Firestone are

men

in and of itself is not the basis
of the

and

who gives

it

seen as a sexual revolution.

revolution as "freeing

which will result

women and

cliildren

is.^^

From

the

the feminist revolution

She defines the program for the feminist

women from

in their

are different.

birth flows the resulting inequalities.

Because Firestone sees women as sexual beings,
is

women

sex class system but the

domination of one group by another which
arises from
differentiation of

some degree,

tries to construct a dialectic
of sex, because she sees

derived directly from the biological
reality that

The difference

in

the tyranny of their reproductive biology, "22

economic independence and self-determination as

become

totally integrated into society. ^3

Production and

reproduction would be organized to be non-repressive.

20

Dana Densmore, "Independence from

the Third Year:
to Bell

the Sexual Revolution, " in Notes from

Women's Liberation, (Ohio: Bell & Howell, 1972),
and Howell, Drawer "E," Wooster, Ohio, 44691 for copies.

21

p. 58.

Shulamith Firestone, The Dialectic of Sex: The Case for a Feminist
Revolution , (New York: Bantom Books, 1970), p. 8.
^^
23

Ibid

. ,

p. 206.

Ibid

. ,

pp. 238 and 239.
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as soon
that

children woro physicully able
to be Independent
to servo immediato
nee,ls rather than

,>»

was meant

P-"-^hy

'^'-'^'l^^"

ps.ychc,lo,.y,

in the

deficient

women

is

I

same way

.scxu.-U

that

I

Durkheim's biological treatment

also find both Greer and Firestone
lacking.
clearly different than Durkheim's;
they have

woman

is still

first is the

woman

that are considered

view rejected, of

The second, which

object.

a

of

women

Their treatment of

moved from

his analysis

wom.m

as primarily sexual.

restricted by her body; her mind is
ignored.

The options
The

nhe

as an active, aggressive, sexual
being.

this analysis is still limited to
the conception of

Wom.-.n

is the

repression and cultural sublimation. 24

find

of passive biological being to
I'>uL

one

uZ-L

is

woman

chosen

as active sexual aggressor.

What has happened here

is that

by Greer and

l.^irestone

are already loaded.

as girl, and girl as passive sexual

to replace this

view of passive being,

Sox becomes actively creative

we have moved from

the view of

for

woman

is

woman.
as

"passive sexuality" (Durkheim) to the conception of

woman

creative and aggressive, (comparable lo llobbes).

Firestone and Greer start to

move us

out of the

Durkheimian framework but place us

perspective instead.
rcvoiil the extent to

This

may

By affirming the opposite
which

th;it

of the

in

as sexually

a Ilobbcsian

anomie perspective they

model sets the terms within which they think

.

be an historically necessary state in order to discard the constraints

of the puritan ethic.

94
''^Ibid., p. 241.

But

it

does not encompass the

full

sense of what

it

means

159
for

women

to be persons.

should be evident by now that

It

if

one follows this

route one by-passes the concerns
rodected in the alienation perspective.
If

one

is to

deal with the idea of

human develoon^ent and

one has to move to the concerns with
persons; to move
total integration of one's thought

concern with "persons"

is

and activity.

to the

deflected by the everyday language
used.

without differentiation, as if they were
the
of beings. And we don't think of
them that

If

woman, as

women, then

it

it

like

same class
way now.

sounds strange.

sexual, provides an insufficient analysis
for the question of

appears that one has

to

move

to a

framework which encompasses

a model of person which involves purposive activity
and

key element here

concerns of the

Dana Densmore notes how the

The language wasn't constructed around
concepts
person, a word that can include man and
woman

That's why

potentiality

is not that

women

human

The

potentiality.

are sexual animals but that they can be

complete persons only i n terms of the integration of their
thought and action

Anomie and Women

I

Contemporary Social Science Literature

have discussed the deficiencies of the sexual-biological view of women,

as expressed by
to

in

Durkheim as well as

examine the validity of the theory

porary society.

If

the variations on his theme.

of

But now

anomie for the study of women

in

I

want

contem-

one adopts Durkheim's theoretical framework but drops his

biological assumptions about

25

.

women

Dana Densmore, "Speech

4 (March, 1970), p. 14.

,

is the

then

women

Form

will experience

of Thought,"

anomie as

The Female

State ,

160

men
to

do when they confront the
appropriate situations.

This move allows one

ask whether Durkheim's specific
assumptions relating

to the condition of

anomie ea^ encompass the varied
problems of women today.

In other

words,

does Durkheim's view of happiness
as moral solidarity and ordered,
secure,
relationships help one in constructing
possible expalanatlons of the
unrest and

discontent of
for

women

today and does

it

generate as well a model of
development

women?
In

comtemporary terminology "status ineonsistency"

of anomie. 26

Women

then are often said to experience
anomie as a result of

experiencing inconsistent self-identities.

educated but works

at a

inconsistency.

is

She

For example, a woman who

mundane, unskilled job could be said

her advanced education.

is

Conflicts arise in such positions, as

women

They are said

are assessed

to experience

of these inconsistent roles.

Consider, in this
it

to experience status

judged differently in terms of

according to different and contradictory standards.

tive as

is highly

aware of her unprivileged status as woman and
the

drudgery of her work, yet she knows that she

anomie because

one manifestation

is

light,

directly pertains to

Gerhard Lenski's treatment of the anomie perspec-

women

in

contemporary society.

be primarily discussing Lenski's treatment

of

women

Although

I

will

he also conceptualizes

26^
Sec, Irving Goffman, "Status Inconsistency and Preference for
Power Distribution, " American Sociological Review 22 (1957), pp.
Gerhard Lcnski, "Status Crystallization: A Non-Vertical Dimension
Status," American Sociological Review, 19 (1954), pp. 405-413, and
,

Change

in

275-281;
of Social
his

"Social Participation and Status Crystallization," American Sociological Review ,
21 (1956), pp. 458-464, as well as Power and Privilege A Theory of Social
:

Stratification .

(New York: McGraw

Hill,

1966).
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men

within the anomie paradigm,
but somewhat differently.

women

and

are both conceived

atomic terms, as

in

is

paradigmatic of mlch of

the social science literature,
while the difference between

are viewed as

more independent and aggressively

Lenski's basic position
in the status of

women

in

is that

them

is that

self-interested than

men

women.

there has been considerable
improvement

modern times, although

In agrarian societies the
status of

For Lenski, men

woma^

not to the level of full
equality.

reflected the status of her
husband^^

while in industrial society woman's
position has changed rapidly
from this view

mere appendage. Hence,

of

it

is

no longer feasible to view

women

as merely

dependents of some male.^S According
to Lenski, opportunities
are now open
outside of the roles of wife,
daughter and dependent kinswoman.

"Virtually all

occupations are now open to them and they
enjoy complete equality with respect
to the rights of property.

Lenski

"29

concerned to find out why

is

His answer involves

woman

in

1)

^^^^

assessment

of

women

have "failed

to

family responsibility,

such as "pregnancy, menopause, and menstruation
(which)
in the intense competition for the

woman

in society

achieve"

2)

full equality.

biological factors

still

more rewarding jobs"^^ and

prove handicaps
3)

the concern

with security.

Because women know there is a much less risky and much
more promising route to rewards, most stop striving for
27
^^

Ibid

. ,

Lenski,

Ibid ., p. 403.

^^Ibid.

30
Ibid ., p. 405.

Power and

Privilege, p. 111.
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m

instead
L~iirtl';
the marriage

--pete

market and the world of the
^1
family.

Lenski discusses marriage as
a style of
not employ

my

life

chosen by women; but clearly
he does

criteria of reflective choice
here.

Despite the fact that modern
feminists are often critical of
this choice, they cannot
ridicule it. It offers almost
as
many opportunities for attaining rewards
as competition in
the man's world, and the
probabilities of success are far
far greater. "^'^

Lenski does not think that the inequalities
between

decrease because
it

renders

that

in

women

women

will continue to "choose"

an uncertain male world.

As

men and women

marriage for the security

for the element of choice,

are free in their choice of a husband
(though this

is not

is largely influenced

women. As

by a society which has

for Lenski's prior assumption that

for security, one could as easily posit

Although Lenski says that
for

women,

it is

remain unequal.
33
it.

However,

full

little

women

woman's desire

may

it

be

always true

because of race and class barriers).' However,
the choice of whether
or not

will

to

marry

place for unmarried

are driven by the desire
for creativity.

equality in agrarian societies is not realized

not as a result of biological or intellectual incapacity
that they
Social conditions

in discussing

make

it

extremely

difficult for

reasons for the unequal status of

them

women

to attain

in

industrial society one of the reasons given is biology, particularly,
menopause.

Ibid

.

Ibid

.

32

Ibid.
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pregnancy, and menstruation.

argument

to

The argument

is

backwards.

One expects

his

be the other way around;
that in agrarian societies
biological

differences might cause inequalities
whereas in industrialized societies
such
differences can be tectaologically
controlled.

discussed, so

us rather look at Lenski's
position that

let

for security which will keep
her
to

Lenski

seek

full

women

But this has already been

will prefer

from gaining

m

is

woman's desire

equality with

marriage with the security

equality in the economic and political
world.

economic security and provides no more

it

it

men. According

provides rather than

Marriage creates an

stultifying a lite style than

many males

are forced to lead.
It is

significant that the most serious charge
militant feminists
now make is that the role-of housewife is
intellectually stultifyinobut most women seem to realize that this
same charge

could

with equal validity, be directed against
most male occupations.

However, the idea
as divorce rates rise.

of security in

marriage becomes increasingly fallacious

Besides, Lenski has a very particular marriage in
mind.

and nevertheless draws broad generalizations from

it.

By an advantageous marriage, a woman may

obtain half
interest in a very substantial income, entree to exclusive
circles, and leisure to do most of the things she wishes. '^^
(1)

An advantageous marriage

to

Lenski

is clearly

one with substantial economic

security, and this limits his discussion to begin with.

woman

He speaks

of the

gaining half-interest in a substantial income but one wonders what "interest"

means here. Most
34

(2)

often the

woman becomes

an economic dependent.

Ibid., p. 426.

35
Ibid

. ,

p. 405.

[The emphasis

is

my

own.]

(3)

Lenski
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also speaks of entrance
into exclusive circles
but
the

woman

again

is

appendage.

privileged marriage.

(4)

is clearly the

.an^s entrance,

Exclusive circles again
connotes that this

The idea of leisure of which
he speaks

most working class families
and even
(5)

it

to a large portion
of

is a

is

myth

a

to

middle class women.

I^nski mentions leisure in
relation to having time to
do what one wishes.

But Without some sense of
one's development, what
does one wish for?
Hence, for Lenski marriage
matches the attractions of a
career.

He works

Within the anomie paradigm
as he chooses security as
his cherished value as

opposed

to

human development. I^nski

because he sees woman as satisfied

is content

in the

with present arrangements

"secure" roles organized for them

through marriage.

The explanation for this apparent
paradox lies in the family
system which, as noted previously,
makes it possible for
most women to attain their goals, through
marriage as
easily as^most men can attain
theirs through work and political

activity.

It is

had lost

on this basis that Lenski predicted in
1966 that the feminist movement

its

vigor.

This probably explains why the feminist movement
has
lost most of its vigor; for the vast majority
of women,
the battle of equality has been won.
In 1972, one can say that Lenski's theory did
not predict appropriately the future

developments of women's priorities.

marriage as

36^,

.

.

is

presently conceived is under serious scrutiny.

,

Ibid

37„

it

,

. ,

Ibid.

The feminist movement has escalated and

p. 426.

Marriages
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have always supplied differential
a^ouiits and kinds of security;
soine carriages
provide none. But the rejection
of the present sexist
system cannot be understood within the confines of the
anomie paradigm

Before laying
it

to rest the

as Germaine Greer handles

much acclaimed
it.

implies the status quo.

can happen

virtue of security, let us
examine

Greer, in the FejuUe E^uch,
dismisses the

importance of the value of security.
it

itself.

Security largely

"Security is when everything is
settled, when nothing

to you; security is the denial
of life. "^S

security does mean.

means boredom, because

oftentimes this

But security as boredom at the same
time

is

what

is clearly

an

upper-class conception of the idea.

Although theoretically security appears as
a socially approved and valued
"need" in actuality society

is not

viding secure relationships.

because even

if

married

organized to really satisfy this "need" by pro-

In other words,

(the so-called

women may

terms

of the

ships which are offered to

But the above
security or order.
security are:

way women are

women

is

quite bored,

always the fear

Ideologically, security is

socialized but the social relation-

often do not actualize such relations.

is still insufficient in

terms

of analyzing the "need" of

Possible ways to analyze the prevalence of the "need" of

Society nurtures the need for security in

1)

become

haven of security) there

of divorce (which is a one in three possibility
today).
of top priority in

not

women

to help

maintain the present arrangements of marriage and motherhood and earning

Women

capacities.

38

Op

.

cit .

,

then, desire security to the extent they are social beings.

Greer,

p. 237.

IGG

Although there are pressures
tew.n, the ..secure" nfe
se^o w„n,e„ who have
developed the oapaeities for
eritieal thought choose
diHerently. They
2)

therefore

direct their lives towards
purposes .md goals which often
necessitate risk or
conflict.

:,)

does, but

It

Thirdly, one can question the
very idea of security, as Greer

seems as thought

the dimension of

wouKI be „„,st

.t

boredom, hut rather

in

fruitful to ,1„

so not

in

terms of simply

terms of possibilities for freedom

in

relationship to developing as persons.

The anomie perspective does

woman's problems

to the extent that

therefore reflect societal needs.
ana lysis

are social and historical beings and

woman.

One

of

woman's largest problems

she becomes locked inside a definition of
self which

is that

of external pressures.

Women

woman

is

in the specific

sense.

women have been

upon them

in

terms

In other

of their wants and needs and to

words the condition

problem of normlessness because

of

when

needs

stated throughout,

it

becomes impossible

if

They reflect

been socialized

Hence, some

not married, due to societal pressures which

teach one to expect certain routines from

As

tlie

anomie may

the individual has

for instance, to accept authority relationships as necessary.
feel insecure

sense

The anomie perspec-

socialized into their roles and want them.

the tendencies of the society.

women may

defined in terms

In the general

seen as needing stable and secure relationships.

tive of individuals focuses

reflect the

is

then are seen as needing marriage, aggressive

husbands, and several children,

extent

women

^vinccM^^

roriccts upon soci.-.li/ed

it

partially express certain dimensions
of

life,

while others

may

not.

one's conception of a person is limited to manifested

to

make

distinctions between real and false needs.

One then becomes locked within
Needs as integral

to the

the societal

to

at the time.

whole process of productive-consumption
become

invalid standards for assessment.

compelled

framework created

need what they can

"Women

don't get what they need,
they rare

The needs which are developed
within

get.

society-for order and security and
harmony-are insufficient
With because they are self-perpetuating.

A

to analyze society

society develops those needs
which

Will perpetuate its stability.

The anomie perspective

via the

phenomena

of status inconsistency continues

to

be deficient as an explanation which can
foster an understanding of the
problem

of

women

in

contemporary society.

It

seems

to

be able to express

(in

a limited

way) the problems of only a few particular
cases, such as highly educated middle
class housewives (although not

The example

is often

necessary

to the

and

let

us say, Black professional women.

of the middle class educated housewife can
reflect the

of status inconsistency.

housewife

all)

The expected criteron

is

problem

present in that the middle class

educated far above the tasks which she performs.

occurrence of status inconsistency

is

However,

a level of consciousness

about the conflict between women's capabilities (specifically education) and
her
actual life style.

In other words, for the middle class housewife

socialized into her role, and

appraised (she
exists.

the one

39

may

is

is

well

not realize that her worth is inconsistently

not even be aware of her own worth), no problem of anomie

Two women,
who

who does

who

hence, can occupy the same social roles; however, only

conscious of her condition as

woman

in conflict with

Evelyn Reed, Problems of Women's Liberation

Pathfinder Press, 1971), p. 83.

,

enlarged ed.

her societal

,

(New York:

value, can .e sai. to
suHer fro„ status inconsistency
or ano.ie.

assessments of status inconsistency
are ii.ited

to the

To tMs

extl

dimension ot conscious-

ness.

It is

important to note that even
for the middle class
housewife who

aware of her conflicting roles,
status inconsistency
of the

problem she

faces.

The

approximation of the problem.

is only a partial

is

expression

conflicts which arise are
dealt with only as a first

She

may

between education and motherhood.

feel undervalued.

Conflicts exist

She feels berated, shortchanged,
or used.

But these feelings are only a
partial expression of the problem,
because they
do not encompass a model of
human development.
a problem but provides faulty
possibi^lities for

Status inconsistency describes

its resolution.

As a theory

it

incorporates descriptions of societal
conditions as well as descriptions of
the
individual but

it

does not have a developed model of
person.

There are also biases clearly involved
Wliat of the economic classes of

women who

privileged activities of society, i.e.

no role conflict for these
is

,

in the notion of status inconsistency.

are unable to partake in any of the

higher education.

women because

an expression of cumulative inequality.

their oppression is consistent.

For Durkheim himself states

the poor or "lower classes" are not subject to anomiCo"^^

"woman," may

There simply may be
This
that

A "Black." "poor,"

not suffer from anomie in that her roles are consistently

E mile Durkheim, Suicide, (New York: Free Press, 1951), p. 250
discusses how the "lower" classes are bounded in such a way by those above
them that there is little room for the expansion of desires which lead to anomie.
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oppressive:

but.

of a (leveh)ped

Anomie

T

wm.ui

^^.^1 |n

rn

fli

ii

i,,

i-

;

.

.

p erson.

Will also often not
exist in

-H^lear roles.

women beeause

they do not experienee

Their roles are most often too
narrowly and clearly defined

and, therefore, they do not
experienee the freedom neeessary
to attain the

conselousness and edueatlon before
status inconsisteney can
beeomo a problem.

And even when there
few who ean experience,

problem.
presence

may

is

it.

Why V Beeause

I

a resolution of role eonfliet,
for the privileged

would

still

want

to

the resolution of ano.nie <loes
not reflect upon the

of a life of developed huu.an beings.

resolve-, the

might have

aii

say that alienation remains a

Th. educated professional woman

problem of status inconsistency and may

ordered

scl l-e one option

and

still

still

be alienated.

be far from Gxperiencing species

Afterall, one might have clear life
goals as

stemming from one's

role as mother, and hence not be able
to develop other aspirations.

may

not have experienced the richness of

One

community or creative

biological

One then

activity with

others.

Social Needs and llistorv

At

tlu^

to construct

sa m(> time one rejects Durkheim's view of
;ui

alternative

framework which allows one

social and historical beings.
tive for the analysis of

woman one can
Lo

begin

umU.rstand wom(Mi as

At the same time one constructs such a perspec-

women one

is

able to

draw upon

historical evidence
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Which contradicts prevailing
conceptions
This involves one

much

in

the

of

women.

same way Marx was

involved in trying to

understand the phenomena of
needs within a given society.
rejects the idea of a static

woman's

rather becomes a part of the

activ_e

"nature'- (as reviewed
earlier).

upon

woman

in

women's nature change as

terms

of its

Woma.

process between individual a.d
society.

The "myths" which are an intermixture
intexpretations of

Such an analysis

own needs.

of the social and historical

society changes.

Society reflects

For example, as the needs of
society

have reduced the number of wanted
births women's "natures" become
defined

somewhat

differently.

As overpopulation has become a more
serious problem

women's roles have had
ol largo families.

Society

The family remains
mother

to

be somewhat modified; she cannot
be the breeder
is still

molding the balance according

intact along with the

woman's

to fewer, that is the only change.

In other

to its needs.

role as mother.

One

is

words, woman's partial

separation from having large families is rooted
more closely to the historical

I'or discussions elaborating

upon or using a social and historical perspecsee: Judith Hole and Ellen Lovinc, Rebirth of
Femini sm
(New York: Quadrangle Books, 1971); Frederick Engels, The Ongin
ojthc F^miiW,'
Private Property and tjie State. (New York: International Publishers,
1942);
tive in relation to

women,

,

Evelyn

Problems

of Women's Liberation (New York: Pathfinder Press,
Dec Ann Pappas, "On Being Natural," in Sookic Stambler, Woman's
Liberation Blueprint for the Future, (New York: Ace Books, 1970). For
Ilccd,

,

1971);

:

historical studies of

women

Eleanor Flexnor, Century of Struggle (New York:
Was Brave (Chicago: Quadrangle,
19G9); Aileen S. Kraditor, Jlie Idea^ ()f Uic^
Suffrage Movement 1890-1920,
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1965).
see:

,

Antheneum,

1959); William O'Neill, Everyone

,

,

phenomena

of overpopulation than the
concern with personhood.

To survive we must

stop making babies at the
current
rate and this can only be
accomplished by breaking
the ancient stereotypes of
man the warrior, woman
the breeder.

Obviously, then, even the recognition
that female roles are social
and
historical does not necessarily lead
to a focus of

merely lead

to a redefinition of a

societal needs, without ever

One must, then add

new

coming

to the social

role for

woman

as persons.

women based upon

to grips with the

It

may

changing

concerns of species being.

and historical perspective an ideal of
human

development for women by which one can assess
particular historical develop-

ments.
Then,

to

understand meaningfuily the present relationships
between

and society one has to examine the need structure
of society

model
needs

of

persons which expresses women's potentialities.

'X' in

order

to bring about 'Y' "

relation to purposes and goals.

In

bring about security .

or developed person

,

terms

of

women,

However, once "Y"

"woman needs

terms

of the

The construct"

can reflect such an analysis of needs

represents security the construct would read:
to

in

women

'X' "

specifically,

Woman
is

'A'

in

"Y"

if

needs marriage

in

order

changed to read as species being

would read as:

woman

needs creative

activity involving consciousness of goals and aims, exercise of choice, and/or

other persons in order to experience

42

Gore Vidal,

1971), p. 12.

human community. Once

"In Another Country, "

New York Review

of

the

model of a

Books

,

17 (July 22,
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person

is

brought to bear upon the
question of

wo»en one .ust

no longer stay
Within the confines of
n^anifeste, societal needs,
one .oves to the
potentialities
of species life.

The anomie paradigm does
It

not inoorporate a model
of development for

women.

instead privileges the interests
of the status ^uo and.
hence, perpetuates the

myth of woman's
This view

is

role by reinforcing

woman's manifested needs

,

security).

not only internally deficient
but is brought into further
question by

woman's history

itself.

Woman's own

history challenges the anomie
interpretation of

passive and in need of security.

Many

of the struggles for

challenged the order and security of their
own lives.

submissive

(i.e.

life that the

It

human

women

dignity of

women

was against the imposed

Feminists fovght. Ida Wyler, an English
Feminist writes:

For two years of wild and sometimes dangerous
adventure,
worked and fought alongside vigorous, happy, well
adjusted
women who laughed instead of tittering ... I slept on hard
floors ... we often were tired, hurt and
frightened, but
we were content as we had never been content before. 43
In the United States in

as

New York and

Philadelphia, in 1909-1910,

active in organizing and supporting union strikes for

I

women were

more human working

conditions.

The Shirtwaist Strike involved organization and commitment by working
class

women who

had the least security of any group

were actively involved

in union activity

were

in society.

Women workers who

often beaten by police and harassed

on the job.

43
Betty Freidan, The Feminine Mystique
p. 92.

,

(New York:

Dell, 1964),

The conditions of wo^en
workers
dangerous to hu.an health.

in the early

ISOCs were crude and

often

They demonstrated and
.ade their grievances

Wn.

Working conditions, however,
remained most demanding.
But the grievances remained-low,
unequal wages the lon,r
hours the indignities inflicted
by foreman and em;ioyer
and the unremitting, sporadic,
unsuccessful attempts to
organize against them also
44

^

continued.

Clearly

it

cannot be that these hard working

women

in the

sweat shops of the 1900' s

are best described as gentile
and passive .

Women

also played a large role in the
struggle against slavery especially

in relation to the

underground railroad.

Harriet

Tubman was

then thirty years old. She became
a
conductor" on the Under-round Railroad.
During a period
of ten years she made nineteen
journeys into slave territory
and brought back more than 300
men, women and children
"Moses, " they called her, a magic name among
slaves
plannmg to take the dangerous journey northward.
In

woman's history there has been

strikes organized by

women

The disparate purposes
issue

is,

movement, there have been

as well as women's involvement in Abolitionists.

of the different

movements are

that despite the need structure

accept, there are those

the feminist

not at issue here.

which society manipulates women

who rebel against

it.

The

fact is, is that there

are activities which challenge the societal statement that

The
to

were and

women need order and

security and calm and that challenge reaches to the foundation of the
aaomie

paradigm.

44

Op.

cit.

,

Flexnor, p. 141.

4=»

Ibid

. ,

p. 96.
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Women
If the

to

in the Alienation
Perspective^ ^

preceding discussion

understand the problem of

is in

women

in

any way persuasive then

it

appears that

contemporary society one has

to

move

outside the anomie paradigm
to a framework which
encompasses questions

about

huma. development. The

alienation perspective provides
such a founda-

tion through the conception of
species being which provides both
a critical stance

and a commitment

to the ideal of

human

possibility.

The terms alienation paradigm are used
here

human development through species being

that

This model involves further commitments

to the

to

express the model of

poses a model of human

fruition.

importance of creative labor as

purposive activity, the integration of'thought and
action, and the value of rich
social ties developed through social
community.

The two ways
through:

1)

in

which the alienation perspective can apply

to

women

are

a set of priorities which are posed as important
for the development

46

Although the alienation perspective does pose a model for
human development, Marx's treatment of women in terms of any specific
attention is limited.

As

Juliet Mitchell notes in Women's Estate o£. cit,
"He retained the abstraction
,
,
of Fourier's conception of the position of women as an
index of general social
advance. This in effect makes it merely a symbol— it accords the
problem a
universal importance at the cost of depriving it of its specific substance."
(p. 78.)
He also basically accepts the division of labor along sex lines in that he never

questions the very conception of "woman's work." The problem of women rather
becomes deflected in his analysis of the bourgeois family. This, however, does
not undermine the value of the alienation perspective which poses human alienation
against the counter example of species being which expresses human possibility
for

men and women

Species being becomes the contrast model to sexist
society; which reflects rigid prescriptions about human possibility along sex
lines.

together.

.

of species beings
(as posing a model of
2)

woman's own involvement

major concern here and
of

I

human development

in the alienated life.

will deal with

person constructed earlier.

it

in

The

terms

for

first

women), and

dimension

of the outlines of the

The second dimension

is

is

of

model

important in that

contemporary treatment of alienated
women reflects conceptual

shifts

away from

the classical, Marxian concerns
with society to a psychologized,
personalized use
it.

To a large

extent, the individualized
contemporary usage of alienation

drops the important model of human
development
the

life) in

same way contemporary

sistency) do.

This problem resides

(as directly related to species

interpretations of anomie (as status inconin the fact that

contemporary social science

literature dealing with alienation is primarily
limited to an implicit need theory,

or need theory with only implicit models of human
development expressed.

For example, writing specifically about women, alienation

is

seen as

referring "to the disintegration of our very selves and
personalities which occur

when we are powerless.

"^"^

The author sees

the

female sexuality as a special case of alienation.
of self

which ultimately leads

47

is

Ibid

widespread alienation of

a kind of rampant mental illness at the base

we must recognize

Linda Phelps, "Death in the Spectacle:
Liberation 16 (May, 1971), p. 24.
,

of

"If alienation is the destruction

to schizophrenia^ the

females from their own sexuality
of our experience which

problem of the destruction

for what

it is.

"'^^

Extreme

alienation

Female Sexual Alienation, "

in
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is then

considered schizophrenia.

dealt With here is that

it

is

The problem of women's
alienation as

is

conceived of as an individual
case of mental health,

instead of as a social and historical
phenomena.

To

limit the discussion of alienation
to the dimensions of
schizophrenia

appears most problematic.
social system in which
typical worker) but
tion or hostility.

it

Alienation

is

not seen as a condition flowing
from a

many are implicated

(e.g.

,

the typical housewife, the

has been individuated into a
personal experience of frustra-

Secondly,

it

refers only to the persons'

felt

grievances, and

anxieties and excludes references to
limitations placed on one's possibilities
for

development, which she might not, and obviously
does not in this case recognize.

To

define alienation in terms of schizophrenia
is to lose the entire set of relation-

ships between the individual, society, labor
and species being.

One, therefore,

loses the potential for development actualized
through such relationships.
If

one believes that alienation

is

rather best discussed as a series of

relationships established within society, of which the
individual is an active part

then

I

think the statements below (using the construct developed
in chapter two)

express the dimensions of alienation more adequately for women.
locate

woman

within her place of work as well as relate

woman

They clearly

to the

pressures

of her society through her relationship to needs.

For instance, the statements

of

women's

alienation can read as follows:

Alienation exists when the relationships between woman and work,
established in the home or place of work prevents the ability to
,

become a person

.

woman and needs ,
established in society, prevents the ability to know or experience
Alienation exists when the relationship between

species

life .

177
I

would

women.s

at this point like to
fi^rther

discuss alienation as

it

exists

when

potentiality is curtailed
because of the relationship
which prevails

between her labor and herself
Labor, when

it

her place of work.

in

is creative,

according

to

not jnorel, for the satisfaction
of another need.

Marx,
It

is

done tor itself and
be productive in and of

is to

itself for the individual
involved.

In contrast to this view
is the fact that

which

is

"Money
work.

non-creative; work
is

is

Three out of every four women interviewed
gave
j^^,^^^^^

does not reflect changes

in the

changes about views of women
fulfilling life.

circumstance.

It

^^^^

work
in

women

to

this as the

situation itself nor does

go out to

main reason

it

reflect related

terms of work being a necessary part of
a

rather seems to be more a product of social
and historical

When

the

man, as the main provider

woman

in

most families, can no

in the

of supplementary (often temporary) work.

find jobs in factories or as secretaries.

development of the individual; nor

'

work

^^^^ ^^^^^

longer provide adequately for his family, the

some kind

in

not conceived of as a
self-creative process.

undoubtedly the largest incentive
for married

for having a paid job.

49

most women are involved

is it

Viola Klein, Britain's Married

This work

house must

find

Most of these women

is

not geared to the

seen as necessary to be so organized.

Women Workers

,

(London: Routledge & Kegan

Paul, 1965), p. 36.
50

Woman's labor is often treated as a stop-gap measure during difficult
As Greer notes in the Female Eunuch oj). _cit. "P'omale
employment in Britain and the United States displays the same basic character,
financial periods.

,

that of an inert, unvalued, though essential force, considered as temporary
labor, docile, ignorant and unreliable. " (pp. 112-113.)

,

17H

tive

won. The

that

many women do

roUowin,

not have, but desire
creative work.

thinU that people

and need productive worU.
and when we're not allowed
any, we m.U.e up

like

games

to

make what we have

The above discussion
that

a quote fro. a secretary
which supports the view

,s

men are

is

seem productive. "51

not to imply by

my emphasis

able always to experience
creative work.

lines extends <.oss sex lines.

often

to do

iLa concern

is

shown

'^^

But the point

at all in

terms of

1

of

concern with

Alienation on assembly

do wish to

make

is that

women.

This

may

a man, without "work,"

where

it

most

most

the necessity of a rewarding

situation lor the development
of individuals, this concern
is extended to

not to

women

work

men and

best be expressed throu.^h the olten
noted statenu.U, that

is

aimless.' A Job

often is not for

women.

is

seen as necessary

Aithoui^^li ihc

lor the

nnn.

concerns with creative labor

as expressed through the alienation
perspective are seldomly applied to both men

and

women

in

terms of everyday language as well as

demonstrated through Lenski) when they

social science literature (as

applied, they are applied to men.

ar(,

51

Judith Ann,

Sisterhood

is

"The Secretarial Proletariat," in Hobin Morgan,
(New York: Random House, 1970), p. 9:5.'

Powerful

ed.

,

52

There

is a varicul literature

which deals with the qiK^stion ol' alienation in
Chinoy, Autcmiobile Workers and the American Dream.
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1955); Georges Fricdmajin, Industj-ial Society
(New Yoi-k:
I'Vee Press, 1955); John aoldethori)o, ct al.
The AITIuent Worker 1, ^_3,
(London: Cambridge University Press, 19()H-9); liichard Hamilton, AI Thi(mco and

work-life.

See,

I'lly

.

,

the j;Yen(di_\^^

(New Jersey: i'rinceton University
Press, 19G7); David Lockwood, The Black(!o ated Worker (Txjndon: Unwin University
Books, 195H); Charles Walker and Rol)ert Guest, ^Fhc Man on the Assembly lino
(Cambridge: Harvard University l^ress, 1952).
,

,

And Whether or
applied to
until

not the eoneerns involved
in alienation are
theoretically

women, wo^en do experience

women

conditions of alienation.

are conceptualized as
persons, in terms of the
necessity of labor

and objectification. they will
„ot be viewed as alienated
in the

home as

terms of

its

well as outside of

to

If

it.

her work

is not

in the

work

situation,

assessed partly in

connection to her development
one cannot view either the
lack of

creative labor in a woman's

mental

However,

her human growth.

critical stance

which

arrangements are

to

is

or a poorly organized work
situation as detri-

life

Such a view of woman stunts the
growth of a

necessary

if

present conceptual molds as well
as work

be changed.

Theoretical views of

women

engaged in serious work she

is

reflect her incorrectly.

viewed as a non-worker.

and incorrect analysis to assess

women

as non-workers.

Although she often
It is

is

an insufficient

Women

do work.

The

assumptions which underly the theoretical treatment
of women as non-workers
are factually incorrect.

and almost

all,

Over

half the female population

but the very rich,

work within

language denies these obvious facts as

women work, women
Hence,

it is

unacceptable to conceptualize

Secondly, even

if this

own homes. Everyday

women

First, because

were not the case,

becoming a purposive being, and
53

home

conceives of workers as men; although

examine and assess the relationship one must

tion.

the

are not viewed as workers .

a relationship to work situations.
to

it

their

works outside

if

women

See, Charlotte Perkins Oilman,
Torchbook, 1966).

as though they do not have

women are workers

initially

if

work

is

order

acknowledge the connecan integral part of

are to be persons, then

Women

in

and Economics

,

women

should

(New York: Harper
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be understood

in

terms of their potential as creative
purposive beings.

work relationships are

alienating and should be assessed
as sueh.

conclusions cannot be drawn until

is

seen as

(a)

But such

potential person and

actual worker.

(b)

If

persons develop through creative labor
as the concretization

ideas and purposes, then
as

woman

Present

it is

in their

it

extended to women.

must be incorporated
Only then can

work as well as estranged from

Starting from the premise that

in the conception of

women be

most women's involvement

human development because
promotes species

One
it is

of the

it

in

person

understood as alienated

their species being.

women

do work, one finds that almost

have engaged at one time or another in the labor
termed housework.
that

of their

such work

is

all

One sees

contrary to the purposes of

is alienating labor,

and only unalienated labor

life.

problems with the work

not conceived of as work.

that

women perform

in the

This parallels the treatment of

home

women

is that

as non-

workers.
In sheer quantity, household labor, including child care,
constitutes a huge amount of socially necessary produc-

Nevertheless, in a society based on commodity
production, it is not usually considered "real work" since
it is outside of trade and the market place.
tion.

In a society

outside the

where money determines

value,

money economy. Their work

"women are a group who work

is not

worth money, and

it is

therefore

54

Margaret Benston, "The Political Economy of Women's Liberation,"
New England Free Press, 1969), p. 15.

(Boston:

"
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valueless,

it

therefore not even real work. "55

is

market value and therefore

is

Women's housework has no

judged as having only slight importance
in terms of

valued work.

According
labor.

Marx, one affirms oneself through

to

However, woman's work within the home

the active creation through

is not related to active creation,

she produces nothing.

Thus woman's work within the home gives her no
autonomy;
it is

not directly useful to society,

the future,

it does not open out on
takes on meaning and
is linked with extent beings who reach out

produces nothing.

it

dignity only as

it

It

beyond themselves, transcend themselves, toward society
in production and action.

Housework can best be described as monotonous and boring;

makes

nothing, simply perpetuates the present. "^^

You

all \u\ow that

still

remain

.

.

she

Lenin wrote of housework:

even when women have full rights, they
factually downtrodden because all housework
is left to them. In most cases housework is the most

unproductive, the most arduous work a woman can do.
is exceptionally petty and docs not include anything that

would

in any

way promote

the development of the

Besides the repetition and routine that women face
that

woman performs

isolation

down

56

from others.

in

her home (or

in another's

"The development

of the

in

home)

woman.

housework, the work

is often

done

modern family meant

of a large integrated society into small self-centered units,

Ibid

. ,

Op.

cit.

It

in

the break-

59

p. 16.

,

Simone de Beauvoir,

p. 430.

^'^

Ibid ., p. 425.
58

Juliet Mitchell,

Free Press, 1966),

"Women, The Longest Revolution,"

p. 7.

59

Op.

cit.

,

Firestone, p. 86.

(Boston;

New England
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Historically the extended
family was the family
unit.
isolated and alone in the

work they performed.

Wo.en

then were not so

But today

wo„an wor.s mainly
by herself and although part
of her work ™ost
regularly involves caring
for
children, young children
do not provide the kind
of reciprocating relationship

Which promote complete
friendships.

women can be

family,

Within the present organization
of the

simultaneously surrounded by
her young children and

still

feel isolated.

Oftentimes

woman

is

it is

said that housework could
not be oppressive because
the

"her own boss." However, the
more fundamental point which must

be reckoned with

is that

one kind of labor that does not
need a director, or boss,

is isolated labor.

Her work

private and because
other reason, it is unsupervised
the housewife is her isolation.

Labor

in

is

order that

it

can lead

The isolation of women cuts her

off

it

is private

...

to species

the

and for no

freedom

of

consciousness must be social.

from others and therefore from

herself.

Alienation ensues, as these conditions combine
with the fact that housework

an objectless activity.

Nothing

is

created.

is

Things are only done to be redone

again.

Unalienated labor

woman's
as

it

labor performed in concert with others.

Being that

potentials cannot develop in isolation from social community, housework

presently

is

Op

Mitchell,

,

is

cit .

,

organized

is

detrimental to the growth of

Woman's Estate

,

p. 161.

women

as persons.
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women workers
as well, outside the

work

is alienating.

Sometimes

are not

li„.ited to the

sphere of housework.

home as secretaries as well as
Factory work

the alienation of

most

is

women

factory workers.

work,

Such

often described as alienating
labor.

greater than men's because

is

Women

assigned the most menial and
routinlzed Jobs.

Woman

is

women are

viewed either as not

capable of more, and/or not "needing"
more.

Most ot the jobs

in the plant

were

like

mine, a scries of

the
same ten or so motions all day. All the
men I knew who
were factory workers admitted that the
women had the worst

jODS

•

•

•

Women

have the most debilitating jobs and are
paid less because their jobs

demand

less skill.

to

women,

in the

monotonous work
about

Monotonous work

eyes of men.

not seen as detrimental or bothersome

Her social training seems

in their eyes.

women who work

is

Juliet Mitchell quotes a

to

fit

her for her

male worker's

feelings

in his factory.

Now

a woman, she's good, the job doesn't matter to
her,
she's not interested, her hands work, she chats to her
neighbor but she doesn't look from side to side as a man
does. ^2

To

the extent that

women's labor

satisfaction of a particular need,

is (1)

"forced," that

non-creative in that

(2)

ing (instead of designing or building a house, she cleans

routinous and boring and

(3)

is

it is

it)

performed

for the

not object creat-

and, therefore,

isolating, organized largely according to separate

61

Jean Tepperman, "Two Jobs: Women Who Work in Factories"
Morgan, ed. Sisterhood is Powerful op^cit. p. 117.
,

62

Op.

cit .

,

,

Mitchell,

Woman's Estate

,

,

p. 128.

in

Robin
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women

fan^ily units,

women

labor but are not involved
in creative or productive
work.

If

are viewed conceptually as
persons their work should come
to encompass

"purposive rational action. "^^
Thus,

it

is within the

framework

of alienation as rooted in
the relations

between woman, and labor, society
and species being

becomes clear. The discussion

that the

relating to alienation and

to "feeling" or "consciousness"
or "vague urging."

problem

women

is

persons

does not relate

Rather alienation exists as a

condition which can be recognized in
terms of the absence of species

can be a condition of alienation because
there

of

lite.

There

an objective condition of non-

alienation.

Women
So far

I

as Persons in Durkheim and

Marx

have dealt with the question of alienation and

to the issue of labor.

At this point

I

want

to turn to the

women

as

more general

it

connects

issue of the

fundamental importance of the model of persons one adopts.
In

(a)

order for

women

to

be involved in a

labor as creative productive activity,

life of

(b)

persons they have to experience

critical thinking

which presupposes

a rich set of ties to others and an awareness of one's interests, goals, and

purposes, and

(c)

social living or a consciousness of others involving group

experiences.
All of these dimensions are dealt with

(to

differing degrees) within the

theory of alienation, whereas the anomie paradigm excludes some and adjusts

63

See, Jurgen Habermas,

Press, 1970) for a discussion

Toward A Rational Society

,

(Boston:

Beacon

of labor as "purposive, rational action."

s
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others to

more narrowly

defined limits,

(a)

Durkheim excludes women from

the View that labor is an
important, creative, process
because he sees

as limited by '^nature.''

He does not view her

and redefining nature through labor.

in the active

women

process of refining

For that matter, Durkheim does
not

discuss labor as an important objectifying
process for

men

either.

The

division of labor is seen as important
primarily in terms of creating solidary
relations through specialization and
dependence for the maintenance of organic
solidarity.

And labor

not assessed as creative in and of itself.

is

Hence, the

division of labor which prevails is valued as
moral for the solidary relations

nurtures, while for
(b)

labor is valued for itself as a self-defining
activity.

The importance of

sitating choice in

way.

Marx

terms

it

critical thinking as

of goals

and purposes

it

involves consciousness neces-

is treated in

Marx

only in a limited

Although his own work assumed critical thought as a starting point
he

never deals with

its

development on an individual

level.

Nevertheless the idea

of critical thinldng (as critical consciousness) is necessary to his idea
of

revolutionary consciousness, and his concern with social change.
thought operates
their

more

Durkheim'

out of a distrust of individual's capacities to project

own goals and purposes and desires.

He

is

preoccupied with circumscrib-

ing the possibilities of limitless and endless desires as opposed to creating the

conditions for critical thought so that individual's real interests, purposes and

goals can be defined, and individual choice be realized.

Therefore, in terms of this aspect of the model of a person Durldieim
is quite

inadequate and

Marx

limits his treatment in that he never deals squarely

with the issue of individual's goals or purposes as they might relate to human choice.
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Despite the neglect of this dimension
in

Marx and Durkheim,

of choice is of key importance
for a life of persons for

choice

most often involved

is

or meaningful or not.
automatically

is

When

when one

is

in the

women

life

of

choice is eliminated for women, and

it

defined by one's biology, what one does
loses

The point

activity.

is that the

kind

are said to have do not primarily involve
voluntary, planned,

goal-directed behavior.

term, their

The process

assessment of an activity as worth-while

import in terms of the standard of creative
of needs

women.

the criterion

Women

do not choose, in any meaningful sense of the

purposes and goals, i.e.

Purposes and goals are rather assigned

childbirth and feeding and child care.

,

to

women.

involvement with choosing one's purposes, which

The consciousness and

is a

necessary element

the

in the

lives of persons, is lacking.

(c)

The importance

interwoven with
find

(a)

creative labor and

(b)

creative thinking.

However, women

themselves severed from human relationships as they are isolated

homes and as

women

To be a part

of a community, and to feel a part of one,

have to become involved with other people

contemporary family structure

is

most

Mary Ellman, Thinking

in

common

projects.

means
The

often not conducive to this sense of

community, especially for the woman.

64

in their

the perimeters of their life activity are defined within their

individual families.

that

of social experience and social consciousness is deeply

Her relationships

Women (New

to others within the

York: Harcourt, Brace,
Jovanovich, Inc. , 1968), for her statement on childbirth as non-creative activity
in that it is often involuntary. "At the same time, this idealization of childbirth
obscures the distinction between involuntary and voluntary achievement which we
depend upon in describing any achievement as creative." (p. 63.)
See,

about

,

family are not those of mutuality
and equality of burdens and
rights.
the

woman

is

Usually

economically dependent on her
husband and her children are

dependent on her for her "motherly"
functions.

These relationships

of

dependence, although the fiber of the moral
community for DurlAeim, hinders
the full development of

Marx's view

women

in

terms

of the priorities of a life of

of species life requires a
consciousness and an activity

which necessitates social involvement and social
responsibility.
unique about persons

is that

they can in

some

What

style does express a tension in

think can be dealt with

life.

And

to others?

that is:

How

How does

most

Marx's thought.

effectively in

It is

terms

does one integrate a

is

ideal sense operate with a con-

sciousness of concepts like social justice and social
responsibility.

I

personhood.

Such a

life

a tension, however, which

of the actual practice of one's

life of

freedom with commitments

one live freely with responsibility?

Species relations exist to the extent that the persons involved are needed by

one another for each other

's fruition.

and not as merely sexual partners.
of

whole beings sharing together.

(social) is thereby differentiated

They need one another as whole persons,

This needing of others

The conception

of

woman

is in

as species being

from Durkheim's conception

(through dependence), which results from partial selves.

Marx's tradition

of morality

Partial selves do not

lead to a consciousness about their relationship to themselves, to others, or the
society.

What

is at

issue here is the kind of

human

relationship wliich allows

one to be conscious of her relationship to others as well as to her aims and

purposes.
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The anomie and alienation
perspectives present varied
conceptions
individual and therefore
different views of

Durkheim-s discussions
In present society

of

whatis

when there

to

human

Marx's ideas about

is dissatisfaction

through the Women's Liberation
Movement

view the alienation paradigm as
more
to conditions

The

it

One moves from

whaM^^oss^

with woman's position
voiced

seems more than reasonable

to

likely to handle the
questions connected

and desires for social change.

possibilities of creating community,
the abilities to handle
conflict

and cooperation, the seeking of
new situations,

paradigm.

society.

of the

The anomie view poses the idea

all

arise out of the alienation

of passivity, the concern with
stable

expectations and the internalization of
roles and customs.

between the applicability of these perspectives
the day, these are

some

of the

When one chooses

in handling the important issues
of

concerns to be reckoned with.

I

clearly believe

that the alienation thesis helps us to
understand the issues with a greater scope,

poses a higher model of development, one which

my

friends, and

makes possible

I

would choose for myself and

the development of a person

who

is

better

equipped to deal with the changeability and conflict of modern
society.

Conclusions;

My primary
when women are

Theoretical Perspectives, of

Women

task has been to show that Durkheim's view of persons, even

not treated as intrinsically inferior, is insufficient as a model

of development for

women

concerns expressed

in

contemporary society and

in species

being in

Marx

that one

must move

for an appropriate model.

I

to the

have

argued throughout that the alienation paradigm provides the more valid ideal
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of

human development and

more

the

insightfcl conception of

how

to foster

tto

development.

However, we have also seen
deficient treatment of

women

as

it

that the

anomie perspective persists

in its

continues to structure the theoretical

foundations of everyday language, as well
as the social science literature.

The

alienation perspective is seldom applied in
contemporary social science
literature and

when

it is,

it is

used in formulations about men.

Women

are most

often not seen as reflecting alienation (as viewed
through the discussion of

workers) because they are not viewed

Even within
tions of what

may

it

the

means

anomie perspective
to be a

to

be secure for

person, for

men and women

will be defined as a good

is

terms

of their developmental capacities.

itself there

are competing interpreta-

men and women. Both men and women

be conceived in terms of the necessity of security but the content of what

means

it

in

women

is

notably different.

marriage or a husband with a stable

Security for a
job.

it

woman

For the man

defined as a good job (although this usually means good pay instead of crea-

Such conceptions are inadequate for both men and women, however,

tive work).

security as

The

it

is

defined for the

woman

turns her into a dependent being.

differentiation in conceptual molds, witnessed through everyday

language, between

men and women sometimes

anomie/alienation distinction and

is,

cannot be expressed through the

therefore, best expressed through the

opposition of the Durkheimian and Hobbesian framework.

expresses
65

man

This language

as aggressive, self-interested and competitive,

as opposed

This same description applying to most individuals appears in Marx, although
he attributes it to the atomistic market economy rather than to an Hobbesian
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to the

Most

tive.

this

nor

everyday language used

to

describe

women

as docile, passive a.d
subjec-

often the differentiation
of the qualities of

.an

woman

and

dimension by-passes the
concerns of the alienation model.

woman

woman

is

is

discussed

passive, and

in

within

Neither

man

terms of their creativeness
or species powers;

man

is

aggressive.

Some women

Liberationists

them-

selves then adopt the Hobbesian
framework as their replacement for
deficient
theoretical conceptions already
applied to

women. Again

the concerns raised by

the concept species being are
excluded.
In conclusion,

I

have treated the issue of

women

as a problem of philosophy

as well as society, a problem of
theory, as well as practice.

framework applied
one's

life style;

to

women

is

important because

parallel organization.

And

life.

That

the conception of

is

why

it

man

Rousseau's conception of

Marx's conception of the nature

being.

defines and/or limits

theoretical frameworks define possibilities.

Plato's view of the tripartite nature of

will.

it

The conceptual

woman

of

resulted in a society with a

man made

possible the general

"Mensch" involved the

ideal of species

also structures the possibilities for her

has been the position of this paper that

women

should be

viewed within a framework which allows for the development of their most

human

capacities.

This means that

women

cannot be sufficiently comprehended

through the anomie paradigm, which functions within the limitations of need analysis,

and conceives of

woman

as a sexual-biological being.

Rather,

women

can more

conception of human nature. See, C. B. MacPherson, The Political Theory
of Possessive Individualism , Hobbes to Locke . (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1962).

191

fruitMly be understood,
theoretically, as persons
within the alienation
paradigm.
She then is viewed in terins
of her potential
developn^ent. The ideal of a
person
beconies a theoretical reality
and a contrast n.odel is
therefore available to

pinpoint areas of needed social
change.
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